1. The Main Difference between the Philosophies

When people search for something, the likely outcome is that either they find it or, not finding it, they accept that it cannot be found, or they continue to search. So also in the case of what is sought in philosophy, I think, some people have claimed to have found the truth, others have asserted that it cannot be apprehended, and others are still searching. Those who think that they have found it are the Dogmatists, properly so called—for example, the followers of Aristotle and Epicurus, the Stoics, and certain others. The followers of Cleitomachus and Carneades, as well as other Academics, have asserted that it cannot be apprehended. The Skeptics continue to search. Hence it is with reason that the main types of philosophy are thought to be three in number: the Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Skeptic. Concerning the first two it will best become others to speak; but concerning the Skeptic Way we shall now give an outline account, stating in advance that as regards none of the things that we are about to say do we firmly maintain that matters are absolutely as stated, but in each instance we are simply reporting, like a chronicler, what now appears to us to be the case.

2. The Accounts of Skepticism

One account of the Skeptic philosophy is called "general"; the other, "specific". In the general account we set forth the characteristic traits of Skepticism, stating its basic idea, its origins, arguments, criterion and goal, as well as the modes of \emph{epoché} [suspension of judgment], and how we take the Skeptic statements, and...
the distinction between Skepticism and the competing philosophies. In the specific account we state objections to each part of so-called “philosophy”. Let us, then, first take up the general account, beginning the exposition with the various terms for the Skeptic Way.

3. The Nomenclature of the Skeptic Way

The Skeptic Way is called Zetetic ["questioning"] from its activity in questioning and inquiring, Ephectic ["suspensive"] from the pathos that arises concerning the subject of inquiry, Aporetic [inclined to aporiai”] either, as some say, from its being puzzled and questioning about everything or from its being at a loss as to whether to assent or dissent, and Pyrrhonean because it appears to us that Pyrrho applied himself to Skepticism more vigorously and conspicuously than his predecessors did.

4. What Skepticism Is

The Skeptic Way is a disposition to oppose phenomena and noumena to one another in any way whatever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence among the things and statements thus opposed, we are brought first to epoché and then to ataraxia. We do not apply the term "disposition" in any subtle sense, but simply as cognate with "to be disposed." At this point we are taking as phenomena the objects of sense perception, thus contrasting them with the noumena. The phrase "in any way whatever" can modify both the word "opposed" statements we simply mean inconsistent ones, not necessarily affirmative and negative. By "equipollence" we mean equality as regards credibility and the lack of it, that is, that no one of the inconsistent statements
takes precedence over any other as being more credible. *Epoché* is a state of the intellect on account of which we neither deny nor affirm anything. *Ataraxia* is an untroubled and tranquil condition of the soul. In our remarks on the goal of Skepticism we shall come back to the question of how *ataraxia* enters the soul along with *epoché*.

5. The Skeptic

The definition of the Pyrrhonean philosopher is implicitly contained in that of the Skeptic Way: he is the person who has the aforementioned disposition.

6. The Origins of Skepticism

We say that the causal origin of the Skeptic Way is the hope of attaining *ataraxia*. Certain talented people, upset by anomaly in "the facts" and at a loss as to which of these "facts" deserve assent, endeavoured to discover what is true in them and what is false, expecting that by settling this they would achieve *ataraxia*. But the main origin of Skepticism is the practice of opposing to each statement an equal statement; it seems to us that doing this brings an end to dogmatizing.

7. Does the Skeptic Dogmatize?

Then we say that the Skeptic does not dogmatize we are not using the term "dogma" as some do, in its more common meaning, "something that one merely agrees to", for the Skeptic does give assent to the *pathé* that are forced upon him by a *phantasia*; for example, when feeling hot (or cold) he would not say "I seem not to be hot (or cold)." But when we assert that he does not dogmatize, we use "dogma" in the sense, which others give it, of assent to one of the non-evident matters investigated by the sciences. For the Pyrrhonist assents to nothing that is non-evident. Not even in putting forward the Skeptic slogans about non-evident things does he dogmatize – slogans like "Nothing *91* more" or "I determine nothing" or any of the others of which we shall speak later. For the dogmatizer propounds as certainty the things about which he is said to be dogmatizing, but
the Skeptic does not put forward these slogans as holding absolutely. He considers that, just as the "All things are false" slogan says that together with the other things it is itself false, as does the slogan "Nothing is true," so also the “Nothing more” slogan says that it itself is no more the case than its opposite, and thus it applies to itself along with the rest. So we say the same of the other Skeptic slogans. So that since the dogmatizer is one who posits the content of his dogmas as being true, while the Skeptic presents his skeptical slogans as implicitly self-applicable, the Skeptic should not be said to dogmatize thereby. But the most important point is that in putting forward these slogans he is saying what seems to him to be the case and is reporting his pathos without belief, not firmly maintaining anything concerning what exists externally.

8. Does the Skeptic Have a System?

We proceed in the same way when asked whether the Skeptic has a system. If one defines a system as an attachment to a number of dogmas that agree with one another and with appearances, and defines a dogma as an assent to something non-evident, we shall say that the Skeptic does not have a system. But if one says that a system is a way of life that, in accordance with appearances, follows a certain rationale, where that rationale shows how it is possible to seem to live rightly ("rightly" being taken, not as referring only to virtue, but in a more ordinary sense) and tends to produce the disposition to suspend judgment, then we say that he does have a system. For we do follow a certain rationale that, in accord with appearances, points us toward a life in conformity with the customs of our country and its laws and institutions, and with our own particular pathé.

9. Does the Skeptic Theorize about Nature?

We reply in the same vein if asked whether the Skeptic needs to theorize about nature. On the one hand, if there is a question of making an assertion with firm confidence about any of the matters dogmatically treated in physical theory, we do not theorize; but, on the other hand, in the course of opposing to every statement an equal statement, and in connection with ataraxia, we do touch upon
physical theory. This, too, is the way we approach the logical and ethical parts of so-called "philosophy."

10. Do the Skeptics Deny Appearances?

Those who claim that the Skeptics deny appearances seem to me not to have heard what we say. For, as we stated above, we do not reject the things that lead us involuntarily to assent in accord with a passively received *phantasia*, and these are appearances. And when we question whether the external object is such as it appears, we grant that it does appear, and we are not raising a question about the appearance but rather about what is said about the appearance; this is different from raising a question about the appearance itself. For example, the honey appears to us to be sweet. This we grant, for we sense the sweetness. But whether it is sweet we question insofar as this has to do with the [philosophical] theory, for that theory is not the appearance, but something said about the appearance. And even when we do present arguments in opposition to the appearances, we do not put these forward with the intention of denying the appearances but by way of pointing out the precipitancy of the Dogmatists; for if the theory is so deceptive as to all but snatch away the appearances from under our very eyes, should we not distrust it in regard to the non-evident, and thus avoid being led by it into precipitate judgments?

11. The Criterion of the Skeptic Way

That we hold to the appearances is obvious from what we say about the criterion of the Skeptic Way. The word "criterion" is used in two ways: first, for the criterion that is assumed in connection with belief about existence or non-existence, and that we shall discuss in our objections; and second, for the criterion of action, by attention to which in the conduct of daily life we do some things and not others; it is of the latter that we are now speaking. Accordingly, we say that the criterion of the Skeptic Way is the appearance – in effect using that term here for the *phantasia* – for since this appearance lies in feeling and involuntary pathos it is not open to question. Thus nobody, I think, disputes about whether the
external object appears this way or that, but rather about whether it is such as it appears to be.

23 Holding to the appearances, then, we live without beliefs but in accord with the ordinary regimen of life, since we cannot be wholly inactive. And this ordinary regimen of life seems to be fourfold: one part has to do with the guidance of nature, another with the compulsion of the pathé, another with the handing down of laws and customs, and a fourth with instruction in arts and crafts. Nature's guidance is that by which we are naturally capable of sensation and thought; compulsion of the pathé is that by which hunger drives us to food and thirst makes us drink; the handing down of customs and laws is that by which we accept that piety in the conduct of life is good and impiety bad; and instruction in arts and crafts is that by which we are not inactive in whichever of these we acquire. And we say all these things without belief.

12. What Is the Goal of Skepticism?

25 After these remarks, our next task is to explain the goal of the Skeptic Way. Now the goal or end is that for the sake of which everything is done or considered, while it, in turn, is not done or considered for the sake of anything else; or, it is the ultimate object of the desires. We always say that as regards belief the Skeptic's goal is ataraxia, and that as regards things that are unavoidable it is having moderate pathé. For when the Skeptic set out to philosophize with the aim of assessing his phantasiai – that is, of determining which are true and which are false so as to achieve ataraxia – he landed in a controversy between positions of equal strength, and, being unable to resolve it, he suspended judgment. But while he was thus suspending judgment there followed by chance the sought-after ataraxia as regards belief. For the person who believes that something is by nature good or bad is constantly upset; when he does not possess the things that seem to be good, he thinks he is being tormented by things that are by nature bad, and he chases after the things he supposes to be good; then, when he gets these, he fails into still more torments because of irrational and immoderate exultation, and, fearing any change, he does absolutely everything in order not to lose the things that seem to him good. But the person
who takes no position as to what is by nature good or bad neither avoids nor pursues intensely. As a result, he achieves ataraxia.

Indeed, what happened to the Skeptic is just like what is told of Apelles the painter. For it is said that once upon a time, when he was painting a horse and wished to depict the horse's froth, he failed so completely that he gave up and threw his sponge at the picture – the sponge on which he used to wipe the paints from his brush and that in striking the picture the sponge produced the desired effect. So, too, the Skeptics were hoping to achieve ataraxia by resolving the anomaly of phenomena and noumena, and, being unable to do this, they suspended judgment. But then, by chance as it were, when they were suspending judgment the ataraxia followed, as a shadow follows the body. we do not suppose, of course, that the Skeptic is wholly untroubled, but we do say that he is troubled only by things unavoidable. For we agree that sometimes he is cold and thirsty and has various feelings like those. But even in such cases, whereas ordinary people are affected by two circumstances – namely by the pathē themselves and not less by its seeming that these conditions are by nature bad – the Skeptic, by eliminating the additional belief that all these things are naturally bad, gets off more moderately here as well. Because of this we say that as regards belief the Skeptic's goal is ataraxia, but in regard to things unavoidable it is having moderate pathē. But some notable Skeptics have added "suspension of judgment during investigations" to these.

13. The General Modes of Epoché

Since we have been saying that ataraxia follows on suspending judgment about everything, the next thing would be to explain how we reach this suspension. Roughly speaking, one may say that it comes about through the opposition of things. We oppose phenomena to phenomena or noumena to noumena, or alternando. For instance, we oppose phenomena to phenomena when we say that the same tower appears round from a distance but square from close up; and noumena to noumena when, in reply to one who infers the existence of divine providence from the order of the heavenly bodies, we oppose the fact that often the good fare ill and the bad fare well, and deduce from this that divine providence does not exist; and noumena to phenomena, as when Anaxagoras
argued, in opposition to snow's being white, that snow is frozen water and water is dark in color, and therefore snow is dark in color. Or, with a different concept of opposition, we sometimes oppose present things to present things, as in the foregoing examples, and sometimes present things to things past or to things future; for example, when somebody brings up an argument that we are not able to refute, we say to him: "Just as before the birth of the person who introduced the system which you follow, the argument supporting that system did not yet appear sound although it really was, so also it is possible that the opposite of the argument you now advance is really sound despite its not yet appearing so to us, and hence we should not yet assent to this argument that now seems so strong." But in order that we may more accurately understand these oppositions, I shall set down the modes or arguments by means of which suspension of judgment is brought about, without, however, maintaining anything about their number or their force. For they may well be unsound, and there may be more than the ones I shall mention.

14. The Ten Modes

The older Skeptics, according to the usual account, have handed down some modes, ten in number, through which it seems that suspension of judgment is brought about, and which they also synonymously call "arguments" or "points." And these modes are as follows: first, there is the one based on the variety of animals; second, the one based on the differences among human beings; third, that based on the differences in constitution of the sense organs; fourth, on the circumstances; fifth, on positions, distances and locations; sixth, on admixtures; seventh, on the quantity and constitution of the external objects; eighth, on relativity; ninth, on the frequency or infrequency of occurrence; and tenth, on ways of life, customs and laws, mythic beliefs and dogmatic opinions. We adopt this order without prejudice.

Superordinate to these are three modes, one based on what does the judging, another based on what is judged, and a third based on both. The first four of the ten modes are subordinate to the mode based on what does the judging, for that is either an animal or a human being or a sense and is in some circumstance; the seventh and tenth modes are referred to the mode based on what is judged; and the
fifth, sixth, eighth, and ninth are referred to the one \(^{39}\) that is based on both. These three in turn are referred to the relativity mode, making it the most generic, with the three as specific and the ten as subordinate. We offer the foregoing comments, as plausible, concerning their number; concerning their content, we say the following.

\(^{40}\) The first argument, as we were saying, is that according to which the same *phantasiai* do not arise from the same things because of the difference of animals. This we conclude from the difference in the ways animals are \(^{41}\) produced and from the variety in the structures of their bodies. As concerns the ways they are produced, some animals are produced without sexual union, and others from intercourse. And, of those produced without sexual union, some come from fire, like the tiny creatures that appear in ovens, some from *95* stagnant water, like mosquitoes, some from wine that is turning, like gnats, some from earth, like [...], some from slime, like frogs, some from mud, like worms, some from donkeys, like dung-beetles, some from greens, like caterpillars, some from fruit, like the gall insects in the wild fig tree, some from rotting \(^{42}\) animals, like bees from bulls and wasps from horses. Of animals produced by intercourse, some, the majority, come from homogeneous parents, and others, like mules, from heterogeneous parents. Again, of animals in general, some are born viviparously, like human beings; others oviparously, like birds; and still \(^{43}\) others just as lumps of flesh, like bears. So one would expect these dissimilarities and differences of origin to result in great contrariety of *pathè*, contributing incompatibility, disharmony, and conflict. \(^{44}\)

However, it is the differences among the most important parts of the body, especially those naturally fitted for judging and sensing, that can produce the greatest conflict of the *phantasiai*. Thus, things that appear white to us are said to be yellow by people with jaundice, and reddish by those with bloodshot eyes. Since, then, some animals have yellow eyes, others bloodshot eyes, others white, and still others some other color, it is likely, I think, that their perception of colors will be different. Further, if we look long and fixedly at the sun and \(^{45}\) then stoop down to a book, the letters seem to us golden and moving around. Since, then, some animals have by nature a luster of the eyes and emit a fine and quick stream of light, so as even to be able to see at night, we should expect that external objects would not affect them and us in the same way. And \(^{46}\) illusionists, by
treating lamp wicks with copper rust and cuttle fish ink, make the bystanders appear now copper-colored and now black, just by a slight sprinkling of the mixture. It is surely all the more reasonable that, since differing humors are mixed in the eyes of animals, these animals will have differing phantasai of the external objects. Also, when we press the eyeball on one side, the forms, shapes and sizes of the things seen appear elongated and narrowed. So it is likely that those animals that have elongated and slanting pupils (e.g., goats, cats, and such) will in their phantasai experience the external objects as different from and unlike what animals with round pupils take them to be. Mirrors, too, because of their differing construction, sometimes show the external objects as very short, when the mirror is concave, and sometimes as long and narrow, when it is convex. And some show the head of the reflected person at the bottom, and the feet at the top. Since, then, some of the organs of sight are bulging with convexity and others are quite concave, while still others are in a flat plane, it is likely that because of this the phantasai, too, are various, and that dogs, fish, lions, human beings, and locusts do not see the same things as equal in size or similar in shape, but in each case what is seen depends on the imprint created by the eye that receives the appearance.

The same argument holds for the other senses as well. For how could one say, with regard to touch, that animals are similarly affected whether their surfaces consist of shell, flesh, needles, feathers, or scales? And, as regards hearing, how could one say that perceptions are alike in animals with a very narrow auditory canal and in those with a very wide one, or in those with hairy ears and those with ears that are hairless? Indeed, even we find our hearing affected one way when our ears are plugged and another way when we use them ordinarily. Smell, too, will differ according to the variety of animals. For if we ourselves are affected in one way when we have a cold with a lot of phlegm, and in another way when the parts about the head are filled with an excess of blood (in the latter case being repelled and feeling virtually assaulted by things that seem to others to smell sweet), then, since some animals are flabby and phlegmatic by nature, others very rich in blood, and still others have a predominant excess of yellow or black bile, it is reasonable to suppose that this makes odiferous things appear differently in each case. So, too, with the objects of taste, since some animals have rough and dry tongues and others very moist. And
when in a fever we ourselves have relatively dry tongues, we consider the food
offered to us to be earthy, bad tasting, and bitter, and we feel thus because of the
differing strength of the humors said to be in us. Since, then, the animals too have
differing organs of taste, with different humors predominating, they would get
differing taste phantasai of the external objects. For, just as the same food, when
digested, becomes in one place a vein, in another an artery, in another a bone, and
in still another a tendon, and so on, showing a differing disposition depending on
the difference of the parts receiving it; and just as water, one and the same in
form, when applied to trees becomes bark in one place, branch in another, and
blossom in another and thus finally fig, pomegranate, and each of the other
fruits; and just as one and the same breath of the musician, when blown into a
flute becomes here a high note and there a low note, and the same stroke of the
hand on the lyre produces here a bass sound and there a treble one; so, too, it is
likely that the external objects are perceived differently depending on the differing
makeups of the animals having the phantasai.

But one can see this more clearly from the preferences and aversions of
animals. Thus, perfume seems very pleasant to human beings but intolerable to
dung beetles and bees, and the application of olive oil is beneficial to human
beings but kills wasps and bees. And to human beings sea water is unpleasant
and even poisonous to drink, while to fish it is most pleasant and potable. And
pigs bathe more happily in the worst stinking mud than in clear and pure water.
And, of animals, some eat grass and others eat bushes, some eat wood and others
seeds or meat or milk, some like their food aged and others fresh, and some like it
raw and others like it prepared by cooking. And in general the things that are
pleasant to some animals are unpleasant, repugnant and even poisonous to
others. Thus, hemlock fattens quails and hyoscyamus fattens pigs, and pigs enjoy
eating salamanders, as the deer enjoy eating poisonous creatures and swallows
enjoy blister-beetles. Ants and mosquitoes, when swallowed by human beings,
produce discomfort and stomach ache, whereas the she-bear, if she feels somehow
weak, is strengthened by licking them up. The adder is stupefied by the mere
touch of a branch of oak, and the bat by a leaf of the plane tree. The elephant fears
the ram, the lion the rooster, sea-monsters the crackling of bursting beans, the
tiger the sound of a drum. And it is possible to give further examples, but-that we
may not seem more prolix than necessary – if the same things are unpleasant to
some but pleasant to others, and if the pleasure and unpleasantness lie in the
phantasiai, then differing animals receive different phantasiai from the external
objects.

*97* But if the same things do appear differently because of the difference of
animals, then we shall be in a position to say how the external object looks to
us, but we shall suspend judgment on how it is in nature. For we shall not be able
to decide between our phantasiai and those of the other animals, since we are part
of the dispute and thus are in need of someone to make the decision, 60 rather than
competent to pass judgment ourselves. Besides, we shall not be able to give
preference, whether with or without proof, to our phantasiai over those of the
non-rational animals. For in addition to the possibility of there being no such thing
as a proof, as we shall point out, any purported proof will either be apparent or not
apparent to us. And if, on the one hand, it is not apparent, then we shall not accept
it with confidence. But if, on the other, it is apparent to us, then since what is
apparent to animals is the very matter in question, and the proof is apparent to us
animals, the proof itself will be in question as 61 to whether, as apparent, it is true.
But it is absurd to try to settle the matter in question by means of the matter in
question, since the same thing will be both credible and not credible, which is
impossible-credible insofar as tending to prove, not credible insofar as needing
proof. Therefore, we shall not have a proof justifying us in preferring our own
phantasiai to those of the so-called "non-rational" animals. If, therefore, the
phantasiai differ because of the difference of animals, and it is impossible to
decide between them, then it is necessary to suspend judgment concerning the
external objects.

But for good measure we go on to match up the so-called "non-rational" 62
animals with human beings as regards phantasiai. For, after our serious
arguments, we do not consider it unseemly to poke a little fun at the Dogmatists,
wrapped, as they are, in the fog of their discussions with themselves. We usually
take the non-rational animals as a group when comparing them with human
beings, but since in groping for an argument the Dogmatists 63 say that the
comparison is unfair, we shall for even more good measure carry our joking still
further and base the argument on just one animal – the dog, if you will – which
seems to be the humblest of all. For we shall find that even in this case the
animals that are the subject of the argument are not inferior to ourselves as regards the credibility of the appearances.

So, then, the Dogmatists acknowledge that this animal differs from us in sensation; for it perceives more by the sense of smell than we do, being able by this sense to track wild animals that it cannot see, and with its eyes it sees them more quickly than we do, and its sense of hearing is more acute. Next let us consider reasoning. One kind of reasoning is internal, the other is expressed. Let us first look at the internal kind. This, according to those Dogmatists who at the moment are our chief opponents – namely, the Stoics – seems to involve the following: acceptance of the familiar and avoidance of the alien, knowledge of the arts related to this, possession of the virtues pertaining to one's proper nature and of those having to do with the pathé. Now then, the dog, the animal upon which as an example we decided to base the argument, chooses what is congenial to him and avoids the harmful, bunting for food and withdrawing before the raised whip. Furthermore, he has the art, namely hunting, to provide the congenial. Nor is without virtue. For certainly if justice is giving to each according to his deserts, the dog, who fawns on and guards his family and benefactors but wards off strangers and malefactors, would not be lacking in justice. And if he has this virtue, then in view of the unity of the virtues he has them all, which the wise tell us is not the case with the majority of mankind. And we see him valiant and smart in his defending, to which Homer bears witness when depicts Odysseus as unknown to all the people of the household but recognized by the dog Argus alone. The dog was not deceived by the physical changes in the man, nor had he lost his "apprehensive phantasia", which he clearly retained better than the human beings did. And according to Chrysippus, who was certainly no friend of non-rational animals, the dog even shares in the celebrated Dialectic. In fact, this author says that the dog uses repeated applications of the fifth undemonstrated argument-schema when, arriving at a juncture of three paths, after sniffing at the two down which the quarry did not go, he rushes off on the third without stopping to sniff. For, says this ancient authority, the dog in effect reasons as follows: the animal either went this way or that way or the other; he did not go this way and he did not go that; therefore, he went the other. Furthermore, the dog is aware of and can deal with his own pathé. For when a thorn has got stuck in him, he hastens to remove it by rubbing his foot on the ground and by using his teeth. And
when he has a wound anywhere he gently licks off the accumulated pus, since dirty wounds are hard to cure, while clean ones are easily healed. Indeed, he follows very well Hippocrates' prescription; since "immobility cures the foot," whenever his foot is injured he holds it up and keeps it undisturbed so far as possible. When he is troubled by humors that do not agree with him, he eats grass, and then regurgitates the uncongenial material along with it and gets well. Since, then, it is apparent that the animal upon which as an example we have rested the argument chooses what is congenial and avoids what is troublesome, and possesses the art of obtaining the congenial, and is aware of and able to deal with his own pathé, and furthermore is not without virtue – in which elements consists the perfection of internal reasoning – the dog would thus far be without deficiency. Which, I suppose, is why certain philosophers [the Cynics] have honored themselves with the name of this animal.

Concerning reasoning as expressed externally it is not necessary at present to inquire, for even some of the Dogmatists have deprecated it as counterproductive to the acquisition of virtue, and for this reason they used to practice silence during their schooling. And anyhow, supposing that a person is unable to speak, no one will infer that he is non-rational. But leaving these points aside, we certainly observe animals, the subject of our discussion, uttering quite human sounds – jays, for instance, and others. And letting this too pass, even if we do not understand the utterances of the so-called "non-rational" animals it is not at all improbable that they are conversing although we do not understand. For when we bear the talk of barbarians we do not understand that either, and it seems to us undifferentiated sound. Moreover, we bear dogs making one sound when they are keeping people away and another when they are howling, and one sound when they are beaten and a different one when they are fawning. In general, if somebody were to study the matter he would find a great difference of sounds uttered by this and the other animals according to different circumstances, and so for that reason it may fairly be said that the so-called "non-rational" animals have their share of externally expressed reasoning. And if they are neither inferior to human beings in the acuteness of their senses nor in internal reasoning, nor, on top of that, in externally expressed reasoning, then as concerns phantasai they are not less worthy of belief than we are. It is also possible to show this, I think, by basing the argument on each kind of non-rational animal.
For instance, who would not say that birds excel in shrewdness and employ externally expressed reasoning? For they have knowledge not only of things present but also of the future, and by prophetic sounds or some other signs they reveal these things in advance to people who can understand them.

As I previously indicated, I have made this comparison for good measure, having sufficiently shown, I think, that we cannot prefer our own phantasai to those of the non-rational animals. But if the non-rational animals are not less worthy of belief than we are when it comes to deciding about phantasai, and the phantasai differ depending on the variety of animals, then although I shall be able to say how each of the external objects appears to me, I shall be forced, for the reasons stated above, to suspend judgment as to how it is in nature.

Such, then, is the first mode of epoché. we said that the second was the one based on the differences among human beings. For even if it were granted, by way of supposition, that human beings are more to be believed than the non-rational animals, we shall find that even consideration of our own differences leads to suspension of judgment. For human beings are said to be composed of two elements, the soul and the body, and we differ from one another in respect to both of them. As regards the body, we differ in form and constitution. The body of a Scythian differs in form from that of an Indian, and the variation is produced, they say, by the differing relative strengths of the humors. Depending on this difference in relative strength of the humors there arise differing phantasai, as we pointed out in the first mode. So, too, these humors produce a great difference in the choice and avoidance of things external. Indians like some things and we like others, and liking different things is an indication of receiving differing phantasai from the external objects. In consequence of our peculiarities of makeup, we differ in such a way that some of us digest beef better than rock fish or get diarrhea from the weak wine of Lesbos. There was, it is said, an old woman of Attica who safely drank thirty drams of hemlock, and Lysis took four drams of opium without trouble. And Demophon, who waited table for Alexander, used to shiver in the sun or the bath, but felt warm in the shade; the Argive Athenagoras felt no pain when stung by scorpions and venomous spiders; the Psyllaeans, as they are called, are not harmed when bitten by asps or other snakes; nor are the Egyptian Tentyritae harmed by crocodiles. Further, the Egyptians who live along the Astapous river opposite Lake Meroe safely eat scorpions, snakes,
and the like. And Rufinus of Chalcis, when he drank hellebore, neither threw up
nor suffered any laxative effect, but he took it and digested it as though it were
something to which he was accustomed. Chrysersmus the Herophilean, if he ever
used pepper, risked a heart attack. And Soterichus the surgeon, whenever
he smelled fried fish, got diarrhea. Andron the Argive was so immune to thirst
that he even travelled through the Libyan desert without needing anything to
drink. Caesar could see in the dark, and Aristotle tells of a certain Thasian to it
seemed that a human phantom was all the time leading him around.

Since there is so much variation among human beings as regards the body –
and it suffices to mention only a few of the cases that the Dogmatists provide – it
is likely that human beings will also differ among themselves as regards the soul.
For the body is a kind of image of the soul, as indeed of Physiognomy shows. But
the greatest indication of the vast and limitless difference in the intellect of human
beings is the inconsistency of the statements of the Dogmatists concerning what
may be appropriately chosen, what avoided, and so on. The poets, too, have
expressed themselves appropriately about these things. For Pindar says:

The crowns and trophies of his storm-foot steeds
Give joy to one; yet others find it joy
To dwell in gorgeous chambers gold-bedecked;
Some even take delight in voyaging
O'er ocean's billows in a speeding barque.
(Frag. 221 Snell, as translated by Sir J. E. Sandys).

And the poet says:

One person delights in one activity, another in another.
(Odyssey 14.228).

Tragedy, too, is full of such things:

If the same things were beautiful and wise for everybody,
There would be no disputatious strife among mankind.
(Euripides, Phoenissae 499-500).
It is strange that the same thing should be pleasing to some mortals and hateful to others. (Anon., frag. 462 Nauck).

Since, then, choice and avoidance are in pleasure and displeasure, and pleasure and displeasure lie in sense and *phantasia*, when the same things are chosen by some people and avoided by others it is logical for us to infer that these people are not affected alike by the same things, since if they were they would alike have chosen and avoided the same things. But if the same things produce different affects depending on the difference of human beings, this too would reasonably lead to suspension of judgment and we would, perhaps, be able to say what each of the external objects appears to be, relative to each difference, but we would not be able to state what it is in nature. For we shall either have to give credence to all human beings or to some. But if to all, we shall be attempting impossibilities and accepting contradictory statements. And if to some, let the Dogmatists tell us to whom we should give assent. The Platonist will say "to Plato" and the Epicurean "to Epicurus," and the others *analogously*, and thus with their unsettled disputes they bring us again to suspension of judgment. Anyone who says that we ought to give assent to the majority view is making a childish proposal, for no one is able to approach the whole human race and by talking with them find out what pleases the majority. Indeed, there may be peoples of whom we know nothing but among whom attributes that are most rare among us are common, while the attributes most common among us are rare among them; so that, for example, most of them feel no pain when bitten by spiders, while a few, on rare occasions, do; and analogously with the other "idiosyncracies" previously mentioned. Of necessity, therefore, suspension of judgment comes in again, via the differences of human beings.

While the Dogmatists egoistically claim that in deciding the facts preference ought to be given to themselves above all other human beings, we realize that this claim of theirs is inappropriate since they themselves are part of the dispute. And if, giving preference to themselves, they make a decision about the appearances, by entrusting the decision to themselves they beg the question before the deciding is begun. In any case, in order to arrive at suspension of judgment by an
argument dealing with only one person – their Ideal Sage, for example, who is expert at interpreting dreams we take up the third mode in the list.

This mode is the one that we say is based on the difference of the senses. That the senses differ from one another is obvious from the start. For instance, to the eye it seems that paintings have hollows and prominences, but not to the touch. And for some people honey seems pleasant to the tongue but unpleasant to the eye; consequently, it is impossible to say without qualification whether it is pleasant or unpleasant. And likewise in the case of perfume, for it pleases the sense of smell but displeases the taste. So too with spurge juice: since it is painful to the eyes but painless to all the rest of the body, we will not be able to say without qualification whether, insofar as its nature is concerned, it is painful or painless to bodies. And rain water is beneficial to the eyes, but it is rough on the wind pipe and lungs, as is olive oil despite its being soothing to the skin. the sting-ray, when it touches the extremities, produces numbness, but it can touch the rest of the body harmlessly. Hence we shall not be able to say how each of these things is in its nature, but only how it appears to be in each instance.

More examples can be given, but in order not to delay carrying out the purpose of our essay, the following point needs to be made. Each thing that appears to us in sensation seems to affect us as complex; for example, the apple seems smooth, fragrant, sweet, yellow. But it is not evident whether it really has these and only these qualities, or whether, having only one quality, it appears differently depending on the different constitutions of the sense organs, or again whether it has more qualities than are apparent but some of them do not affect us. That it has one quality could be argued on the basis of what we previously said about the food taken up by the body and the water taken up by the tree and the air breathed into flutes and pipes and similar instruments; for the apple, too, may be of one form but appear differently because of the difference of the sense organs through which it is perceived. And that the apple has more qualities than those that appear to us, we can reason as follows. Suppose that someone is born having the senses of touch, smell, and taste, but can neither bear nor see. Then he will assume that the origin of his perceptions is not something visible or audible, but that it has only those three types of quality which he is capable of perceiving. And it is possible that we, with only our five senses, perceive only those qualities of the apple that we are fitted to perceive, and that perhaps there
are other qualities, affecting other sense organs which we lack and for which we consequently cannot perceive any corresponding objects.

But nature, someone may say [Aristotle, De Anima, III, 2, 425b], has made the senses exactly proportionate to the objects of sense. But what is this "nature", seeing that there is so much unresolved controversy among the Dogmatists concerning its very existence? For anyone who decides this question, that is, whether nature exists, will have no credibility with them if he is an ordinary person, while if he is a philosopher he will be part of the controversy and instead of being a judge will be subject to judgment himself. So that if it is possible that only those qualities exist in the apple which we seem to perceive, or that there are more than these, or again that there are not even the ones that affect us, what the apple is like will be nonevident to us. The same argument holds also in the case of the other objects of sense. And since the senses do not apprehend the external objects, the intellect is not capable of doing so either, so that this argument, too, seems conducive to suspension of judgment concerning the external objects.

In order that we shall be able to reach suspension of judgment when basing the argument on each single sense or even disregarding the senses, we take up further the fourth mode of epoché. This is the one described as "based on circumstances," where by "circumstances" we mean conditions. We say that it is concerned with being in a natural or unnatural condition, with being awake or asleep, with dependence on age, on being in motion or at rest, on bating or loving, on being in need or satisfied, on being drunk or sober, on predispositions, on being courageous or fearful, on being distressed or cheerful. Thus, things affect us in dissimilar ways depending on whether we are in a natural or unnatural condition, as when people who are delirious or possessed by a god seem to bear spirits but we do not. Similarly, those people often say that they perceive odors of storax or frankincense or some such thing, and much else, too, although we do not sense them. And the same water that seems to us to be lukewarm seems boiling hot when poured on an inflamed place. And the same coat appears tawny-orange to people with bloodshot eyes but not to me. Also, the same honey appears sweet to me but bitter to the jaundiced. Further, if someone says that an intermingling of certain humors produces, in persons who are in an unnatural condition, odd phantasiai of the external objects, it must be replied that since healthy people, too, have intermingled humors, it is possible that the external
objects are in nature such as they appear to those persons who are said to be in an
unnatural state, but that these humors are making the external objects appear to
the healthy people to be other than they 103 are. For to give the power of altering
the external objects to some humors but not to others is arbitrary; since just as the
healthy in a natural state have the nature of the healthy and in an unnatural state
that of the sick, so too the sick *103* in an unnatural state have the nature of the
healthy and in a natural state that of the sick; so that credence should be given to
these last, too, as being in a relatively natural state.

Different phantasiai come about, too, depending on whether we are asleep 104
or awake. For when we are awake we do not imagine [ou phantazometha] what
we imagine when we are asleep, nor when we are asleep do we imagine what we
imagine when awake, so that whether the phantasiai are the case or are not the
case is not absolute but relative, that is, relative to being asleep or awake. It is fair
to say, then, that when asleep we see things that are not the case in the waking
state, though not absolutely not the case. For they are the case in our sleep, just as
what we see in our waking state is the case, though not in our sleep.

Depending on age, too, different phantasiai arise, since the same air seems 105
cold to the aged but temperate to those who are in their prime, and the same color
appears faint to older people but vivid to those in their prime, and likewise the
same sound appears faint to the former but clearly audible to the latter. And
people of differing ages are moved in different ways depending on 106 their
choices and aversions. For instance, children are interested in balls and hoops, but
people in their prime prefer other things, and the elderly still others. From this we
conclude that, also depending on differences of age, differing phantasiai arise
from the same external objects.

Objects appear differently, too, depending on whether one is in motion or 107 at
rest. For things that we see as stationary when we are at rest seem to be moving
when we are sailing by. Depending on liking and disliking, also: for 108 some
people are completely repelled by pork, while others eat it with the greatest of
pleasure. Whence Menander, too, said:

Look how his face appears now that he
has come to this – like an animal!
It is acting justly that makes us fair.
And many people who have ugly mistresses think them beautiful. Depending on hunger and satiety, too: since the same food seems very pleasant to the hungry but unpleasant to the sated. And depending on being drunk or sober: since things we consider shameful when we are sober appear to us not to be shameful when we are drunk. And depending on predispositions: since the same wine that appears sour to people who have previously eaten dates or figs seems sweet to those who have eaten nuts or chickpeas; and the vestibule of the bathhouse is warm to those entering from outside and cold to those leaving, if they have spent some time in it. And depending on being afraid or feeling courageous: since the same thing seems frightful and terrible to the timid but not at all so to the bold. And, finally, depending on being distressed or cheerful: since the same things that are annoying to people who are distressed are pleasant to those who are cheerful. Since, therefore, there is so much anomaly depending on conditions, and human beings are in one condition at one time and another at another, how each external object appears to each person is easy to say, I suppose, but not how it is, since the anomaly is unresolved. For anyone resolving it is either in one of the aforementioned conditions or is in no condition at all. But to say that he is in no condition at all— for example, neither healthy nor sick, neither in motion nor at rest, nor of any particular age, and devoid of the other conditions as well— is completely absurd. But if he, being in some condition, makes a decision about the phantasai, he will be part of the dispute and in other ways not a pure or fair judge of the external objects, because he has been contaminated by the conditions he is in. the waking person cannot compare the phantasai of sleepers with those of people who are awake, nor can the healthy person compare those of the sick with those of the healthy. For we assent to things that are in the present and move us in the present, more than to things that are not in the present.

In another way, too, the anomaly of such phantasai is unresolved. For anyone preferring one phantasia to another or one circumstance to another either does this without making a decision and without giving proof, or by making a decision and giving proof. But he will not do it without these means, for then he will not be credible, nor will he do it with them, either. For if he makes a decision about the phantasai, he will certainly decide by means of a criterion. And
certainly he will either say that this criterion is true or that it is false. But if he says that it is false, he will not be credible. And if he says that the criterion is true, either he will say this without proof or he will say it with proof. Again, if he says it without proof, he will not be credible; but if with proof, the proof will certainly need to be true if he is to be credible. When he affirms the truth of the proof which he is taking to establish the credibility of the criterion, will he have made a decision about this or not? If he has not made the decision, he will not be credible; and if he has made the decision, then it is obvious that he will say that he has decided by means of a criterion, in order that it may be maintained, and the criterion has need of a proof, in order that it may be shown to be true. And neither is it possible for a proof to be sound without the prior existence of a true criterion, nor for a criterion to be true without the previously confirmed proof. And thus the criterion and the proof fall into the circularity type of aporia, in which both are found not to be credible; for each, while it awaits the credibility of the other, is equally incredible with the other. Therefore, if nobody, with or without a proof and criterion, is able to give one phantasia preference over another, then the differing phantasiai that arise depending on the different conditions will be undecidable; so that this mode, too, leads to suspension of judgment concerning the nature of the external objects.

The fifth argument is that depending on positions, distances, and locations. For, depending on each of these, the same things appear different – for example, the same stoa viewed from either end appears tapering but from the middle completely symmetrical, and from afar the same boat appears small and stationary but from close up large and in motion, and the same tower appears round from afar but square from close up.

These depend on distances. But depending on locations: the same lamplight appears dim in the sunshine but bright in the dark, and the same oar appears broken when it is in the water and straight when it is out, and the egg soft when it is in the bird but hard when it is in the air, and the ligature liquid in the lynx but hard in the air, and coral soft in the sea but hard in the air, and sound appears one way in a pipe, another in a flute, and still another when it is simply in the air.

And depending on positions: the same portrait appears smooth when tilted back, but when tilted forward a certain amount it seems to have depths and
prominences. And the necks of pigeons appear different in color depending on the different angles of inclination.

Therefore, since everything apparent is viewed in some location and from some distance and in some position, each of which produces a great deal of variation in the *phantasiai*, as we have remarked above, we shall be forced also by this mode to have recourse to suspension of judgment. And anyone wishing to give preference to some of these *phantasiai* will be attempting the impossible. For if he makes his assertion simply and without proof, he will not be credible; whereas, supposing that he wishes to use a proof, if he says that the proof is false he will confute himself, while if he says that it is true he will need a proof of its being true, and again a proof of that, since it too must be true, and so on ad infinitum. But it is impossible to produce infinitely many proofs; and so he will not be able by means of a proof to give one *phantasia* preference over another. And if one cannot decide about the aforementioned *phantasiai* either with or without a proof, suspension of judgment results; for, I suppose, of any given thing we are able to say of what sort, relative to its particular position, distance, and place, it appears to be, but for the above reasons we cannot state of what sort it is in its nature.

The sixth mode is the one that depends on admixtures and according to which we conclude that, since none of the external objects affects us by itself but always in combination with something, it is perhaps possible to say what the mixture of the external object and that together with which it is observed is like, but we cannot do the same for the external object considered by itself. It is obvious from the start, I think, that none of the external objects affects us by itself, but always does so in combination with something, and that depending on this it is observed as different. Thus, our own complexion is seen as of one hue in warm air and as of another in cold air, and so we cannot say how our complexion is in nature, but only how it looks together with each of the two kinds of air. Further, the same sound appears one way in thin air and another in dense air, and spices are more pungent in the bathhouse and in the sun than in very cold air, and the body is light when immersed in water, but heavy in air.

In order to get away from just external admixtures: our eyes contain within themselves both membranes and liquids. Since things seen are not observed without these, they will not be accurately apprehended, for it is the mixture that
we perceive, and because of this the jaundiced see everything yellow, while those with blood in the eyes see things as bloodred. And since the same sound appears of one quality in open places and of another in places that are narrow and winding, and of one quality in clear air and another in murky air, it is likely that we do not perceive the sound in and of itself; for the ears have narrow and winding passages and are contaminated by vaporous effluvia said to be conducted from places around the head. Moreover, since there are substances in the nostrils and in the areas of taste, we perceive the objects of taste and of smell together with these and not in and of themselves. Therefore, because of the admixtures the senses do not perceive precisely how the external objects are. Nor does the intellect do so either, especially since its guides, the senses, go wrong; perhaps it too contributes some special admixture of its own to the reports of the senses; for we observe that there are humors situated around each of the places in which the Dogmatists suppose that the ruling part of the soul is located, whether the brain or the heart or whatever part of the animal anyone wants to put it in. And so by this mode also we see that, being unable to say anything about the nature of the external objects, we are forced to suspension of judgment.

The seventh mode, we said, is that depending on the quantity and constitution of the external objects, giving "constitution" its common meaning, namely, combination. It is obvious that by this mode, too, we are forced to suspend judgment about the nature of the objects. For example, shavings off a goat's horn appear white when observed by themselves and not in combination, but when they are combined in the substance of the horn they look black. And individual filings of a piece of silver appear black, but when united with the whole they affect us as white. And pieces of Taenarean marble look white when they are polished, but combined in the whole stone they appear yellow. And grains of sand when scattered appear rough, but when gathered together in a dune they affect our senses as soft. And hellebore, taken when fine and light, tends to choke one, but not when coarse. And wine, when drunk in moderation, strengthens us, but when taken in excess, disables the body. And food, similarly, exhibits different powers depending on the amount; often, indeed, by being taken in too great quantity it brings the body down with indigestion and diarrhea. So here, too, we shall be able to say of what quality the shaving of horn is, and of what quality the combination of many shavings is, and the same for the particle of
silver and the combination of many particles, and for the bit of Taenarean marble and the combination of many bits, and we can make relative statements in the case of the grains of sand and the hellebore and the wine and the food, too, but we still cannot state the absolute nature of the things because of the anomaly of phantasiai depending on combination.

133 It seems that in general even beneficial things become harmful when they are used in immoderate quantities, and the things that seem hurtful when taken in excess are harmless in small quantities. The best indication of this point is what is observed in regard to the powers of medicines, in which the exact mixing of the simple drugs produces a compound that is beneficial, but the occasional slightest error in weighing, when overlooked, makes it not only not beneficial but even quite hurtful and often poisonous.

134 So the argument relating to quantities and constitutions muddles the existence of the external objects. Consequently this mode too may be expected to lead us around to suspension of judgment, for we are unable to say anything without qualification about the nature of the external objects.

The eighth mode is the one based on relativity, where we conclude that, 135 since everything is in relation to something, we shall suspend judgment as to what things are in themselves and in their nature. But it must be noticed that here, as elsewhere, we use "are" for "appear to be," saying in effect "everything appears in relation to something." But this statement has two senses: first, as implying relation to what does the judging, for the object that exists externally and is judged appears in relation to what does the judging, and second, as implying relation to the things observed together with it, as, for example, what is on the right is in relation to what is on the left. And, indeed, we have taken 136 into account earlier that everything is in relation to something: for example, as regards what does the judging, that each thing appears in relation to this or that animal or person or sense and in relation to such and such a circumstance; and as regards the things observed together with it, that each thing appears in relation to this or that admixture or manner or combination or quantity or position.

But it is also possible to prove by a special argument that everything is in 137 relation to something, as follows. Do the things that are what they are by virtue of a difference differ from the things that are in relation to something, or not? If they do not differ, then they too are in relation to something; if they do differ, then,
since whatever differs is in relation to something (for it is called what it is in relation to that from which it differs), the things that are what they are by virtue of a difference are in relation to something. And, according to the Dogmatists, of things that are, some are summa genera, others are infimae species, and others are genera and species. But all these are relative. Again, of things that are, some are pre-evident and others are non-evident, as they say; the appearances signify, and the non-evident things are signified by the appearances. For, according to them, "the appearances are a view of the non-evident." But what signifies and what is signified are relative. Therefore, everything is relative. Moreover, of things that are, some are similar and others are dissimilar, and some are equal and others are unequal; but these things are relative; therefore, everything is relative. And even the person who says that not all things are relative confirms the relativity of all things, for by the arguments he opposes to us he shows that the very relativity of all things is relative to us and not universal.

Now, when we have shown that all things are relative, the obvious result is that as concerns each external object we shall not be able to state how it is in its own nature and absolutely, but only how, in relation to something, it appears to be. It follows that we must suspend judgment about the nature of the objects.

In connection with the mode based on the constancy or infrequency of occurrence, which we say is the ninth in order, we consider such items as the following. The sun is certainly a much more marvellous thing than a comet. But since we see the sun all the time but the comet only infrequently, we marvel at the comet so much as even to suppose it a divine portent, but we do nothing like that for the sun. If, however, we thought of the sun as appearing infrequently and setting infrequently, and as illuminating everything all at once and then suddenly being eclipsed, we would find much to marvel at in the matter. And earthquakes are not equally troublesome to the person who is experiencing one for the first time and to the person who has become accustomed to them. And how marvellous is the sea to the person who sees it for the first time! And a beautiful human body that is seen suddenly and for the first time excites us more than if it were to become a customary sight. Things that are rare seem precious, but things that are familiar and easy to get do not. Indeed, if we thought of water as rare, how much more precious it would appear than all the things that do seem
precious! And if we imagine gold simply scattered on the ground like stones, to whom do we think it would then be precious and worth hoarding away?

144 Since, then, the same things, depending on whether they occur frequently or infrequently, seem at one time marvellous or precious and at another time not, we infer that we shall perhaps be able to say how each of these appears when it occurs frequently or when it occurs infrequently, but that we shall not be able to state without qualification how each of the external objects is. And, accordingly, via this mode too we withhold assent as regards them.

145 The tenth mode, which is principally concerned with ethics, is the one depending on ways of life and on customs, laws, mythic beliefs, and dogmatic suppositions. A way of life is a chosen basis for living or for some particular action, adopted by one person or many—for example, by Diogenes or the Laconians. A law is a written agreement among the citizens, the violator of which is punished; a custom or common practice (for there is no difference) is the joint acceptance by a number of people of a certain way of acting, where the violator is not in all cases punished; thus, there is a law against adultery, and for us it is a custom not to have intercourse with a woman in public. A mythic belief is the acceptance of things that are not the case and are fictional—such as, among others, the myths about Cronus—and in which many people place credence. And a dogmatic supposition is the acceptance of something that seems to be established by analogy or some kind of proof, such as that there are atomic elements of things, or homoeomeries [ultimate particles of matter], or *minima*, or other things.

148 And we oppose each of these items sometimes to itself and sometimes to each of the others. For example, we oppose custom to custom thus: some of the Ethiopians tattoo their babies, but we do not. And the Persians think it becoming to wear brightly colored garments that reach to the feet, but we consider it unbecoming; and whereas the Indians have intercourse with women in public, most others consider this shameful. We oppose law to law thus: among the Romans, he who gives up his patrimony does not pay his father's debts; but among the Rhodians he always pays them; and among the Tauri of Scythia there was a law that foreigners were to be sacrificed to Artemis, but with us it is forbidden to kill a human being at the temple. And we oppose a way of life to a way of life when we set Diogenes's way of life in opposition to that of Aristippus,
or that of the Laconians to that of the Italians. We oppose a mythical belief to a mythical belief when in one place we say that according to myth Zeus is the father of men and gods, while in another we say that it is Oceanus, referring to the line:

Oceanus, the source of the gods, and Tethys, the mother.
Iliad 14.201

And we oppose dogmatic opinions to one another when we say that some people assert that there is just one element and others that there are infinitely many, and that some assert that the soul is mortal and others that it is immortal, and that some assert that our affairs are arranged by divine providence while others assert that they are not.

We also oppose custom to the other items—law, for example, when we say that among the Persians sodomy is customary but among the Romans it is prohibited by law; and with us adultery is prohibited, but among the Massagetae it is by custom treated as a matter of indifference, as Eudoxus of Cnidos reports in the first book of his Travels; and with us it is forbidden to have intercourse with one's mother, whereas with the Persians this sort of marriage is very much the custom. And among the Egyptians men marry their sisters, which for us is prohibited by law. Custom is opposed to way of life when, whereas the majority of men have intercourse with their wives in some place apart, Crates did it with Hipparchia in public; and Diogenes went around with shoulders bare, while we dress in the usual way. And custom is opposed to mythical belief, as when the myths say that Cronus ate his own children, it being customary among us to take care of children; and whereas with us it is customary to worship the gods as being good and immune from evil, they are presented by the poets as being wounded by and envious of one another. Custom is also opposed to dogmatic opinion when with us it is the custom to pray to the gods for good things, whereas Epicurus says that the divinity does not care about us; and when Aristippus thinks it a matter of indifference whether one wears women's clothing, while we think this shameful.

We oppose way of life to law when, though there is a law against striking a free and well-born man, the pancratiasts hit one another because of their way of
life, and when, though homicide is forbidden, the gladiators kill one another for the same reason. Further, we oppose mythical belief to way of life when we point out that the myths say that Heracles in the house of Omphale "carded wool and endured slavery" and did these things which nobody would choose to do, even to a moderate degree, whereas Heracles's way of life was noble. We oppose way of life to dogmatic supposition when athletes undertake an onerous way of life for the sake of glory, on the supposition that glory is good, while many philosophers dogmatize that it is an evil thing. And we oppose law to mythical belief when the poets present the gods as practicing adultery and sodomy, while with us the law prohibits doing these things; and we oppose law to dogmatic opinion when the Chrysippeans say that intercourse with mothers or sisters is a matter of indifference, while the law prohibits these things. Further, we oppose mythical belief to dogmatic supposition when the poets say that Zeus came down and had intercourse with mortal women, whereas this is deemed by the Dogmatists to be impossible; and the poet says that Zeus, because of grief over Sarpedon,

Let fall a shower of blood upon the earth,
Iliad 16.459

while it is a dogma of the philosophers that the divinity is impassive; and when the philosophers reject the myth of the hippocentaurs, while offering us the hippocentaur as a paradigm of nonexistence.

For each of the foregoing oppositions it was possible to take many other examples, but in an outline these will suffice. At any rate, since by this mode, too, so much anomaly in "the facts" has been shown, we shall not be able to say how any external object or state of affairs is in its nature, but only how it appears in relation to a given way of life or law or custom, and so forth. And so because of this mode, too, we must suspend judgment about the nature of the external "facts." thus, via all ten modes we end up with suspension of judgment.

15. The Five Modes
The more recent Skeptics hand down the following five modes of epoché: the first is the mode based on disagreement; the second is that based on infinite regress; the third, that based on relativity the fourth, on hypothesis; and the fifth is the circularity mode. The one based on disagreement is that according to which we find that, both in ordinary life and among philosophers, with regard to a given topic there has been reached an unresolvable impasse on account of which we are unable to reach a verdict one way or the other, and we end up with suspension of judgment. The one based on infinite regress is that in which we say that what is offered as support for believing a given proposition is itself in need of such support, and that support is in need of other support, and so on ad infinitum, so that, since we have no place from which to begin to establish anything, suspension of judgment follows. The one based on relativity is, as we said before, that in which the external object appears this way or that way in relation to the judging subject and the things observed at the same time, but we suspend judgment as to how it is in its nature. And the one based on hypothesis comes into play when the Dogmatists, involved in an infinite regress, begin with something that they do not establish but that they deem worthy of acceptance as agreed upon without question or demonstration. And the circularity mode occurs when what ought to make the case for the matter in question has need of support from that very matter; whence, being unable to assume either in order to establish the other, we suspend judgment about both.

That every matter of inquiry can be brought under these modes we shall show in brief as follows. Anything proposed for consideration is either a sense object or a thought object, but whichever it is, there is a disagreement concerning it. For some people say that only the sense objects are true, others that only the thought objects, and still others that some of each. Now, will they say that the disagreement can be decided or that it cannot? If it cannot, we have the conclusion that one must suspend judgment, for concerning disagreements that are not decidable one cannot make an assertion. On the other hand, if it is decidable, then we want to know how it is to be decided. Shall we decide about a sense object, for example (for first we shall base the argument on this case) by a sense object or a thought object? If by a sense object, then, since the sense objects are what our inquiry is about, this object too will need something else as support. And if that also is a sense object, it again will need support from another one, and so
on ad infinitum. But if we are to decide about the sense object by a thought object, then, since there is a disagreement about the thought objects, too, and this is a thought object, it also will be in need of decision and support. But by what will it be supported? If by a thought object, it will similarly involve an infinite regress; but if by a sense object, then, since a thought object was used as support for a sense object and a sense object for a thought object, the circularity mode of epoché comes in.

But if, to avoid these points, our interlocutor should think to assume something, by consent and without demonstration, as a basis for demonstrating what follows, the hypothesis mode comes into play and allows no way out. For if the hypothesizer is worthy of credence, we shall be no less worthy of credence whenever we hypothesize the opposite. And if what the hypothesizer hypothesizes is true, he makes it suspect by taking it as a hypothesis instead of establishing it; but if it is false, the underpinnings of the things being established will be rotten. Further, if hypothesizing contributes something to credibility, we might as well hypothesize what is in question and not something else from which the hypothesizer is going to establish the point at issue; and if it is absurd to hypothesize what is in question, it will also be absurd to hypothesize a proposition superordinate to this.

That all sense objects are relative is evident, for they are relative to whoever does the sensing. It is therefore plain that any sense object that is proposed to us is easily brought under the five modes. And we reason in the same way about thought objects. For if it is said that the dispute is not decidable, the necessity of suspending judgment about it will be granted us. And if the dispute is going to be decided, then if by means of a thought object, we shall produce an infinite regress, while if by means of a sense object, a circular inference. For when the dispute is about the sense object and cannot be decided by means of a sense object because of an infinite regress, there will be need of a thought object, just as for the thought object there will be need of a sense object. For these reasons, again, anyone who assumes something as a hypothesis will be acting absurdly. Furthermore, the thought objects, too, are relative; for they are so named with respect to the people who think them, and if they were in nature as they are said to be, there would be no dispute about them. Hence the thought objects, too, are
brought under the five modes, so that in all cases it is necessary for us to suspend judgment about any matter proposed for consideration. *112*

Such, then, are the five modes handed down by the later Skeptics; they are not put forward by way of throwing out the ten modes, but in order to combat the precipitancy of the Dogmatists in greater detail by means of both together.

16. The Two Modes

They also hand down two other modes of epoché. For since everything that is apprehended is either apprehended through itself or through something else, by pointing out that what is apprehended is apprehended neither through itself nor through anything else they produce aporiai, as they suppose, about everything. That nothing is apprehended through itself is apparent, they say, from the dispute among the physical scientists concerning not only all sense objects but also, I think, all thought objects – a dispute that is not decidable since we cannot use either a sense object or a thought object as a criterion, for anything we take will be in dispute and hence not credible. And the following is the reason why they do not agree that something can be apprehended through something else. If that through which something is apprehended must in every case be apprehended through something else, they encounter the circularity or infinite regress modes of epoché. But if somebody should wish to take as apprehended through itself something through which something else is apprehended, be runs up against the fact that for the aforementioned reasons nothing is apprehended through itself. So we are at a loss as to how the thing in question could be apprehended either on the basis of itself or on that of something else, since there is no apparent criterion of truth or of apprehension and since signs, even apart from proof, are eliminated, as we shall show later.

It will suffice for the present to have said thus much about the modes leading to suspension of judgment.

17. Some Modes for Refuting People Who Give Causal Explanations
Just as we hand down the modes of *Epochè*, so some people set forth modes by which we produce *aporia* about particular causal explanations, thereby giving a jolt to the Dogmatists since they pride themselves especially on these. Aenesidemus, indeed, hands down eight modes by means of which he thinks to refute and expose as unsound every dogmatic causal explanation. The first of these, he says, is the mode according to which causal explanations in general, concerned as they are with what is nonevident, get no agreed-upon confirmation from the appearances. The second is that according to which, although there is often a plethora of ways of giving a causal explanation of what is in question, some people give such an explanation in one way only. According to the third, they refer orderly things to causes that exhibit no order. According to the fourth, when they have apprehended how the appearances come about, they think they have apprehended how the things that are not appearances come about, whereas although it is possible that these latter come about similarly to the appearances, it is also possible that they come about, not similarly, but in a way peculiar to themselves. The fifth mode is that according to which practically all the causal explainers give accounts based on their own particular hypotheses about the elements and not on common and generally agreed approaches. The sixth is that according to which they often accept what fits in with their own particular hypotheses but reject what is equally credible but does not so fit in. According to the seventh, they assign causes that conflict not only with the appearances but even with their own hypotheses; while according to the eighth it frequently happens that when the things under investigation and the things seemingly apparent are equally puzzling, they construct their doctrine about the equally puzzling on the basis of the equally puzzling. Nor is it impossible, Aenesidemus says, that some should fail with their causal explanations on the basis of certain mixed modes dependent on the foregoing ones.

Possibly, too, the five modes of *epochè* suffice against the causal explanations. For any cause that somebody proposes will either be compatible with all philosophical systems and with Skepticism and with the appearances, or it will not. And that it will be thus compatible is impossible, I suppose, for there is disagreement about all the appearances and nonevident things. But if there is disagreement about the proposed cause, the proponent will be asked for the cause of it, and if he takes an appearance as the cause of an appearance or a non-evident
thing as the cause of a non-evident thing, he will land in an infinite regress, and in a circular inference if he takes them *alternando*. And if he makes a stand somewhere, either he will say that he has established the cause as such in relation to what was said before, thus introducing "in relation to" and eliminating "in nature," or else he will take something as an hypothesis and will be brought to a standstill. So, by these modes too it is possible, I think, to combat the precipitancy of the Dogmatists in their causal theories.

18. The Skeptic Slogans

Since, in using each of these modes and those leading to suspension of judgment, we utter certain slogans expressive of the Skeptic temper of mind and of our *pathê* – for example, "not more," "nothing is to be determined," and the like – it would be reasonable to take up these next. Let us begin with "not more."

19. The "Not More" Slogan

We say this sometimes in the form I have just mentioned, but sometimes in the form "nothing more"; for we do not, as some people suppose, employ the "not more" in specific investigations and the "nothing more" in general ones; rather, we say either "not more" or "nothing more" indifferently, and now we shall discuss them as though they were identical. This slogan, then, is elliptical. Just as when we say "a duplex" we are saying in effect "a duplex house," and when we say "a wide" [*plateia*, a square] we are saying in effect "a wide street," so also when we say "not more" we are saying in effect "not more this than that, up than down." Some of the Skeptics, however, in place of the "not" adopt "what" – "what more this than that" – taking the "what" to refer to the cause, so that the meaning is "because of what [i.e., why] this more than that?" For it is common practice to use questions instead of assertions, as in the line

What mortal doesn't know the bride of Zeus?

Euripides, *Hercules* 1
and assertions instead of questions, such as "I want to know where Dion lives" and "I ask why one should marvel at a poetic person." Also, the use of "what" instead of "why" [i.e., "because of what"] is found in Menander:

[Because of] what was I left behind?  
Frag. 900 Kock

190 And the slogan "not more this than that" also makes evident our pathos with respect to which we reach equilibrium through the equipollence of the opposed things – where we use the term "equipollence" for equality as regards what appears persuasive to us, and "opposed things" in the everyday sense of things that conflict, and "equilibrium" for the absence of assent to either alternative. 191 Even if the slogan "nothing more" exhibits the character of assent or denial, we do not use it in that way, but rather we take it in an imprecise and not strictly correct sense, either in place of a question or instead of saying "I don't know to which of these I ought to assent and to which I ought not to assent." For our goal is to make evident what appears to us, and we do not care with what expression we do it. And this also should be noticed: that in uttering the "nothing more" slogan we are not maintaining that it is entirely true and firm, but in its case, too, we are speaking in accord with what appears to us.

20. "Non-assertion" (Aphasia)

192 Concerning non-assertion we say the following. The term "assertion" has two senses, a wider and a narrower. In the wider sense an assertion is an expression indicating affirmation or denial, such as "It is day," "It is not day"; whereas in the narrower sense it is an expression indicating affirmation only; in this sense people do not call negative statements "assertions." Non-assertion, then, is the avoidance of assertion in the wider sense, in which we say that both affirmation and negation are covered; so that non-assertion is a pathos of ours in view of 193 which we say that we do not affirm or deny anything. From this it is evident that we adopt the "non-assertion" slogan, too, not on the assumption that things are in their nature such as to produce non-assertion in every case, but simply as making evident that we, now, when we are uttering it, and in the case
of the particular matters in question, are experiencing this pathos. And this,
too, must be kept in mind: it is dogmatic statements about the non-evident that we
say we neither affirm nor deny; we grant the things that stir our pathê and drive us
by force to assent.

21. "Perhaps," "It Is Possible," "Maybe"

The slogans "perhaps," and "perhaps not," and "possibly" and "possibly not,"
and "maybe" and "maybe not" we take in place of "perhaps it is the case" and
"perhaps it is not the case," and "possibly it is the case" and "possibly it is not the
case," and "maybe it is the case" and "maybe it is not the case" – for brevity's sake
using "possibly not" for "possibly it is not the case" and "maybe not" for "maybe
it is not the case," and "perhaps not" for "perhaps it is not the case." But here
again we do not fight over words, nor are we raising the issue of whether the
slogans make evident the nature of these matters; rather, as I said before, we
employ them imprecisely. Nevertheless, I think, it is evident that these slogans are
expressive of non-assertion. Certainly the person who says "perhaps it is the
case," by not firmly maintaining that it is the case, is in effect also asserting the
seemingly inconsistent "perhaps it is not the case;" similarly for the remaining
slogans.

22. "I Withhold Assent"

We use "I withhold assent" as short for "I am unable to say which of the
alternatives proposed I ought to believe and which I ought not believe," indicating
that the matters appear equal to us as regards credibility and incredibility. As to
whether they are equal, we maintain no firm opinion, but we do state what appears
to us to be the case about them when that appearance affects us. And withholding
assent [epoche] is so called from the intellect's being held back [epechesteθai] in
such a way as neither to assert nor deny, because of the equipollence of the
matters in question.

23. "I Determine Nothing"
Concerning "I determine nothing" we say the following. We think that "determining" is not simply saying something but rather is putting forward and assenting to something non-evident. Thus, I suppose, the Skeptic will be found not to be determining anything, not even the slogan "I determine nothing" itself. For that slogan is not a dogmatic opinion, that is, an assent to the non-evident, but rather it makes evident our pathos. Whenever the Skeptic says "I determine nothing," he is saying this: "I am now in such a state of mind as neither dogmatically to affirm nor deny any of the matters in question." And *116* this he says, reporting what appears to him concerning the matters at hand, not dogmatically and confidently, but just as a description of his state of mind, his pathos.

24. "Everything Is Indeterminate"

Indeterminateness is a pathos of the intellect in accord with which we take neither a negative nor an affirmative position on the matters of dogmatic inquiry, that is, the non-evident. Whenever the Skeptic says "Everything is indeterminate," he uses "is" in place of "appears to me to be," and with "everything" he does not refer simply to all there is, but rather to the Dogmatists' non-evident objects that are under his consideration; and by "indeterminate" he means "not standing out as superior, as regards credibility and incredibility, among the things that are opposite or mutually inconsistent." 199 And just as the person who says "I'm walking around" is in effect saying "I am walking around," so, according to us, the one who is saying "Everything is indeterminate" means also "as relates to me" or "as appears to me"; consequently, what is said comes down to this: "all the matters of dogmatic inquiry that I have considered appear to me to be such that not one of them seems to me superior, as regards credibility and incredibility, to anything inconsistent with it."

25. "Everything Is Non-apprehensible"

And we adopt a similar stance, too, when we say "Everything is non-apprehensible." For we explain "everything" in the same way, and we add "to me," so that what is said amounts to this: "All of the non-evident matters of
dogmatic inquiry that I have considered appear to me to be non-apprehensible."
This is not the assertion of one who is firmly maintaining that the things
investigated by the Dogmatists are of such a nature as to be non-apprehensible,
but rather of one who is reporting his own pathos, in accord with which he says: "I
take it that up to now, because of the equipollence of the opposites, I have
apprehended none of them; and consequently everything that is brought forward
by way of refutation seems to me to be irrelevant to what we are reporting."

26. “I Am Non-apprehensive" and "I Do Not Apprehend"

Both of the slogans "I am non-apprehensive" and "I do not apprehend"
express a personal pathos, in accord with which the Skeptic declines for the
present to take an affirmative or negative position on any of the non-evident
matters of inquiry, as is evident from what we have previously said about the
other slogans. *117*

27. “To Every Argument an Equal Argument is Opposed"

When we say "To every argument an equal argument is opposed," by "every argument" we mean "every argument that has been considered by us," and we use
"argument" not in its ordinary sense but for that which establishes something
dogmatically, that is to say, concerning the non-evident, and which establishes it
in any way at all, not necessarily by means of premises and conclusion. We say
"equal" as regards credibility and the lack of it, and we use "opposed" in its
common meaning of "conflicting"; and we tacitly supply "as appears to me."
Thus, when I say "To every argument an equal argument is opposed," I say in
effect this: "for every argument that I have examined and that establishes
something dogmatically, there appears to me to be opposed another argument that
establishes something dogmatically and is equal to it as regards credibility and
lack of credibility," so that the utterance of the statement is not dogmatic but is
just a report of a human pathos, which is apparent to the person experiencing it.
But also some people state the slogan thus: "To every argument an equal argument is to be opposed," intending to give this admonition: "To every argument establishing something dogmatically let us oppose some conflicting
argument that proceeds dogmatically and is equal to it as regards credibility and lack of credibility"; they are addressing the statement to the Skeptic, although they use the infinitive "to be opposed" in place of the imperative "let us oppose." And they address this admonition to the Skeptic lest he be tricked somehow by the Dogmatist into ceasing to raise questions about the arguments and through precipitancy should miss out on the ataraxia that appears to them and that they, as we mentioned before, think follows on suspension of judgment about everything.

28. More about the Skeptic Slogans

This will be a sufficient number of the slogans to discuss in an outline, especially since, on the basis of what we have already said, it is possible to give an account of the rest. For concerning all the Skeptic slogans it is necessary for this to be understood first of all: we absolutely do not firmly maintain anything about their being true, especially since we say that they can be confuted by themselves, as they are included among the cases to which they apply – just as cathartic drugs not only flush out the bodily humors but expel themselves as well. Also, we do not put them forward as sharply expressing the points with which they have to do, but we employ them imprecisely and, if you like, not strictly correctly; for it does not befit the Skeptic to fight about slogans, and besides it works in our favor that not even these slogans are said to have signification absolutely, but only relatively, that is, relative to the Skeptics. In addition, it must be borne in mind that we do not apply them to all things in general but only to things that are non-evident and are investigated dogmatically, and that we are saying what appears to us and are not asserting, as something firmly maintained, anything about the nature of the external objects. On the basis of these points I think it possible to fend off every sophism against a Skeptic slogan.

And now that we have elucidated the character of Skepticism, reviewing its basic idea, parts, criterion, and goal – and the modes of Epoché, too – and have discussed the Skeptic slogans, we consider that the next thing to do is to go over concisely the distinction between it and the alternative philosophies, in order that we may understand more clearly the Ephectic Way. Let us begin with the Heraclitean philosophy.
29. That the Skeptic Way Differs from the Heraclitean Philosophy

Now it is evident from the start that the Heraclitean philosophy differs from our Way, for Heraclitus makes dogmatic assertions about many non-evident things, but, as has been said, we do not. It is true that Aenesidemus and his followers used to say that the Skeptic Way was a road to the Heraclitean philosophy, since opposites appearing to be the case about the same thing leads into opposites being the case about the same thing, and the Skeptics say that opposites appear to be the case about the same thing, while the Heracliteans move from this to their being the case. But we reply to them that opposites' appearing to be the case about the same thing is not a dogma of the Skeptics but a matter occurring not only to the Skeptics but also to the other philosophers, and, indeed, to all mankind. For surely nobody would bring himself to say that honey does not taste sweet to healthy people and that it does not taste bitter to the jaundiced. So the Heracliteans, just as we and perhaps the other philosophers, start from an assumption common to every body. Therefore, if the Heracliteans had got their "opposites are the case about the same thing" from one or another of the Skeptic slogans—such as, for example, "Everything is non-apprehensible," "I determine nothing," or the like—perhaps Aenesidemus and his followers might have validly drawn their conclusion. But since what the Heracliteans start from is something observed not only by us but by the other philosophers and the plain man as well, why would anyone claim that our Way, any more than the other philosophies or the plain man's view, is a road to the Heraclitean philosophy, since we all utilize the same materials in common? Indeed, not only does the Skeptic Way not promote acceptance of the Heraclitean philosophy, but it actually works against it, for the Skeptic rejects all Heraclitus's dogmatic assertions as precipitate pronouncements, opposing his "world conflagration" and his "opposites are the case concerning the same thing"; and, as I was saying before, in regard to each dogma of Heraclitus he derides the dogmatic precipitancy and reiterates "I do not apprehend" and "I do not determine anything," all of which conflicts with the Heracliteans. Now it is absurd to say that a conflicting Way is a road to the system with which it conflicts; therefore, it is absurd to say that the Skeptic Way is a road to the Heraclitean philosophy.
30. Wherein Skepticism Differs from the Democritean Philosophy

But the Democritean philosophy, too, is said to have something in common with Skepticism, since it seems to use the same material as we do. For from honey's appearing sweet to some people and bitter to others, Democritus, as they say, reasons that it is neither sweet nor bitter, and in view of this he joins in sounding the Skeptic slogan "not more." But the Skeptics and the followers of Democritus use the slogan "not more" differently, since the latter apply it in reference to neither alternative being the case, whereas we ape it in reference to our not knowing whether both or neither of the appearances is the case. So that we differ also in respect to this, and the difference becomes most evident when Democritus says "Truly, [there are] atoms and the void"; for he says "truly" instead of "in truth"; and it is superfluous to state, I think, that he differs from us when he says that in truth atoms and the void exist, although he does start from the anomaly of the appearances.

31. Wherein Skepticism Differs from the Cyrenaic Way

Some people say that the Cyrenaic Way is the same as the Skeptic Way, since it too says that only pathé are apprehensible. But it differs, for it says that pleasure and the smooth transition from state to state of the body are the goal, while we say that it is ataraxia, which is incompatible with their goal. For the person who firmly maintains that pleasure is the goal undergoes torments whether or not pleasure is present, as I have argued in the section on the Goal. Further, we suspend judgment as regards the philosophic theory about the external objects, whereas the Cyrenaics assert that these objects have a nature that is not apprehensible.

32. Wherein Skepticism Differs from the Protagorean Way

Protagoras thinks that man is the measure of all things; of things that are, that they are; and of things that are not, that they are not. And by "measure" he means the criterion, and by "things" he means objects or facts. So in effect he says that man is the criterion of all objects or facts; of those that are, that they are; and
of those that are not, that they are not. And for this reason he posits only what appears to each person, and thus he introduces relativity. Wherefore he too seems to have something in common with the Pyrrhoneans. But he differs from them, and we shall see the difference when we have properly set forth what Protagoras thinks. He says that matter is in flux and that as it flows additions are continuously made, replacing the effluvia; and that the senses are restructured and altered depending on the age and the other structural features of our bodies. He says also that the explanations of all appearances are founded on matter, as matter in itself is capable of being in all respects such as it appears to anyone. And [he says] that people apprehend different things at different times depending on the different conditions they are in. For the person who is in a natural condition apprehends those features of matter that can appear to people who are in a natural condition, while those who are in an unnatural condition apprehend what can appear to people in an unnatural condition. And the same account applies in relation to age and as regards being asleep or awake and for each type of condition. For him, therefore, man becomes the criterion of existence, since whatever appears to somebody exists, and what does not appear to anybody does not exist. We see, therefore, that he dogmatizes both about matter being in flux and about the explanations of all appearances being founded on it, while these are nonevident matters concerning which, we suspend judgment.

33. Wherein Skepticism Differs from the Academic Philosophy

Some, of course, claim that the Academic philosophy is the same as Skepticism, and so the next step will be to discuss this, too. According to most people, there have been three Academics. The first and most ancient is the school of Plato and his followers; the second, or Middle Academy, is that of Arcesilaus, the pupil of Polemo; and the third, or New Academy, is that of Carneades and Cleitomachus. Some add a fourth, the school of Philo and Charmidas, and some even reckon the school of Antiochus as a fifth. Beginning, then, with the Old Academy, let us see how these philosophies differ from ours. Some people have said that Plato was dogmatic, others that he was aporetic, and still others that he was aporetic in some respects and dogmatic in others. For be shows, they say, a "gymnastic" and aporetic character in his "gymnastic" discourses, where Socrates
is introduced either as making sport of someone or as contending with the sophists, but a dogmatic character where he speaks seriously through Socrates or Timaeus or some such personage. Concerning those who say that he is dogmatic or that he is dogmatic in some respects and aporetic in others, it would be superfluous to say anything now; for they concede his difference from us. The question whether he is, strictly speaking, skeptical, we treat more fully in our commentaries; but now we shall argue in brief, against the school of Menodotus and Aenesidemus (for these most of all advanced this position), that whenever Plato makes statements about the Ideas or about the existence of providence or about the virtuous life being more choiceworthy than the wicked, if he assents to these as being more plausible than not, he also abandons the Skeptic character since he gives preference to one thing over another as regards credibility and incredibility. From what has been said before it is very evident that this is alien to us. And if he does put forward some points skeptically whenever, as they say, he is doing "gymnastics," that does not make him a Skeptic; for he who dogmatizes about any single thing or prefers any phantasia at all to any other as regards credibility and incredibility, or makes an assertion about something nonevident, acquires the dogmatic character, as Timon, too, shows by what he says about Xenophanes. For, after praising him in many respects and even dedicating his Satires to him, he portrays him as making this lamentation:

I, too, should have had wisdom of mind when I was vacillating. But, being old and not completely versed in Skepticism, I was deceived by the treacherous pathway. For in whichever direction I turned my mind, everything was resolved into one and the same; and everything, continually drawn in all directions, wound up in a single common nature. (Diels Vorsokt. 11 A35)

By reason of this, indeed, Timon describe him as more or less free from delusion, but not completely free, where he says:

Xenophanes, fairly free from delusion, mocker of Homer's fiction, invented a god far removed from human kind, spherical in shape, unshakeable, unblemished, and surpassing thought in his thinking. (Diels Vorsokt. 11 A35)
He calls him "fairly free from delusion" as being on some points not deluded, and " mocker of Homer's fiction" because he ridiculed Homer's stories about [divine] tricks. But Xenophanes, contrary to the preconceptions of the rest of mankind, asserted dogmatically that everything is one, and that god coalesces with everything and is spherical in shape, devoid of pathé, unchangeable and reasonable; whence it is easy to show the difference between Xenophanes and us. In any case, it is very evident from what has been said that even if Plato is aporetic about some things, he is not a Skeptic because in some respects he appears to be making assertions about the existence of non-evident things or to be preferring one non-evident thing to another as regards credibility. The members of the New Academy, although they say that all things are non-apprehensible, differ from the Skeptics, it appears, even in the very statement that all things are non-apprehensible (for they firmly maintain this, while it seems to the Skeptic that maybe something can be apprehended); but they differ from us very evidently in the judgment of things good and evil. For the Academicians say that something is good or evil, not as we do, but having been persuaded that what they call good is good more likely than not, and similarly in the case of evil; whereas we say such things, not with the thought that what we are saying is plausible, but, without any belief, following the common course of life in order not to be incapable of action. And we say that, so far as the philosophic theory is concerned, phantasiai are equal as regards credibility and incredibility, but they say that some are plausible and others the reverse. *122*

And they draw distinctions among the plausible phantasiai: some, they think, are just plausible, some are plausible and tested, and some are plausible, tested and stable. For example, when a rope is lying coiled up in a dark room, a person who enters the room suddenly gets a simply plausible phantasia that it is a snake; but to a person who has looked carefully around and considered the circumstances – for example, that it does not move, that it is of such and such a color, and so on – it appears to be a rope, in accord with a phantasia that is plausible and tested. And a phantasia that is in addition stable is such as the following. After Alcestis had died, Heracles is said to have brought her up again from Hades and to have shown her to Admetus, who got a plausible and tested phantasia of Alcestis; but since he knew that she had died, his intellect withdrew the assent and leaned toward disbelief. Accordingly, the New
Academics prefer the plausible and tested phantasia to the simply plausible, and to both of them the phantasia that is plausible, tested, and stable. And although both the Academics and the Skeptics say that they are persuaded of certain things, here too the difference of the philosophies is very evident. For "to be persuaded" has different senses: on the one hand, it means not to resist but simply to follow without much proclivity or strong pro feeling, as the child is said to be persuaded by or obedient to his teacher; but sometimes it means to assent to something by choice and with a kind of sympathy due to strong desire, as when a profligate man is persuaded by one who approves of living extravagantly. Since, therefore, the followers of Carneades and Cleitomachus say both that they are strongly persuaded and that things are strongly persuasive, whereas we say that we simply make a concession without any pro feeling, we would differ from them in this respect, too. But we also differ from the New Academy as regards the goal; for whereas the gentlemen who say that they conduct themselves in accord with the plausible employ it in everyday life, we live without belief, following the laws, customs, and our natural pathé. And if we were not aiming at brevity, we could say still more about this distinction.

Arcesilaus, however, who we said was the head and founder of the Middle Academy, does indeed seem to me to share the Pyrrhonean arguments, so that his Way is almost the same as ours. For one does not find him making any assertion about the existence or nonexistence of anything, nor does he prefer one thing to another as regards credibility or incredibility; rather, he suspends judgment about everything. And he asserts that the goal is suspension of judgment, which, we were saying, is accompanied by ataraxia. He further says that individual cases of suspension are good and that individual cases of assent are bad. One might note, however, that while we say these things in accord with what is apparent to us, and we do not firmly maintain them, he says them as holding in nature, so as to mean that the suspension itself is good and the assent is bad. And if one is to believe what is said about him, he appeared at first glance to be a Pyrrhonean, they say, but in truth he was a Dogmatist; and since he undertook to test his associates by the aporetic method, to see whether they were naturally fitted to receive the Platonic dogmas, he seemed to be aporetic, but in fact he did pass on the Platonic dogmas to those of his associates who were naturally fitted. And this was why Ariston said of him: "He is Plato in front, Pyrrho in back, and Diodorus in
the middle," for he made use of the dialectic of Diodorus, but he was an outright Platonist.

The followers of Philo say that, insofar as it depends on the Stoic criterion, that is, the apprehensive phantasia, objects and facts are not apprehensible, but that insofar as it depends on the nature of the objects and facts themselves, they are apprehensible. Antiochus even transferred the Stoa to the Academy, so that it was said of him that in the Academy he did Stoic philosophy; for he showed that the Stoic dogmas are in Plato. So the difference between the Skeptic Way and the so-called Fourth and Fifth Academics is quite evident.

34. Whether Medical Empiricism Is the Same as Skepticism

Since some say that the empiricism of the empirical medical system is the same as the Skeptic philosophy, it needs to be recognized that inasmuch as empiricism firmly maintains the inapprehensibility of the non-evident, it is not the same as Skepticism; nor would it befit a Skeptic to take up that system. He might better adopt the so-called Method, it seems to me, for it alone of the medical systems seems not to make precipitate assertions about non-evident things by self-assuredly telling us whether they are apprehensible or not apprehensible; and following the appearances, it takes from them what seems beneficial, in accord with the Skeptic practice. For we said above that everyday life, in which the Skeptic shares, has four parts: one involving nature's guidance, another involving the compulsion of the pathé, still another the tradition of laws and customs, and a fourth the teaching of arts. Accordingly, just as the Skeptic, in accord with the compulsion of the pathé, is led by thirst to drink and by hunger to food and similarly in the other cases, so too the Methodic physician is led by the pathé to what is appropriate by tightness to loosening up, as when one seeks refuge in heat from a cold-induced attack of cramping; and by secretion to drying up, as when people in a sauna, relaxed and sweating profusely, come to the end of the session and with that in mind betake themselves to the cold air. It is also very evident that conditions that are naturally alien impel us to their removal, seeing that even the dog, when stuck by a thorn, proceeds to pull it out. And so in sum – in order not to depart from the outline form by taking up each point individually – I consider
that all the things thus said by the Methodics can be classed as instances of the compulsion of the pathé, whether these pathé are natural or unnatural.

Also common to the two Ways is the undogmatic and relaxed use of words. For just as the Skeptic uses the slogans "I determine nothing" and "I apprehend nothing" undogmatically, as we have said, so also the Methodic physician employs "common features" and "pervade" and the like in an uncomplicated way. So, too, he uses the word "indication" undogmatically, as short for "the guidance of the apparent pathé, both natural and unnatural, to the seemingly appropriate remedies," analogous to what I said in the case of hunger and thirst and the rest. Thus it must be said, on the basis of these and similar significant features, that the Methodic physician's Way has a kinship with Skepticism. And indeed, when considered not simply in itself but in comparison with the other medical systems, it has more kinship than they do.

With this much said about the seeming alternatives to the Skeptic Way, we here complete both the general account of Skepticism and Book I of the Outlines.

Outlines of Pyrrhonism

Book 2 of Three

1. Can the Skeptic Question What Is Said by the Dogmatists?

Since our inquiry is directed against the Dogmatists, let us go over, briefly and in outline, each part of what is called "philosophy", after first having answered those Dogmatists who constantly proclaim that the Skeptic is not in a position to raise questions about or even comprehend in any way the issues concerning which they dogmatize. For they declare that either the Skeptic apprehends what the Dogmatists say or he does not; and if he does apprehend, how can he be at a loss about what he claims to apprehend? But if he does not apprehend, then he will not even know how to discuss what he has not apprehended. For just as the person who does not know what, say, the theorems called "reduced with the respect to" and "by means of two conditionals" are is not able to discuss them, so the person who does not understand the particular things said by the Dogmatists is unable to raise objections to what he does not understand. Therefore, the Skeptic is in no way able to question the statements of the Dogmatists.
Now let those who say this tell us what they mean here by "to apprehend" – whether they mean "to conceive" simpliciter, that is, without also maintaining the existence of the things under discussion, or they mean "to conceive" and also "to establish the existence of" those things. For if they are saying that in their account "to apprehend" means "to assent to an apprehensive phantasia," where an apprehensive phantasia is "one that is derived from, and stamped and impressed in accord with, an existent object or state of affairs, and is such as would not arise from something non-existent," then perhaps not even they themselves will want to claim inability to raise questions about things that they have not apprehended in this sense. For example, when the Stoic raises questions in opposition to the Epicurean's statement that Being is divided, or that god does not have foreknowledge of events in the Cosmos, or that pleasure is good, has he apprehended or not? If he has apprehended, then by saying that these states of affairs exist he has completely abrogated the Stoa, while if he has not apprehended them, he cannot say anything against them.

And a similar point will have to be made against people who subscribe to other systems, whenever they wish to question the views of those with whom they have doctrinal differences. So they are not even able to raise questions against one another. Or rather, to be more serious about it, if it is once granted that it is impossible to raise questions about what is not in this sense apprehended, the whole Dogmatic philosophy, so to say, will be confuted and the Skeptic philosophy firmly established. For he who makes a dogmatic assertion about something nonevident either does so having apprehended that about which he is talking, or not having apprehended it. But if he has not apprehended it, he will not be worthy of belief, while if he has apprehended it, he will say either that he has apprehended it affecting him directly, through itself and with clarity, or else by means of some research and inquiry. Now, if he says that the nonevident thing has affected him and been apprehended immediately through itself and with clarity, then that thing would not be nonevident but, instead, would be equally apparent to everybody, that is, a matter agreed upon and not disputed. But there has been endless controversy among the Dogmatists about every single nonevident matter, so that he who firmly maintains and asserts something about the existence of a nonevident thing or state of affairs cannot have apprehended it affecting him through itself and with clarity. But if be has apprehended it by means of some
research, how, on the hypothesis before us, was be able to conduct the inquiry before be bad accurately apprehended its object? For since the inquiry requires the prior accurate apprehension of, and thus an inquiry into, what is going to be inquired about, while in turn the apprehension itself of the object of inquiry *127* certainly requires an inquiry into that object beforehand, it becomes impossible (because of the circularity mode of aporia) for the Dogmatists to inquire into and dogmatize about things non-evident. If any of them wish to begin with the apprehension, we refer them to the necessity of inquiring about the object before apprehending it, while if they wish to begin with the inquiry, we refer them to the necessity of apprehending the object before it is inquired about. So that for these reasons it is impossible for them either to apprehend any of the nonevident things or to maintain firmly an assertion about them; These considerations, I think, will result directly in the confutation of the Dogmatic sophistry and the introduction of the philosophy of suspending judgment.

If, however, they are going to say that it is not this kind of apprehension that they are claiming should precede inquiry, but rather conception simpliciter, then it is not impossible for those who suspend judgment to inquire about the existence of non-evident things. For, I suppose, the Skeptic is not precluded from a conception that arises during the discussion itself from clear appearances affecting him passively, and that does not at all imply the existence of its objects; since, as the Dogmatists say, we conceive not only of things and states of affairs that exist, but also of those that do not. Hence, the person who suspends judgment remains in the Skeptic state both when he is inquiring and when he is forming conceptions; for it has been shown that he assents to whatever things affect him in accord with a passively received phantasia, insofar as that phantasia appears to him. But notice that even in this case the Dogmatists are precluded from inquiry. For inquiring about objects and states of affairs is not inconsistent in those who agree that they do not know how these things are in nature, but only in those who think they have accurate knowledge of them, since for the latter the inquiry has already reached its end, as they think, whereas for the former the supposition on which every inquiry is based still holds – namely, that they have not already found out the facts. Accordingly, we must now inquire, briefly and in outline, into each part of so-called "philosophy." And since there has been a great deal of controversy among the Dogmatists about the parts of philosophy, with some saying that there
is only one part, some two, and some three, and it would not be convenient to go into this at greater length just now, we shall continue our account by setting forth fairly the doctrine of those who seem to have considered the matter most fully.

2. Where the Criticism of the Dogmatists Should Begin

Now the Stoics and some others say that there are three parts of philosophy, namely, the logical, the physical, and the ethical; and they begin their instruction with the logical part, even though there has been much dispute about the proper place to begin. Without subscribing to any doctrine we shall follow them, and, since the things said in the three parts have need of testing and a criterion, and discussion of the criterion seems to belong to the logical part, let us begin with discussion of the criterion and the logical part. But we must first mention that the word "criterion" means either that by which they say that we decide questions about existence and non-existence, or that with regard to which we conduct our lives. We should now examine what is called the criterion of truth, since we have already discussed the criterion in its other sense in our discourse on Skepticism.

"Criterion," then, in the present account has three senses-the general, the specific, and the most specific. In the general sense, it is any standard of apprehension; in this sense even physical features – for example, eyesight – are called criteria. In the specific sense, it is any technical standard for apprehension – for example, the mason's rule and chalk line. In the most specific sense, it is any technical standard for the apprehension of a non-evident object or state of affairs; in this sense the standards of ordinary life are not called criteria, but only logical standards and those that the Dogmatists apply in deciding about truth. We propose, therefore, to lead off with a discussion of the logical criterion. But "logical criterion," too, is used in three senses, to refer to the "by whom," the "by means of which," and the "according to which." Thus the "by whom" criterion would be a human being; the "by means of which" would be the senses or the intellect; and the "according to which" would be the application of the phantasia in accord with which the human being tries to reach a decision by means of the senses or the intellect.
It was appropriate, I think, to make these remarks in advance, in order that we may understand what our discussion is about; it remains to proceed to the refutation of those who precipitately assert that they have apprehended the criterion of truth; we begin with the controversy about this.

4. Does There Exist a Criterion of Truth?

Of those who have considered the matter, some, for example, the Stoics and others, have asserted that there is a criterion; others, including the Corinthian Xeniades and Xenophanes of Colophon, who said "opinion holds sway over everything," have asserted that there is not; while we have suspended judgment as to whether there is or not. This dispute, then, they will either declare to be decidable or to be undecidable; if undecidable, they will be granting at once that judgment should be suspended; but if decidable, let them say with what it is to be decided, seeing that we do not have any agreed-upon criterion and do not know – indeed, are inquiring – whether one exists. And anyhow, in order to decide the dispute that has arisen about the criterion, we have need of an agreed-upon criterion by means of which we shall decide it; and in order to have an agreed-upon criterion it is necessary first to have decided the dispute about the criterion. Thus, with the reasoning falling into the circularity mode, finding a criterion becomes aporetic; for we do not allow them to adopt a criterion hypothetically, and if they wish to decide about the criterion by means of a criterion we force them into an infinite regress. Further, since proof requires a criterion that has been proved, while the criterion has need of what has been determined to be a proof, they land in circularity.

We think, therefore, that these points are sufficient to show the precipitancy of the Dogmatists as concerns their account of the criterion; but in order to be able to refute them in detail, it will not be inappropriate to expatiate on the subject. We do not, however, undertake to combat every single doctrine concerning the criterion (for by so doing even we would necessarily sink into unsystematic talk, as the controversy has grown out of all proportion), but since the criterion in question seems to be threefold – the "by whom" and the "by means of which" and the "according to which" – we shall take up each of these in turn and establish that it is not apprehensible; in this way, our argument will be systematic and complete.
Let us begin with the "by whom," the agent; for the rest seem somehow to share the perplexity attached to this.

5. The "By Whom" Criterion

Now it seems to me that human beings, if we go by the statements of the Dogmatists, are not only non-apprehensible but are even inconceivable. Indeed, we bear the Platonic Socrates expressly agreeing that he does not know whether be is a human being or something else. And when the Dogmatists wish to define the concept, they first disagree and then talk nonsense.

Thus Democritus says that human beings are "what we all know." But if we go by this we shall not know human beings, since we also know a dog and consequently the dog will be a human being. Further, there are some human beings whom we do not know; therefore, they will not be human beings. What is more, if we go by this concept, nobody will be a human being. For since Democritus says that human beings must be known by all, and no human being is known by all human beings, no one, according to him, will be a human being. Further, that we are not making these remarks sophistically is apparent from their relevance to him. For this gentleman says that in truth there exist only atoms, and the void, which are the existential basis not only of animals but of all compounds, so that as far as these [atoms and the void] are concerned we cannot form a conception of the individuality of the human being, since they are common to everything. And besides these there is no other substrate; therefore, we shall have no means of distinguishing human beings from the other animals and thus of forming a precise concept. Epicurus, on the other hand, defines a human being as "this sort of shape, plus animation." According to him, then, since human beings are ostensively defined by pointing, what is not pointed at is not a human being. And if somebody points at a woman, a man will not be a human being, while if he points at a man, a woman will not be a human being. We shall also argue for the same conclusions on the basis of the differences of circumstances, which we know from the fourth mode of Epochè. *130*

Others used to assert that a human being is a rational mortal animal, capable of thought and knowledge. But since it is shown in the first mode of Epochè that no animal is non-rational and all are capable of thought and knowledge, we shall
not know what these people have in mind if we go by what they say. And the attributes in the definition are meant either as actual or as potential. If, on the one hand, they are meant as actual, then a person will not be a human being unless he has perfect knowledge and perfect reason and is in the very act of dying – for that is actual mortality. But if, on the other hand, they are meant as potential, then no one who has perfect reason and has already got intelligence and knowledge will be a human being; but this is even more absurd than the previous conclusion. By this, therefore, the concept of human being has shown itself impossible to frame.

When Plato deems a human being to be a "wingless biped with flat nails, capable of political knowledge," even he does not think to put this forward as something he firmly maintains. For since human beings are among those things that, as he puts it, are always becoming and never really exist, and since further it is impossible, according to him, to assert and firmly maintain anything about that which never really exists, not even Plato will want to seem to propose this definition as something he firmly maintains, but only, in his usual way, as a statement of what is plausible.

But even if we should grant for the sake of argument that human beings are conceivable, they will be found not to be apprehensible. For a human being is compounded of soul and body, but neither the body nor the soul, it seems, is apprehensible; therefore the human being is not apprehensible, either. And that the body is not apprehensible is evident as follows: the attributes of something are other than that of which they are attributes. Thus, whenever a colored surface or something like that affects us, it is probably the attributes of the body that affect us, and not the body itself. Besides, they say that the body is extended in three directions; therefore, we ought to apprehend its length, breadth, and depth if we are to apprehend the body. But if depth affected us, we would perceive the silver interiors of gold coins. Therefore, we do not apprehend the body, either.

But, not to linger over the dispute about the body, human beings will be found not to be apprehensible also because the soul is not apprehensible. That this is not apprehensible is evident as follows: of those who have discussed the soul - leaving to one side the extensive and interminable battle over it – some, like the followers of Dicaearchus the Messenian, say that there is no such thing as the soul; some say that there is such a thing; and some have suspended judgment.
Now if the Dogmatists are going to say that this dispute is not decidable, they will be admitting right off that the soul is not apprehensible; while if they will say that it is decidable, let them tell us by what they will decide it. They cannot say "by the senses," for according to them the soul is an object of thought. But if they will say "by the intellect," we shall reply that since the intellect is the most non-evident part of the soul, as is shown by the fact that those who agree about the existence of the soul disagree about the intellect, if they propose to use the intellect to apprehend the soul and to decide the dispute about it, they will be proposing to decide and establish the less questionable by the more questionable, which is absurd. Hence, the dispute about the soul will not be decided by the intellect, either. Therefore, it will not be decided by anything. And if that is the case, the soul is not apprehensible, so that human beings would not be apprehensible either.

But even if we grant that human beings are apprehensible, it would not be possible, I think, to show that determinations about things and issues should be made by them. For anyone who says that determinations about things and issues should be made by a human being will say this either without proof or with proof. But he will not say it with proof, for it is necessary that the proof be true and have been determined to be such, and, in view of this, that it have been determined by someone to be a true proof. Since, therefore, we are not able with general agreement to say by whom the proof can be determined to be such (for we are in the midst of our inquiry into the "by whom" criterion), we shall not be able to decide about the proof, nor, in view of this, to prove that the criterion with which the argument is concerned is a criterion. But if, on the other hand, it will be said without proof that determinations about things and issues should be made by human beings, the statement will not be worthy of belief. Consequently, we shall not be able to maintain firmly that human beings are the "by whom" criterion. Moreover, by whom will it be determined that human beings are the "by whom" criterion? For if they just say this without making a determination, they will not be believed. And if they say "by a human being," the point at issue will have been assumed. But if by another animal, how do they light upon that animal to determine whether human beings are the criterion? For if they do so without making a determination, they will not be believed, while if with a determination, that again will have to be determined by something. But if by itself, the same absurdity will remain (for the determination about what is in question will be
made by means of what is in question), and if by a human being, we have the circularity mode; and if by something other than these two, we shall again demand in its case the "by whom" criterion, and so on ad infinitum. For this reason, therefore, we shall not be able to say that things and issues should be determined by a human being.

But let it be the case and let it be believed to be the case that determinations about things and issues should be made by human beings. Then, since human beings differ a great deal, let the dogmatists first agree with one another that this is the human being to whom one should pay attention, and then, and only then, let them tell us to agree with him. But if they are going to dispute about this "as long as water flows and trees grow," as the saying goes, how can they urge us to be quick about assenting to anyone? For if they say that we must give credence to the person who is wise, we shall ask them "What sort of wise person? – The wise Epicurean? the wise Stoic? The Cyrenaic? The Cynic?" They will not be able to agree upon an answer.

If somebody thinks that we should desist from raising such questions, and simply believe the most sagacious person of all, then, in the first place, the Dogmatists will disagree about who is most sagacious of all, and next, even if it be granted that it is possible to agree on someone as the most sagacious of all people present and past, still this will not make that person more worthy of belief. For since sagacity is subject to great, almost infinite, variation in degree, we declare that it is possible for another person to turn up who is more sagacious than this person whom we are saying is the most sagacious of all people past and present. Thus, just as we are told to give credence, because of his sagacity, to the person who is now said to be wiser than the others present and past, so one ought to give even more credence to the more sagacious person coming after him. And when that successor has appeared, we must expect another one to show up who is more sagacious than be, and so on ad infinitum. Nor is it evident whether these people will all agree with one another or will give accounts that disagree.

Wherefore, even if someone is agreed to be more sagacious than other people past and present, since we are not able to say with firm assurance that nobody will be more clever than be (for it is nonevident), it will always be necessary to await the determination by the wiser person of the future, and not to assent to the aforementioned "best" one.
But even if we grant for the sake of argument that nobody is, was, or will be more sagacious than our hypothetical sage, even then it does not make sense to believe him. For since it is above all the sagacious who, in arguing about the facts, love to defend unsound ones and make them seem to be sound and true, when this clever fellow says something we shall not know whether perhaps the matter is in nature as he says or whether he is defending as true what is really false and is persuading us to think it true on the ground that he is more sagacious than all other existing people and for that reason is not subject to refutation by us. So we shall not even give assent to this person as one who determines the facts truly, since, though we think it possible that he may be telling the truth, we also think it possible that he says what he says while wishing, because of an excess of cleverness, to defend the false as true. For these reasons, in determining the facts we have no obligation to believe even the most clever of all existing people.

If anyone says that we ought to pay heed to the consensus of the many, we shall reply that that is foolish. For, first of all, the truth is a rare thing, I think, and for that reason it is possible for one person to be wiser than the many. And next, for any given criterion there are more people who disagree than agree about it, since all the people who accept any criterion, whatever its kind, other than the one that seems to some to be generally agreed upon, will oppose this latter one and are much more numerous than those who agree about it. But apart from these considerations, those who agree are either in different conditions or in one and the same condition. Now they are certainly not in different conditions so far as what is being spoken about is concerned; else how can they have said the same things about it? But if they are in one and the same condition, then, since not only the individual person who makes a different statement is in a single condition but also those who are agreeing, no difference will be found (insofar as it is a matter of the conditions in which we find ourselves) even on the basis of numbers. Consequently, there is no more need to pay attention to the many than to the one; in addition to which, as we pointed out in the fourth mode of Skepticism, the classification of determinations on the basis of numbers is not apprehensible, since there exist innumerable human beings and we cannot go through the determinations of all of them and say which are asserted by more people and which by fewer. Thus, according to this, it is absurd to choose among determinations on the basis of numbers. But even if we disregard numbers, we
shall not find anyone by whom things and issues are to be determined, despite
our having granted so much for the sake of argument. Therefore, for all these
reasons, the criterion "by whom" things and issues are to be determined will be
found not to be apprehensible. And as the other criteria are encompassed in this
one (for each of them is either a part or a pathos or an action of a human being),
the next thing, I suppose, would be to go on to one of the topics coming next in
order in our account, on the assumption that the other criteria have been
adequately covered by the present remarks. But in order that we may not seem to
be avoiding giving a specific refutation for each case, we shall say a few things
about these, too, for good measure. However, first we shall discuss the so-called
"by means of which" criterion.

6. The "By Means of Which" Criterion

Concerning this criterion there has been a huge and almost endless controversy
among the Dogmatists. But we, again with a view toward systematic treat-
say that since according to them the human being is the one "by whom" objects
and issues are determined, and since be has, as they also agree, only his senses
and intellect by means of which to make determinations, if we show that he will
not be able to make them by the senses alone, nor by the intellect alone, nor by
both of them, we shall have concisely rebutted all the particular doctrines; for it
seems that they all can be reduced to these three positions. Let us begin with the
senses.

Since, then, some people say that the senses provide "empty" pathé, – that is,
that nothing the senses seem to perceive exists – while others say that everything
by which they suppose them to be moved exists, and still others say that some of
it exists and some of it does not, we shall not know to whom we should assent.
For we shall not decide the dispute by the senses, since we are questioning
whether they produce "empty" pathé or apprehend truly, nor by something else,
since on the hypothesis before us there is no other criterion by means of which
one ought to make the determination. Therefore, whether sensation produces
"empty" pathé or apprehends anything is not decidable and not apprehensible; and
a corollary to this is that in making determinations about things and issues we
ought not give heed to sensation alone, since in regard to it we cannot assert that it even apprehends anything at all.

But suppose, for the sake of argument, that the senses do serve to perceive things; even so, they will be found no less unworthy of belief in relation to making determinations about the external objects and states of affairs. For certainly the senses are moved in opposite directions by things external – for example, taste perceives the same honey sometimes as bitter and sometimes as sweet, and to sight the same color seems sometimes blood red and sometimes white. Not even smell agrees with itself, for myrrh is found unpleasant by the person who has a headache, but pleasant by the one who is not in that condition. And those who are divinely possessed or raving seem to hear people conversing with them, while we do not. Further, the same water seems unpleasantly hot to people in a fever, but lukewarm to others. Thus, there is no way of saying whether one is to deem all phantasiai true, or some true and some false, or all false, since we have no agreed-upon criterion by means of which we shall make our proposed determinations, nor are we even provided with a true proof that has been determined to be such, since we are still in search of the criterion of truth by means of which the purported true proof should be appraised. Also, for these reasons, any person who thinks that we should believe those who are in a natural condition and not believe those who are not is being absurd, for he will not be believed if he says this without proof, nor, for the reasons given above, will he have a true proof that has been determined to be such.

And even if someone were to agree that the phantasiai of people who are in a natural condition are worthy of belief, while those of people who are in unnatural condition are not, it will still be found impossible to make determinations about the external objects by means of the senses alone. For certainly sight, even when it is in the natural condition, at one time calls the tower round and at another time calls it square; and taste declares the food unpleasant for the sated but pleasant for the hungry; and hearing similarly perceives the same sound as loud at night but faint by day; and the sense of smell fancies the same things malodorous in the case of the many but not so in the case of the tanners; and by the same sense of touch we feel warm when we are entering the bathhouse by the vestibule, but cold when we are leaving. Wherefore, since the senses
contradict themselves even when they are in the natural state, and the disagreement is undecided because we have no criterion by means of which it can be decided, the same aporiai follow of necessity. And, to establish this conclusion it is possible to carry over still more points from what we have said before in connection with the modes of Epoché. Hence it would not be true, I think, that it is possible to make determinations out the external objects and states of affairs by means of the senses alone.

57 In our account, then, let us proceed to the intellect. Those who claim that in making determinations about objects and states of affairs we should pay heed to the intellect alone are, in the first place, unable to show that the existence he intellect is apprehensible. Gorgias, when he claims that nothing exists, implies that not even the intellect exists, while others assert that it does exist, so how shall we resolve this dispute? Not by the intellect, since that would beg the question; nor by anything else, for according to the present hypothesis there is nothing else, as they claim, by means of which determinations about objects and states of affairs are made. Therefore, whether the intellect exists or does not exist is neither decidable nor apprehensible; a corollary to which is that in making determinations about objects and states of affairs one ought not attend only to the intellect, which has not as yet been apprehended.

58 But suppose that the intellect has been apprehended, and let it be agreed by hypothesis that it exists; I still say that it is not able to make determinations *135* about objects and states of affairs. For if it does not even discern itself accurately, but disputes with itself concerning its own existence and the manner of its genesis and the location where it is, how would it be able accurately to apprehend anything else? And even granting that the intellect is able to make determinations about objects and states of affairs, we shall not find out how to make such determinations in accord with it. For since there is much controversy regarding the intellect, with one intellect being that of Gorgias, in accord with which be says that nothing exists, and another that of Heraclitus, in accord with which be says that everything exists, and still another that of those who say that some things exist and others do not, we shall have no way of resolving this controversy of the intellects, nor shall we be able to say that one should heed the intellect of this person but not that of that one. If we take a chance on making the determination by any one intellect, we shall be assenting to one party of the
dispute and thus begging the question; but if by anything else, we shall be making false the assertion that one should make determinations about objects and states of affairs by the intellect alone.

Another thing: from what was said about the so-called "by whom" criterion we shall be able to show that we are not able to find the most clever of all the intellects, and that even if we did find the most clever of all past and present intellects, one ought not to pay attention to it, for whether in the future there will be another intellect more clever than it is nonevident; and further, that even if we hypothesize an intellect that is more clever than any that will arise, we shall not give assent to the person who is making determinations by means of it, lest, putting forward some false proposition, he is able by means of his sharp intellect to fool us into believing that it is true. Consequently, we should not make determinations about objects and states of affairs by the intellect alone.

The remaining possibility is to say that it should be done by means of both the senses and the intellect. But again this is impossible. For not only do the senses not lead the intellect to apprehension, but they even oppose it. Democritus, as we know, on the basis that honey appears bitter to some people and sweet to others, said that it is neither sweet nor bitter, while Heraclitus said that it is both. And the same account may be given in the case of the other senses and sensory objects. Thus the intellect, moved by the senses, is forced to make differing and inconsistent statements; and this is alien to an apprehensive criterion. Then there is also the following to be said. the Dogmatists will make determinations about objects and states of affairs either by all the senses and by everybody's intellect, or by some. But if someone will say "by all," he will be claiming what is impossible, with so much inconsistency apparent among the senses and among the intellects; and in particular, his statement will be, turned back on itself because of the assertion of the intellect of Gorgias that one should not pay heed either to the senses or to the intellect. And if they say "by some," how will they determine, not having an agreed-upon criterion by means of which to make determinations about the differing senses and intellects, that we should hold to these senses and this intellect and not to those? And if they are going to say that we shall make determinations about the senses and intellects by the intellect and the senses, they will be begging the question; for whether it is possible for anyone to make determinations by means of these is precisely what we are questioning.
And this, too, needs to be said: either they will make determinations about both the senses and the intellects by the senses, or both by the intellects, or the senses by the senses and the intellects by the intellects, or the intellects by the senses and the intellects by the intellect. If, then, they prefer to make determinations about both by either the senses or the intellect, they will not do so by both sense and intellect but by one of these, whichever they may choose; and consequently the previously mentioned aporiai will dog their steps. But if they are going to decide about the senses by the senses and the intellects by the intellect, then, since the senses are inconsistent with the senses and the intellects with the intellects, whichever of the battling senses they take for making the determinations about the other senses, they will be begging the question. For they will be taking as credible one party to the dispute, in order to decide about others that are no more questionable than it. And the same argument applies in the case of the intellects. But if they will decide about the intellects by the senses and the senses by the intellect, we have circularity, since in order that a determination be made about the senses it is necessary that one have been made about the intellects beforehand, and in order that the intellects be tested there must first be a decision about the senses. Since, therefore, we cannot decide about criteria of the same type by means of those of the same type, nor about both types by means of one type, nor, alternando, about each type by the other type, we shall not be able, in making determinations, to prefer one intellect to another or one sense to another. And for this reason we shall not have anything by means of which to make determinations, for if we are neither able to do so by means of all the senses and intellects, and if we do not know by which we should do so and by which we should not, then we shall not have anything by means of which to make determinations about things and issues.

So that for these reasons, too, the "by means of which" criterion would be non-existent.

7. The "According to Which" Criterion

Next, let us take a look at the criterion "according to which" they say determinations about objects and states of affairs are reached. The first thing to say on this topic is that one cannot form a conception of phantasia. For they
define a *phantasia* as an impression on the ruling part of the soul. But since the soul is either breath or something even more subtle than breath, as they say, nobody will be able to conceive of an "impression" on it, whether by way of raised and depressed areas, as we see in the case of seals, or by way of the mystical alteration they talk about. And certainly the soul would not be able to keep memories of all the principles that constitute an art [*techné*], since the previously existing alterations would be wiped off by the succeeding ones. But even if one could form a conception of it, the *phantasia* would not be apprehensible, for, since it is a *pathos* of the ruling part, and the ruling part, as we have shown, is not apprehensible, we shall not apprehend a *pathos* of it, either.

And further, even if we were to grant that the phantasia is apprehended, it would not be possible to make determinations about objects and states of affairs in accord with it. For, as the Dogmatists say, the intellect does not of itself get in contact with external objects and receive *phantasiai* from them, but it does so by means of the senses; and the senses do not apprehend the external objects but only their own pathé, if anything. And so the *phantasia* will be of a sensory pathos, which is not the same thing as the external object. For example, the honey is not the same as my experiencing a sweet taste, nor the wormwood the same as my experiencing a bitter taste, but something different. And since this pathos differs from the external object, the *phantasia* will not be of the external object but of something different. So if the intellect makes determinations in accord with the phantasia, it does so foolishly and not in accord with the external object. Consequently, it is absurd to say that determinations about external matters are made according to phantasiai.

Nor again can one say that the soul apprehends the external objects by means of the sensory *pathè* because the *pathè* of the senses are similar to the external objects. For from whence will the intellect know whether the *pathè* of the senses are similar to the objects of sense, when it has not itself met with these external objects, and when the senses do not reveal to it the nature of those objects, but only their own *pathè* (as I have argued from the modes of *Epochè*)? For just as the person who does not know Socrates but has seen a picture of him does not know whether the picture is like Socrates, so also the intellect, looking at the *pathè* of the senses but not having observed the external objects, will not know
whether the *pathè* of the senses resemble the external objects. Therefore, not even on the basis of similarity will the intellect be able to judge these objects in accord with the phantasia.

But by way of concession let us grant that, in addition to being conceived \(^76\) of and apprehended, the *phantasiai* are such that determinations can be made about objects and issues according to them, even though the argument points to the complete opposite of this. Then either we shall give credence to every *phantasia* and make determinations according to it, or to some. But if to every *phantasia*, it is clear that we will give credence also to that of Xeniades, according to which be said that no *phantasiai* are worthy of credence, and our statement will be turned back on itself to imply that not all phantasiai are such that determinations about objects and issues can be made according to them. But if to some, how shall we determine that to these *phantasiai* we should pay \(^77\) heed, and to those, not? And if they say that we are to do so without a *phantasia*, they will be granting that phantasiai are superfluous for making determinations, since they will be saying that it is possible to do this about objects and issues without them. But if they say "with a *phantasia,"

how will they select the *phantasia* which they are using to decide about the other phantasiai? Once again, they will need another phantasia for judging the other \(^78\) one, and still another for that, and so on ad infinitum. But it is impossible to make an infinite number of determinations. Consequently, it is impossible to *138* discover which sort of phantasiai should be used as criteria and which not. Since, therefore, even if we grant that determinations about objects and issues should be, made in accord with phantasiai, the argument is overturned whether we give credence to them all or only to some; it follows that we should not use phantasiai as criteria for making such determinations.

\(^79\) At this point in our outline these remarks will suffice as regards the criterion according to which determinations about objects and states of affairs are said to be made. Nevertheless, it must be understood that we have no intention of asserting that a criterion of truth does not exist, for that would be dogmatic; but since the Dogmatists seem to have established plausibly that there is a criterion of truth, we have set up some seemingly plausible counter-arguments – not, however, firmly maintaining that they are true or more plausible than the opposing ones, but arriving at suspension of judgement on the basis of the apparent equipollence, as regards plausibility, of these arguments and those of the Dogmatists.
8. The True and Truth

However, even if we were to grant, as an hypothesis, that there is a criterion of truth, it is revealed as useless and idle when we recall that, going by what is said by the Dogmatists, truth is non-existent and the true is unreal. What we have in mind here is the following. The true is said to differ from truth in three respects, namely, in essence, in composition, and in power. They differ in essence, since the true is not a body (for it is a proposition and thus a lekton), whereas truth is a body (for it is knowledge assertoric of all truths, and knowledge is the ruling part in a certain state, just as a fist is a hand in a certain state; and the ruling part is a body, for according to them it is breath). They differ in composition, since the true is something simple, like "I am conversing," but the truth consists of many true items of knowledge. And they differ in power, since the truth involves knowledge, but in general the true does not. Consequently they say that the truth exists only in wise people, while the true occurs also in the stupid, for it is possible for a stupid person to say something true.

The foregoing is what the Dogmatists say. In deference once again to the plan of our treatise, however, we shall restrict ourselves for the present to arguments about the true, for they also cover the truth since it is defined as "the systematized knowledge of things true." Furthermore, while some of these arguments (namely, those whereby we call in question the very existence of the true) are more general, while others (by means of which we show that the true is not to be found in the sound or in the lekton or in the movement of the intellect) are specific, we think it sufficient on this occasion to set out the more general. For just as when the foundation of a wall is destroyed, all the superstructure is destroyed along with it, so also, when the subsistence of the true is challenged, the particular subtleties of the Dogmatists will be included. *139*

9. Is There Anything True by Nature?

There is a controversy among the Dogmatists regarding the true, since some of them say that there is something true and others say that nothing is true. But it is not possible to resolve the, because the person who says that there is something
true will not, in view of the controversy, be believed without proof, while if he
wishes to give a proof, then if he agrees that it is false be will not be credible;
whereas if he says that it is true he falls into a circular argument and will be
required to give a proof that it is in fact true, and another proof of that, and so on
ad infinitum. But it is impossible to prove an infinite number of things. Therefore,
it is impossible to know even that there is something true.

Further, the "something," which they say is the highest genus, is either true or false, or neither true nor false, or both false and true. If, then, they are going to
say that it is false, they will be agreeing that everything is false. For just as since
Animal is animate all particular animals are animate, so, if the highest genus of
all, the "something," is false, all the particular things will be false and nothing will be true. But along with this there follows also the conclusion that nothing is false,
for the very statements "everything is false" and "something is false," being
included among the "all," will be false. And if the "something" is true, then
everything will be true – from which it will follow again that nothing is true, for
since this statement itself (I mean "nothing is true") is something, it is true. And if
the "something" is both false and true, each of the particulars will be both false
and true. From this it follows that nothing is true by nature. For that which has
such a nature as to be true would in no way be false. But if the "something" is
neither false nor true, it is conceded that all the particulars, being said to be
neither false nor true, will not be true. And for these reasons, it will be nonevident
to us whether there is something true.

In addition to these considerations, either the true are appearances only, or nonevident only, or, of the true some are nonevident and some are appearances;
but none of these alternatives is true, as we shall show; nothing, therefore, is true.
For if the true are appearances only, the Dogmatists will say either that all or that
some of the appearances are true. And if they say "all," the argument is turned
around, for it appears to some that nothing is true. But if they say "some,"
obody can assert without a criterion that these are true and those are false, while
if he employs a criterion he will say either that this criterion is an appearance or
that it is nonevident. But it is certainly not nonevident, for it is now being
assumed that appearances only are true. But if it is an appearance, then, since the
point at issue is which appearances are true and which are not, the appearance that
is taken for the purpose of judging the appearances will need again another
apparent criterion, and this another, and so on ad infinitum. But it is impossible to
decide an infinite number of things. Therefore, it is impossible to apprehend
whether the true things are appearances only.

Similarly, the person who says that the non-evident only are true will not say that all of
them are true (for he will not say both that the number of the *140*
stars is even and that it is odd); and if he says that only some are true, by what
shall we decide that these non-evident matters are true and those are false?
Certainly not by an appearance. But if by something non-evident, then, since we are
investigating which of the non-evident are true and which are false, this non-
evident point will itself require another to decide about it, and that one another,
and so on ad infinitum. Therefore, it is not the case that the non-evident only are
true.

The remaining alternative is to say that of the true, some are appearances and
some are non-evident, but this possibility, too, is absurd. For either all the
appearances and the non-evident are true, or some of the appearances and some of
the non-evident. Now if all, the statement will once again be turned around, as it
will be granted true that nothing is true; and it will be said to be true both that
the number of the stars is even and that it is odd. But if only some of the
appearances and some of the non-evident are true, how shall we determine that of
the appearances these are true and those are false? If by some appearance, the
argument will go on ad infinitum. And if by something non-evident, then since the
non-evident also require determining, by means of what will this non-evident
point be determined? If by some appearance, we have the circularity mode, and if
by something non-evident, an infinite regress. Similar things must also be said
about the non-evident. For the person who tries to make a determination about
them by something non-evident falls into the infinite regress, while the one who
tries to do so by an appearance either gets into an infinite regress (if he again and
again employs something apparent) or into circularity (if he switches over to
something non-evident). It is false, therefore, to say that of the true things some
are appearances and some are non-evident.

So if neither the appearances only nor the non-evident only are true, nor are
some of the appearances and some of the non-evident, then nothing is true. But if
nothing is true, and the criterion is supposed to be useful for making
determinations about the true, the criterion is useless and idle even if we grant for
the sake of argument that it has some sort of existence. And if one must suspend judgment as to whether there is anything true, it follows that those who say that dialectic is the science of things false or true or neither are getting ahead of themselves.

95 Further, since the criterion of truth has appeared to be aporetic, it is no longer possible, if we go by the statements of the Dogmatists, to make any confident assertion either about the things that seem clear or about the non-evident, for seeing that the Dogmatists think that they apprehend these latter on the basis of the "clear" things, how shall we dare to assert anything about the non-evident if we are forced to suspend judgment about these 96 so-called "clear" things? But for very good measure we shall raise some objections applying against the non-evident objects and states of affairs in particular. And since these seem to be apprehended and confirmed by means of sign and proof, we shall point out briefly that one ought also to suspend judgment about those. Let us begin with signs, for proof seems to be a species of sign. *141*

10. Signs

Of objects of discourse [ta pragmata], some, according to the Dogmatists, are 97 pre-evident and some are non-evident; and of the non-evident, some are non-evident once and for all, some are temporarily non-evident, and some are non-evident by nature. And they call "pre-evident" those things that come to our awareness directly, such as that it is daytime; "non-evident once and for all" are those which do not naturally fall within our apprehension, such as that the number of the stars is even; "temporarily non-evident" are those which, though 98 they are by nature clear, are temporarily non-evident to us because of external circumstances, as, for example, the city of Athens is at the moment non-evident to me; and "non-evident by nature" are those which are not of such a nature as to fall within our clear view, such as the intelligible pores, for these never appear of themselves but may be thought to be apprehended, if at all, by means of other things, such as perspiration or something like that. Now the pre-evident 99 things, they say, have no need of a sign, for they are apprehended by means of themselves. Nor do the once-and-for-all non-evident things have need of a sign, since they are never apprehended at all. But, say the Dogmatists, the temporarily
non-evident and the naturally non-evident are apprehended by means of signs, though not by the same ones, for the temporarily non-evident are apprehended by means of mnemonic signs, and the naturally non-evident by means of indicative signs. According to the Dogmatists, then, some of the signs are mnemonic and others are indicative. And they call a sign "mnemonic" if, having been observed together with the thing signified, it, by its clearness at the time when it occurs to us (while the thing signified is non-evident), leads us to recall what was observed together with it and is not occurring clearly now, as is the case with smoke and fire. A sign is "indicative," as they say, if it is not clearly observed together with what is signified, but it signifies that of which it is a sign by its own individual nature and constitution; for example, the motions of the body are signs of the soul. Whence they also define the indicative sign thus: "an indicative sign is a proposition that is the true antecedent in a true conditional and serves to disclose the consequent." There being two different kinds of sign, as we said, we do not argue against every sign but only against the indicative kind, since it seems to have been invented by the Dogmatists. For the mnemonic sign is relied on in the normal course of life, since fire is signified to the person who sees smoke, and if he observes a scar he says that there has been a wound. Hence, not only do we not fight against the normal course of life, but we are allied with it in that we assent undogmatically to what it relies on, while opposing the peculiar creations of the Dogmatists.

It was, I think, appropriate to say these things in advance in order to clarify the matter in question. It remains for us to proceed to the refutation, not being concerned to show completely the non-existence of the indicative sign, but only recalling the apparent equipollence of the arguments that are brought for and against its existence. *142*

11. Is There Such a Thing as an Indicative Sign?

Now the sign, if we go by what is said about it by the Dogmatists, is not conceivable. Thus, for example, those who seem to have dealt with it carefully – the Stoics – in their attempt to set before the mind the notion of sign say that a sign is a proposition that is the true antecedent in a sound conditional and serves to disclose the consequent. And they say that a proposition is a complete lekton
that is assertoric by itself, and a sound conditional is one that does not have a true antecedent and a false consequent. For the conditional either has a true antecedent and a true consequent, (for example, "If it is day, it is light") or a false antecedent and a false consequent, (for example, "If the earth is flying, the earth has wings") or a true antecedent and a false consequent, (for example, "If the earth exists, the earth is flying") or a false antecedent and a true consequent, (for example, "If the earth is flying, the earth exists"). They say that of these only the one with a true antecedent and a false consequent is unsound, and that the others are sound. They say also that a "guiding proposition" is the antecedent of a true conditional that has a true antecedent and a true consequent. And it serves to disclose the consequent, seeing that "She has milk" seems to disclose "She has conceived" in this conditional, "If she has milk, she has conceived."  

That is what the Stoics say. But we say, first of all, that it is non-evident whether there is any such thing as a lekton. Some of the Dogmatists – the Epicureans – say that lekta do not exist, while others – the Stoics – say that they do exist. When the Stoics say that lekta exist they employ either mere assertion or a proof as well. But if mere assertion, the Epicureans will counter with the assertion that lekta do not exist; and if the Stoics will bring in a proof, then since the proof consists of propositions, that is, of lekta, and, itself consisting of lekta, cannot be brought in to promote belief in the existence of lekta (for how will a person who does not grant the existence of lekta agree that there is a system of lekta?) – it follows that the person who seeks to establish the existence of lekta by assuming the existence of a system of lekta is trying to make what is in question believable by means of what is in question. Hence, if it is impossible to establish the existence of lekta either simply or by a proof, it is non-evident that there is any such thing as a lekton.

Similarly with regard to the question of whether propositions exist, for the proposition is a lekton. Further, even if it should be granted for the sake of argument that lekta exist, it will be found that propositions do not, for they are composed of lekta that do not exist simultaneously with one another. In the case of "If it is day, it is light," when I say "It is day" the proposition "It is light" does not yet exist, and when I say "It is light" the "It is day" no longer exists. And since composite things cannot exist if their parts do not exist simultaneously, and the
things of which propositions are composed do not exist simultaneously, propositions do not exist.

But, even leaving these points aside, the sound conditional will be found not to be apprehensible. For Philo says that a sound conditional is one that does not have a true antecedent and a false consequent; for example, when it is day and I am conversing "If it is day, I am conversing"; but Diodorus defines *143* it as one that neither is nor ever was capable of having a true antecedent and a false consequent. According to him, the conditional just mentioned seems to be false, since when it is day and I have become silent, it will have a true antecedent and a false consequent. But the following conditional seems true: 111 "If atomic elements of things do not exist, then atomic elements of things do exist," since it will always have the false antecedent, "Atomic elements of things do not exist," and the true consequent, "Atomic elements of things do exist." And those who introduce connection or coherence say that a conditional is sound when the denial of its consequent is inconsistent with the antecedent; so, according to them, the above-mentioned conditionals are unsound, but the following is true: "If it is day, it is day." And those who judge by "force" declare 112 that a conditional is true if its consequent is in effect included in its antecedent. According to them, I suppose, "if it is day, then it is day" and every repeated conditional will be false, for there is no way for a thing itself to be included in itself.

So it will seem, I guess, that there is no way of settling the controversy. 113 For whether we give preference to any one of the aforementioned positions with or without proof, we shall not be credible. For a proof is considered sound if its conclusion follows from the conjunction of its premises as a consequent follows from an antecedent; as, for example, with:

If it is day, it is light.
But it is day.
Therefore, it is light;

and

If, if it is day it is light, and it is day, then it is light.
But when we ask how we shall determine whether the consequent follows from the antecedent, we are met with circularity. For in order that a determination about the conditional be proved, the conclusion of the proof must follow from the premises, as we have said above; and, in turn, in order for this to have any credibility, it is necessary that a determination have been made about the conditional and the relation of following. Which is absurd. Therefore, the true conditional is not apprehensible.

But the "guiding proposition", too, is a subject of aporia. For it, they say, is the antecedent in a conditional that has a true antecedent and a true consequent. But if the sign "serves to disclose the consequent," that consequent will either be pre-evident or non-evident. And if it is pre-evident, it will not have any need of what is supposed to do the "disclosing," but will be apprehended along with it and will not be the thing signified, and thus the other will not be a sign of it. On the other hand, if it is non-evident, then since there are undecidable disputes about the non-evident things as to which of them are true and which are false, and even in general whether any one of them is true, it will be non-evident whether the conditional has a true consequent. A corollary to this is that it is also non-evident whether its antecedent is a "guiding proposition." *144*

But, leaving these points to one side, it is impossible for the sign to serve to disclose the consequent if what is signified is relative to the sign and is therefore apprehended together with it. For relative things are apprehended together with one another; for example, just as the right cannot be apprehended as the right of the left before the left is apprehended, nor vice-versa, so also in the case of the other relative things; and thus the sign cannot be apprehended as the sign of the significatum before the significatum is apprehended. 118 And if the sign is not apprehended before the significatum, it cannot really serve to disclose something that is apprehended together with it and not after it. Thus also, if we go by the usual statements of the Stoics, a concept of sign cannot be formed. For they say both that the sign is relative and that it serves to disclose the significatum to which they say it is relative. Now, if it is relative, that is to say, relative to the significatum, it certainly ought to be apprehended together with the significatum, just as the left with the right and the up with the down and the rest of the relative things. But if it also serves to disclose what is signified, it also certainly ought to be apprehended in advance in order that, being preknown, it may lead us to the
notion of the object or state of affairs that becomes known through it. But it is impossible to form a notion of an object or state of affairs that cannot be known before that [object or state of affairs] before which it has to be apprehended; therefore, it is impossible to conceive of something that is relative and serves to disclose that existing thing relative to which it is thought. But they say both that the sign is relative and that it serves to disclose the significatum; it is impossible, therefore, to conceive of the sign.

In addition to these points, the following should be said. There has been a controversy among those who have gone before us, with some claiming that there is such a thing as an indicative sign and others that there is no such thing. Now whoever says that there is such a thing as an indicative sign will say this either simply and without proof, making a bald assertion, or he will say it with proof. But if he employs mere assertion he will not be credible, while if he tries to prove it he will assume what is in question. For since proof is said to come under the genus Sign, and it is disputed whether or not there is such a thing as a sign, there will also be a dispute as to whether or not there is such a thing as a proof—just as when, for example, it is questioned whether there is any such thing as an animal, it is also questioned whether there is any such thing as a human being; for a human being is an animal. But it is absurd to try to prove what is in question either by means of what is equally in question or by means of itself; therefore, it will not be possible for anyone by means of a proof to maintain firmly that there is such a thing as a sign. But if one cannot, whether simply or with proof, make and firmly maintain a positive assertion about the sign, it is impossible for an apprehensive assertion to be made about it; and if the sign is not accurately apprehended, it will not be said to be significant of anything, since it itself is a subject of disagreement, and for this reason it will not even be a sign. Hence, according to this line of reasoning, too, the sign is non-existent and inconceivable.

And there is still more to be said. Either all the signs are appearances, or all are non-evident, or some signs are appearances and some are non-evident. But none of these alternatives is true; therefore, there does not exist a sign.

Now, that it is not the case that all signs are non-evident is shown as follows. According to the Dogmatists, the non-evident does not appear of itself but affects us by means of something else. And so the sign, if it were non-evident, would
require another non-evident sign, since according to the hypothesis before us, no
sign is an appearance; and that one would require another, and so on ad infinitum.
But it is impossible to grasp an infinite number of signs; therefore, it is impossible
for the sign, if it is non-evident, to be apprehended. And for this reason it will also
be non-existent, being unable to signify anything, that is, to be a sign, because it is
not apprehensible.

But if all the signs are appearances, then, since the sign is relative – that is, 125
relative to the significatum – and relative things are apprehended together with
one another, the things said to be signified, being apprehended together with what
is an appearance, will be appearances. For just as, when the right and the left are
perceived, the right is no more said to be apparent than the left, nor the left than
the right, so too when the sign and the significatum are apprehended together, the
sign should no more be said to be apparent than the significatum. And if the
significatum is an appearance, it will not be a significatum, since it will not need
anything to signify and disclose it. Whence, just as if there is no right, neither is
there a left, so if there is no significatum there can be no sign; thus, if one says
that all signs are appearances, the sign turns out to be non-existent.

It remains to suppose that some signs are appearances and some non-evident; 127
but even so the aporiai remain. For the things said to be signified by signs that
are appearances will be appearances, as we said before, and not being in need of
anything to signify them, will not be significata at all, whence the others will not
be signs, either, as they do not signify anything. As to the 128 non-evident signs,
which need something to disclose them, if they are said to be signified by non-
evident things, the argument goes on to infinity and they are found not to be
apprehensible and for that reason non-existent, as we have said before. But if they
are said to be signified by appearances, they will be appearances apprehended
together with their signs and for this reason will also be non-existent. For it is
impossible that there exist some object or state of affairs that is both non-evident
by nature and yet is apparent, and the signs that the argument is about, having
been posited as non-evident, have been found to be appearances because the
argument has been turned around.

If, therefore, it is neither the case that all the signs are appearances nor that 129
they are all non-evident, nor that some of them are appearances and some are non-
evident, and besides these, as the Dogmatists themselves say, there is no other alternative, the so-called "signs" will be non-existent. *146*

130 These few arguments, out of many, will suffice for the present to support the position that there is no such thing as an indicative sign. Next we shall set forth those supporting the position that signs do exist, in order that we may show the equipollence of the opposed arguments. Either, then, the expressions that are uttered against signs signify something or they do not. But if they do not, how can they have any bearing on the existence of signs? And if they do 131 signify something, there is such a thing as a sign. Furthermore, the arguments against signs are either probative or they are not. But if they are not probative, they do not prove that there is no such thing as a sign; while if they are probative, since a proof, as serving to disclose the conclusion, fails under the genus Sign, signs will exist. Whence the following sort of argument is also made:

If there is a sign, there is a sign; and if there is no sign, there is a sign, for the non-existence of signs is shown by a proof, which is a sign. But either there is a sign or there is not; therefore, there is a sign.

132 This argument, however, is matched by the following: If there is no sign, there is no sign. And if there is a sign - a sign being what the Dogmatists say it is - there is no sign. For the sign under discussion, which, in accord with its concept, is said to be both relative and serving to disclose the significatum, turns out to be non-existent, as we have shown. But either there is a sign or there is no sign; therefore, there is no sign.

133 Also, with regard to the phrases uttered about the sign, let the Dogmatists themselves answer whether these signify something or not. For if they do not signify anything, they do not make credible the existence of a sign; while, if they do signify, the significatum will follow from them. But this was that there is such a thing as a sign; from which, as we showed, by a turnaround of the argument it follows that there is no such thing as a sign. So, with such plausible arguments presented both for and against the existence of signs, it must be said that it is "not more" the case that signs exist than that they do not.
12. Proof

From these considerations it is manifest that proof, too, is a matter upon which there is no agreement; for if we are suspending judgment about signs, and a proof is a kind of sign, it is necessary to suspend judgment about proofs as well. And we shall find that the arguments propounded concerning signs can be adapted to fit proofs as well, since the latter seem to be both relative and serving to disclose the conclusion, from which has followed all the things we have said about signs. But if it is necessary to say something applying specifically to proofs, I shall briefly consider the argument concerning them, after first trying to give a concise clarification of the Dogmatists' definition of proof.

A proof, as they say, is an argument that, by means of agreed-upon premises and a valid inference, discloses a non-evident conclusion. What they mean will become more clear from the following: An argument is a system consisting of premises and a conclusion. Those propositions that are agreed upon for the establishment of the conclusion are called the premises, and the proposition which is established from the premises is called the conclusion.

For example, in this argument:

If it is day, it is light.
It is day.
Therefore, it is light,

the proposition "It is light" is the conclusion and the others are premises. Some arguments are valid, and some are not valid; they are valid whenever the conditional whose antecedent is the conjunction of the premises and whose consequent is the conclusion, is sound. For instance, the previously mentioned argument is valid, since "It is light" follows from the premise conjunction, "It is day, and if it is day it is light" in this conditional:

If (it is day and if it is day it is light), then it is light.

Arguments not having this characteristic are invalid.
And of the valid arguments, some are true and some are not true – true, \(^{138}\) whenever not only is there a sound conditional consisting of the premise conjunction and the conclusion, as we said before, but also both the conclusion and the premise conjunction, which is the antecedent of the conditional, are true. And a conjunction, – for example, "It is day, and if it is day it is light" – is true whenever every conjunct is true. Arguments not having the above-described characteristic are not true. For, supposing that it is daytime, \(^{139}\) such an argument as the following is valid enough,

If it is night, it is dark.
It is night.
Therefore, it is dark,

since the following conditional is sound:

If (it is night and if it is night it is dark), then it is dark,

but the argument is not true. For the conjunctive antecedent – "It is night and if it is night it is dark" – is false, since it contains the false conjunct "It is night," and a conjunction containing a false conjunct is false. Hence they also define a true argument as one that leads logically from true premises to a true conclusion.

Again, of the true arguments some are probative and some are not \(^{140}\) probative; the probative are those validly concluding something non-evident from things that are pre-evident, and the non-probative are those that are not of this sort. For example, such an argument as this:

If it is day, it is light.
It is day.
Therefore, it is light, \(^{*148}\)

is not probative, for its conclusion, that it is light, is pre-evident. But such an argument as:

If sweat flows through the surface, there are intelligible pores.
Sweat flows through the surface.
Therefore, there are intelligible pores,

is probative, since its conclusion, "There are intelligible pores" is non-evident.

141 And, of the arguments validly concluding something non-evident, some lead
us through the premises to the conclusion simply in the manner of guides, and
others lead us not only as guides but also as bringing something bidden to light.
Leading us as guides are those that seem to depend upon trust and memory, for
example, this one:

If a god has said to you that this man will be rich, then this man will be rich.
This god (suppose that I am pointing to Zeus) has said to you that this man will
be rich.
Therefore, this man will be rich.

For we assent to the conclusion not so much because of the force of the 142
premises as because we trust the assertion of the god. But some arguments lead us
to the conclusion not only as guides but also as bringing something bidden to
light, for example:

If sweat flows through the surface, there are intelligible pores.
The first.
Therefore, the second.

For the flowing of the sweat discloses the existence of the pores, given the
common notion that water cannot go through a solid body.

143 Thus, a proof should be an argument that is valid and true and has a non-
evident conclusion disclosed by means of the force of the premises, and in view of
this it is defined as an argument which, by means of agreed-upon premises and
valid inferences, discloses a non-evident conclusion.

It is by means of these considerations, then, that the Dogmatists are
accustomed to clarify the notion of proof.

13. Are There Proofs?
That proof is non-existent can be inferred from the very things they say, by attacking each ingredient of the concept. For instance, an argument is composed of propositions, and composite things cannot exist unless the things of which they are composed coexist with one another, as is obvious in the case of a bed and similar things. But the parts of an argument do not coexist with one another. For when we state the first premise, neither the other premise nor the conclusion as yet exists; and when we state the second one, the first premise no longer exists and the conclusion has not yet come into being, and, finally, when we assert the conclusion, its premises are no longer in being. Therefore, the parts of the argument do not coexist with one another, whence it will be apparent that the argument, too, does not exist.

But apart from these considerations, the valid argument is not apprehensible. For if its validity is determined on the basis of the soundness of the corresponding conditional, and the truth of the conditional is a matter of unsettled dispute and is perhaps not apprehensible, as we have pointed out in our discussion of signs, then the valid argument, too, will not be apprehensible. Now the logicians say that an argument becomes invalid either by incoherence or by deficiency or by being put forward in an unsound schema or by redundancy. For example, it is invalid by incoherence when the premises are not logically connected with one another and with the conclusion, as in:

If it is day, it is light.
Grain is being sold in the agora.
Therefore, Dion is walking.

It is invalid by redundancy when it contains a premise that is not needed for the validity of the argument, for example:

If it is day, it is light.
It is day.
Dion is walking.
Therefore, it is light.
And it is invalid by being in an unsound schema whenever the schema of the argument is not valid; for example, while the following, as they say, are syllogisms:

If it is day, it is light.
It is day.
Therefore, it is light.

And

If it is day, it is light.
It is not light.
Therefore, it is not day;

this argument is not valid:

If it is day, it is light.
It is light.
Therefore, it is day.

For since the conditional declares that if its antecedent is the case so is the consequent, it is reasonable, when the antecedent is assumed, to infer also the consequent, and when the consequent is denied, to deny also the antecedent, for if the antecedent were the case, the consequent would also be the case. But *150* when the consequent is assumed, the antecedent will not in general be implied; for the conditional did not promise that the antecedent follows from the consequent, but only that the consequent follows from the antecedent.

*149* For that reason, an argument inferring the consequent of a conditional from the conditional and its antecedent is said to be syllogistic, and likewise one inferring the negation of the antecedent from the conditional and the negation of the consequent. But an argument, like the one mentioned above, that infers the antecedent from the conditional and its consequent is invalid in that it infers a false conclusion from true premises (when it is uttered at night while there is lamp...
light. For the conditional "If it is day, it is light" is true, and also the second premise, "It is light," but the conclusion, "It is day," is false.

An argument is unsound by deficiency if something is lacking that is needed for inferring the conclusion. For example, while the following argument is sound, as they suppose:

\[
\begin{aligned}
\text{Wealth is good or bad or indifferent.}\\
\text{It is neither bad nor indifferent}\\
\text{Therefore, it is good,}
\end{aligned}
\]

this argument is defective by deficiency:

\[
\begin{aligned}
\text{Wealth is good or bad.}\\
\text{It is not bad.}\\
\text{Therefore, it is good.}
\end{aligned}
\]

So if I shall show that, going by what the Dogmatists say, no difference can be discerned between invalid and valid arguments, I shall have shown that the valid argument is not apprehensible, so that the innumerable arguments that they bring forward in accord with their logic are useless. And I show it as follows.

It was said that the kind of argument that is invalid by incoherence is to be recognized by the lack of logical connection of the premises with one another and with the conclusion. Now since recognizing this connection has to be preceded by making a determination about the truth value of the corresponding conditional, and since the conditional is not decidable, as I have argued, it will be impossible to distinguish the arguments that are invalid by incoherence. For anyone who says that a given argument is invalid by incoherence will, if be just asserts it, receive in opposition the assertion contradictory to his own; but if he proves it by an argument, be will be told that this argument must first be valid if it is to prove the lack of logical connection between the premises of the argument that is allegedly characterized by incoherence. But we shall not know whether it is probative, since we have no agreed-upon test of that conditional by which we are to determine whether the conclusion of the argument follows from the conjunction...
of the premises. And so, on this basis, too, we shall not be able to distinguish from
the valid arguments those arguments that are invalid by incoherence.

154 We shall say the same things to anyone who claims that a given argument is
invalid by being propounded in an unsound schema. For he who tries to *151*
establish that a schema is unsound will not have an agreed-upon valid argument
by means of which he will be able to infer what he claims. By these 155
considerations we have in effect also refuted those who try to show that there are
arguments invalid by deficiency. For if the argument that is complete and finished
cannot be distinguished from other arguments, then the argument that is deficient
will be non-evident. And, further, whoever wishes to show, by means of an
argument, that some argument is deficient will not be able to make a tested and
correct statement to that effect because for the corresponding conditional be does
d not have an agreed-upon test by means of which he can make a determination
about the inference in the argument he is discussing. Furthermore, the argument
said to be unsound by redundancy cannot be 156 distinguished from the proofs.
For, as far as redundancy is concerned, even the "undemonstrated" arguments so
much talked of by the Stoics will be found defective, and if those are taken away,
Stoic logic is overturned. For these, the Stoics say, have no need of demonstration
to establish them, and they themselves serve to demonstrate that the other
arguments are valid. But that they are redundant will be clear when we have set
forth the undemonstrated arguments and then make good what we are saying.

Now the Stoics fancy that there are many undemonstrated arguments, but 157
for the most part they put forward the following five, to which all the others, it
seems, can be reduced. From a conditional and its antecedent, the first concludes
the consequent. For example:

If it is day, then it is light.
It is day.
Therefore, it is light.

From a conditional and the contradictory of its consequent, the second
concludes the contradictory of the antecedent. For example:

If it is day, then it is light.
It is not light.
Therefore, it is not day.

From the denial of a conjunction and one of the conjuncts, the third concludes the contradictory of the other conjunct. For example:

Not both: it is day and it is night.
It is day.
Therefore, it is not night.

From a disjunction and one of the disjuncts, the fourth concludes the contradictory of the other disjunct. For example:

Either it is day or it is night.
It is day.
Therefore, it is not night.

*152* From a disjunction and the contradictory of one of the disjuncts, the fifth concludes the other disjunct. For example:

Either it is day or it is night.
It is not night.
Therefore, it is day.

159 These, then, are the vaunted undemonstrated arguments, but they all seem to me to be invalid by redundancy. To begin with the first, for example, either it is agreed or else it is non-evident that the proposition "It is light" follows from the antecedent "It is day" in the conditional "If it is day, it is light." But if it is non-evident, we shall not coned the conditional as agreed upon; while if it is pre-evident that if "It is day" is the case then necessarily "It is light" is also the case, then in saying "It is day" we imply "It is light," so that this argument will suffice:

It is day.
Therefore, it is light;
and the conditional "If it is day, it is light" will be superfluous.

We make a similar point in the case of the second undemonstrated argument. For either it is possible or it is not possible for the antecedent to hold while the consequent does not. But if it is possible, the conditional will not be sound; while if it is not possible, then in asserting the negation of the consequent we shall be simultaneously asserting the negation of the antecedent. So once again the conditional will be superfluous, since what is being propounded amounts to:

It is not light.
Therefore, it is not day.

161 The same reasoning applies also in the case of the third undemonstrated argument. Either it is pre-evident or it is non-evident that it is impossible for all the conjuncts of the conjunction to hold. And if it is nonevident, we shall not concede the contradictory of the conjunction; while if it is pre-evident, then in asserting one of them we shall be simultaneously denying the other, and the contradictory of the conjunction will be superfluous, as we are saying in effect:

It is day.
Therefore, it is not night.

162 We say similar things about the fourth and fifth undemonstrated arguments. For either it is pre-evident or it is non-evident that, of the components of a disjunction, necessarily one is true and the other is false. And if it is non-evident, we shall not concede the disjunction; but if it is pre-evident, then when one of them is asserted it is obvious that the other does not hold, and *153* when one is denied it is pre-evident that the other does hold, so that the following suffice:

It is day. Therefore, it is not night. It is not day. Therefore, it is night

and the disjunction is superfluous. Similar points can also be made about the so-called "categorical" syllogisms, 163 which are much used by the Peripatetics. Thus, in the argument:
The just is fair.
The fair is good. Therefore, the just is good;

either it is agreed upon and pre-evident that the fair is good, or it is disputed and non-evident. But if it is non-evident, it will not be conceded while the argument is being put forward, and for this reason the syllogism will not be valid; while if it is pre-evident that whatever is fair is without exception good, then when it is said that something is fair it is simultaneously implied that it is also good, so that the following form of the argument suffices:

The just is fair.
Therefore, the just is good;

and the other premise, in which the fair is said to be good, is superfluous. 
Likewise, in the following argument:

Socrates is a human being.
Every human being is an animal,
Therefore, Socrates is an animal;

if it is not immediately evident in advance that anything whatever that is a human being is also an animal, the universal premise will not be agreed upon nor shall we concede it when the argument is put forward. But if something's being an animal follows from the fact that it is a human being, and for that reason the premise "Every human being is an animal" is agreed to be true, then when it is said that Socrates is a human being it is simultaneously implied that he is an animal, so that this form of the argument suffices:

Socrates is a human being.
Therefore, Socrates is an animal;
and the premise "Every human being is an animal" is superfluous. And, not to spend more time on this, it is possible to use similar methods in the case of the other first-figure categorical arguments.

In view of the fact, however, that these arguments on which the logicians found their syllogisms are redundant, all logic is overturned because of this redundancy, for we are not able to distinguish from the so-called "valid" syllogisms those arguments that are redundant and consequently invalid. And if some people disapprove single-premised arguments, they are no more worthy of credence than Antipater, who does not reject such arguments.

For these reasons, what the logicians call "valid argument" is not determinable. But further, a "true" argument is not discoverable, both for the foregoing reasons and because it must in all cases end in a true proposition. For the conclusion that is said to be true is either an appearance or it is non-evident. And it is certainly not an appearance; for then it would not need to be disclosed by means of the premises, being self-evident and no less an appearance than its premises. But if it is non-evident, then since there is an unresolved dispute concerning non-evident things, as we have pointed out previously, and they are therefore also not apprehensible, the conclusion of the argument said to be true will not be apprehensible, either. And if this is not apprehensible, we shall not know whether what is concluded is true or false. Thus we shall be ignorant as to whether the argument is true or false, and the "true" argument will not be discoverable.

But, passing over these difficulties also, it is impossible to find an argument that concludes something non-evident by means of things that are pre-evident. For if the conclusion follows from the conjunction of the premises, and if what follows and is the consequent is relative, that is, relative to the antecedent, and if relatives must be apprehended together with one another, as we have established – then, if the conclusion is non-evident the premises will be non-evident, and if the premises are pre-evident the conclusion will also be pre-evident, as it is apprehended together with them and they are pre-evident; so that no longer is something non-evident being inferred from things that are pre-evident. For these reasons neither is the conclusion disclosed by the premises, whether it is non-evident and thus not apprehended, or pre-evident and not in need of anything to disclose it. If, therefore, a proof is said to be an argument that by inference – that is, validly – discloses a non-evident conclusion by means of some premises
agreed to be true, and we have pointed out that there exists no argument that is valid or true or that validly concludes something non-evident from things that are pre-evident or that serves to disclose its conclusion, it is plain that there is no such thing as a proof.

From the following line of attack, too, we shall make plain that proof neither exists nor is even conceivable. The person who says that there is such a thing as a proof is positing either a generic proof (a "proof in general") or a particular proof. But, as we shall point out, it is not possible to establish the existence either of a generic proof or of a particular proof, and besides these no other can be thought of. Therefore, nobody can establish the existence of proof. For the following reasons the generic proof does not exist. Either it has some premises and a conclusion or it does not. If it does not, it is not a proof. If it does have some premises and a conclusion, then, since everything proved and proving is particular, it will be a particular proof. Therefore, there is no such thing as a generic proof. But neither is there a particular proof. For they will define "proof" either as the system of premises and conclusion, or as the system of premises alone. But neither of these is a proof, as I shall show. Therefore, there is no particular proof. The system of premises and conclusion is not a proof because, first of all, it has a non-evident part, namely, the conclusion, and so will be non-evident. But this is absurd, for if the proof is non-evident, then, rather than serving to prove other things, it will itself be in need of something to prove it [i.e., to prove that it is a proof].

Also, since they say that proof is relative, that is, relative to what is inferred, and things that are relative, as they themselves claim, are thought of in relation to other things, what is proved must be other than the proof, and if indeed the conclusion is what is proved, the proof will not be thought of together with its conclusion. Furthermore, either the conclusion contributes something to its own proof, or it does not; but if it does contribute, it will be serving to disclose itself, and if it does not contribute but is superfluous, it will not even be part of the proof, since we shall say that the latter is defective by redundancy.

But neither would the system of the premises alone be a proof, for who would say that this kind of statement:

If it is day, it is light.
It is day;

is an argument or even completely expresses any thought at all? Thus, a system
of premises alone does not constitute a proof. Therefore, no particular proof
exists, either. And if no particular proof nor generic proof exists, and no other
"proof" is conceivable, then there is no such thing as proof.

One can show the non-existence of proof also from the following
considerations. \(^{177}\) If there is a proof, then either, being itself an appearance, it
serves to disclose an appearance, or being itself non-evident, it serves to disclose
something non-evident, or being non-evident, to disclose an appearance, or being
an appearance, to disclose something non-evident. But it cannot be conceived as
disclosing any of these; therefore, it cannot be conceived. For if, \(^{178}\) being an
appearance, it serves to disclose an appearance, what is disclosed will be
simultaneously an appearance and non-evident– an appearance, since by
hypothesis it is such, and non-evident, since it is in need of something to disclose
it and does not of itself affect us in a clear way. And if, being non-evident, it
serves to disclose something non-evident, it will have need of something to
disclose it and will not serve to disclose other things, which is at odds with the
concept of proof And for these reasons, neither will a non- evident \(^{179}\) proof serve
to disclose something pre-evident. Nor will a pre-evident proof serve to disclose
something non-evident. For since they are relatives, and relatives are apprehended
together with one another, what is said to be proved will be apprehended together
with the pre-evident proof and will be pre-evident \(^{156}\) evident, so that the
argument is turned back on itself and the proof of the non-evident is found not to
be pre-evident. If, therefore, the proof is neither an appearance and of an
appearance, nor non-evident and of something non- evident, nor non-evident and
of something pre-evident, nor pre-evident and of something non-evident, and they
say that besides these there is no other alternative, then it must be stated that the
proof is non-existent.

\(^{180}\) In addition, the following needs to be said. There is a controversy about
proof, for some assert that it does not exist – as, indeed, do those who say that
nothing at all exists-and some, like the majority of the Dogmatists, claim \(^{181}\) that it
does exist; but we say that it "no more" exists than not. And besides, a proof
always includes a dogma, and the Dogmatists have bad disputes about every
dogma, so necessarily there is controversy about every proof. For if, in agreeing, for example, to the proof that there exists a vacuum, one simultaneously agrees to the existence of the vacuum, then it is evident that those who dispute the existence of a vacuum will also dispute the proof of it. And the same reasoning applies to all the other dogmas proved by the proofs. Therefore, every proof is disputed and is a matter of controversy.

182 Since, then, proof is non-evident because of the controversy concerning it (for objects of controversy, as such, are non-evident), its existence is not manifest of itself but needs to be established for us by a proof. The proof, however, by which proof is established will not be agreed upon and manifest (for we are right now questioning whether there is any proof at all), and being a matter of controversy and non-evident, it will require another proof, and that one another, and so on ad infinitum. But it is impossible to prove an infinite number of things; therefore, it is impossible to show that there is such a thing as proof.

183 But neither can it be disclosed by a sign. For since there is a question whether there is such a thing as a sign, and since signs require proof of their own existence, we have circularity, with the proof requiring a sign and the sign again requiring a proof, which is absurd. And for these reasons it is not possible to resolve the controversy about proof, since the decision requires a criterion and it is questionable whether there is any such thing; and in view of this, the criterion will need a proof showing that there is such a thing as a criterion, so 184 that we have the circularity type of aporia once again. Hence, if neither by means of a proof nor by means of a sign nor by means of a criterion is it possible to show that there exists a proof, nor is this of itself pre-evident, as we have shown, then whether there exists a proof will not be apprehensible. For this reason, proof will indeed be non-existent, for proof and proving are thought of together, and so the proof, not being apprehensible, will not be able to prove anything. Hence, proof will not exist.

185 It will suffice to have said this much, by way of outline, against the existence of proof. The Dogmatists, in support of the opposite point of view, say that either the arguments given against proof are probative, or they are not probative. And if they are not probative, they cannot show that there is no proof; while if they are probative they themselves, by a turnaround of the is6 argument,
establish the existence of proof. Whence the Dogmatists also *157* propound the following argument:

If there is a proof, there is a proof.
If there is no proof, there is a proof.
Either there is a proof or there is no proof.
Therefore, there is a proof.

With the same force they set forth this argument:

What follows from contradictory propositions is not only true but necessary. But "There is a proof" and "There is no proof" are contradictories, from each of which it follows that there is a proof.
Therefore, there is a proof.

Now in opposition to these points it is possible to state, for example, that since we do not think that any argument is probative, we do not say absolutely that the arguments against proof are probative, but only that they seem plausible to us; and plausible arguments are not necessarily probative. Yet if they are probative (which we do not maintain), they certainly are also true. And true arguments are those that from true premises validly infer something true; therefore their conclusion is true. But that conclusion was "Therefore, there is no such thing as a proof"; consequently, turning the argument around, "There is no such thing as a proof" is true. And just as cathartic drugs flush themselves out along with the various materials in the body, so these arguments apply to themselves along with the other arguments that are said to be probative. Nor is this nonsense, for even the slogan "Nothing is true" not only denies each of the other statements but negates itself as well.

Moreover, the following argument,

If there is a proof, there is a proof.
If there is no proof, there is a proof.
Either there is a proof or there is no proof.
Therefore, there is a proof;
can be shown invalid in a number of ways, but for the present let the following method suffice. If the conditional "If there is a proof, there is a proof" is sound, then the contradictory of its consequent, namely, "There is no proof" must be inconsistent with "There is a proof," for the latter is the antecedent of the conditional. Now, according to the Dogmatists it is impossible for a conditional made up of inconsistent propositions to be sound. For a conditional says that if its antecedent is the case, so is its consequent, whereas inconsistent propositions, on the other hand, say that if either is the case, the other cannot be so. Therefore, if the conditional "If there is a proof, there is a proof" is sound, the conditional "If there is no proof, there is a proof" cannot be sound. Conversely, if we agree by hypothesis that the conditional "If there is no proof, there is a proof" is sound, then the proposition "There is a proof" can hold simultaneously with "There is no proof." And if it can hold simultaneously with it, it is not inconsistent with it. Therefore, in the conditional, "If there is a proof, there is a proof," the contradictory of its consequent is not inconsistent with its antecedent, so that, conversely, this conditional will not be sound, since the other one was postulated as sound by hypothesis. And since the proposition "There is no proof" is not inconsistent with "There is a proof", the disjunction "Either there is a proof or there is no proof" will not be sound, for the sound disjunction says that one of its disjuncts is sound and the other or others are false, with inconsistency. Or, conversely, if the disjunction is sound, the conditional "If there is no proof, there is a proof," as composed of inconsistent parts, will be found unsound. Consequently, the premises of the aforementioned argument are inconsistent, that is, they negate one another, and thus the argument is not sound. But the Dogmatists cannot even show that anything follows logically from the contradictory propositions, since, as we have argued, they have no criterion for logical consequence.

But we are going on beyond necessity For if, on the one hand, the arguments on behalf of proof are plausible (and let them be so), while, on the other hand, the attacks made against proof are also plausible, it is necessary to suspend judgment about proof, saying that it "no more" exists than not.

14. Syllogisms
I suppose that it is also superfluous to discuss in detail the much vaunted syllogisms since, for one thing, they are included in the refutation of the existence of proof (for it is evident that when proof does not exist there is no place for probative argument either), and for another, we have in effect refuted them by the objections previously made, when in discussing redundancy we mentioned a method by means of which it is possible to show that all the probative arguments of the Stoics and Peripatetics are invalid. Yet perhaps it will not be amiss to consider them separately, for good measure, since these thinkers are much taken with them. Now there is a great deal that one could say by way of showing their non-existence, but in an outline it suffices to deal with them by the following method. And for the present I shall discuss the undemonstrated syllogisms, for if these are nullified all the remaining arguments are overthrown, since the proof of their validity is based on these.

So, then, the proposition "Every human being is an animal" is established by induction from the particulars; for from the fact that Socrates is both a human being and an animal, and Plato, Dion, and each of the particulars likewise, it seems possible to maintain that every human being is an animal – recognizing that if even one of the particulars should appear to be in opposite case with the others, the universal proposition is not sound; for example, although most animals move their lower jaw and only the crocodile moves the upper, the proposition "Every animal moves the lower jaw" is not true. Thus, when they say:

Every human being is an animal.
Socrates is a human being.
Therefore, Socrates is an animal,

intending to infer from the universal proposition "Every human being is an animal" the particular proposition "Therefore, Socrates is an animal," (which, as we pointed out, is involved in establishing by induction the universal) they fall into a circular argument, establishing the universal proposition inductively by means of each of the particulars, and then syllogistically inferring the particular from the universal. Similarly, in the case of this argument:
Socrates is a human being.
No human being is four footed.
Therefore, Socrates is not four footed,

by proposing to establish inductively the "No human being is four footed" proposition while wishing to infer each of the particular cases from it, they are caught in the circularity aporia.

A similar treatment should be given to the remaining arguments called "undemonstrated" by the Peripatetics, and also to such propositions as "If it is day, it is light." For the proposition "If it is day, it is light" is, as they say, involved in proving the proposition "It is light," and the proposition "It is light" together with "It is day" serves to establish the proposition "If it is day, it is light"; for the aforementioned conditional would not have been considered sound if the constantly conjoined truth of "It is light" and "It is day" had not been observed beforehand. But if, in order to establish the conditional "If it is 199 day, it is light," it is necessary to apprehend in advance that whenever it is day it is also always light, while from this conditional it is inferred that whenever it is day it is light – so that the coexistence of its being day and its being light is implied by the conditional "If it is day, it is light" insofar as this just depends on the undemonstrated argument before us, and that conditional in turn is established by the coholding of the aforementioned propositions – then here too the circularity mode of aporia destroys the basis of the argument. 200

So likewise in the case of the argument:

If it is day, it is light.
It is not light.
Therefore, it is not day.

On the basis of day's not being observed without light, the conditional "If it is day, it is light" would be thought sound, assuming that if indeed by hypothesis day should ever appear without light, the conditional would be said to be false. But insofar as the matter just depends on the aforementioned undemonstrated argument, the proposition "There is no day when there is no light" is inferred *160* from the proposition "If it is day, it is light," so that each of these
propositions needs, if it is to be established, the firm establishment of the other in order to become credible through it by circular inference. But also, from the fact that some things – day, say, and night – cannot coexist, the negated conjunction "Not both: it is day and it is night" and the disjunction "Either it is day or it is night" would be deemed true. But the Dogmatists suppose that the non-coexistence is established by means of the negated conjunction and the disjunction, saying:

Not both: it is day and it is night.
It is night.
Therefore, it is not day;

and

Either it is day or it is night.
It is night.
Therefore, it is not day;

or

It is not night. Therefore, it is day

Whence we argue again that if, in order to establish the disjunction and the negated conjunction we need to have apprehended in advance that the propositions contained in them are inconsistent, and the Dogmatists expect to infer that inconsistency from the disjunction and the negated conjunction, the circularity type of *aporia* is introduced; for we cannot place credence in the aforementioned composite propositions without apprehending the incompatibility of the propositions contained in them, nor can we solidly maintain the inconsistency before asserting the syllogisms based on these propositions. Therefore, since because of the circularity we have no place upon which to ground belief, we shall say that, insofar as the matter depends on these points, neither the third nor the fourth nor the fifth undemonstrated argument has any substance.
For the present, then, it will suffice to have said thus much about the syllogisms.

15. Induction

It is also easy, I think, to find fault with the inductive mode of inference. For when the Dogmatists attempt to lend credence to a universal by induction from the particulars, in doing this they will consider either all the particulars or only some of them. But if they consider only some, the induction will not be firm, since some of the particulars omitted in the induction may refute the universal; while if they consider all, they will be working at an impossible task, since the particulars are infinite in number and unbounded. So that either way, I think, the induction turns out to be shaky.

16. Definitions

But the Dogmatists are also very proud of their logical treatment of definitions, which they include in the logic component of so-called "philosophy." So now let us too make a few observations about definitions.

The Dogmatists think that definitions have many uses, but you will find, I think, that there are two main ones, which they say include all the necessary uses; for they represent definitions as necessary in all cases either for apprehension or for instruction. So if we show that they are not of use for either of these purposes, we shall nullify, I think, all the vain labor of the Dogmatists concerning them.

Coming right to the point, then: If, on the one hand, whoever cannot recognize the object of a definition is unable to define that which he cannot recognize, and, on the other hand, any person who can recognize it and proceeds to define it has not apprehended the object from its definition but has composed a definition for an object that has already been apprehended, then definitions are not necessary for the apprehension of things. And since, if we wish to define absolutely everything we shall define nothing (because of the infinite regress), while if we agree that some things are apprehended even without definitions, then we are asserting that definitions are not necessary for apprehension (for we could
apprehend everything without definitions in the same way in which those undefined things were apprehended), either we shall define nothing at all or else we shall assert that definitions are not necessary.

And for these reasons definitions are not necessary for teaching, either, as we shall find. For just as the first person to recognize a thing recognizes it without a definition, so likewise the person who is taught about it can be taught without a definition. Further, the Dogmatists judge definitions by reference to the things defined, and declare defective those definitions that include some property not belonging to all or some of the things defined. Thus, whenever somebody says that a human being is a rational immortal animal or a rational mortal grammatical animal, when none are immortal and-some are not grammatical, they declare the definition defective. And hence it is also possible that definitions cannot be judged because the particulars with reference to which they are to be judged are infinite in number; and thus they will not facilitate apprehension and instruction about those things by means of which they are judged, which obviously will have been known beforehand, if at all, and apprehended beforehand. *162*

And how could it not be ridiculous to say that definitions are of use for apprehension or instruction or clarification in general, when they involve us in so much unclarity? For instance, if we may jest, suppose that somebody wished to ask someone else whether he had met a person riding a horse and leading a dog, and he put the question to him as follows: "O logical mortal animal, capable of intelligence and knowledge, have you met a broad-nailed animal capable of laughter and of political knowledge, who has his buttocks seated on a mortal animal capable of neighing and who is leading a four-footed animal capable of barking?" How would he not be utterly ridiculous in thus by his definitions striking the other person dumb concerning so familiar a state of affairs?

Therefore it must be said that in view of the foregoing point definitions are useless, whether they are said to be "phrases that, by a brief reminder, lead us to the concept of the objects or states of affairs ranged under the expressions," as is evident (is it not?) from what we said a little beforehand, or a "phrase disclosing the essence," or whatever you like. For, wishing to explain what a definition is, the Dogmatists fall into an endless controversy, which, though it does seem to dispose of definitions, I now pass over because of the plan of my treatise.

It suffices for me at present to have said thus much about definitions.
17. Division

Since some of the Dogmatists tell us that logic is "the science dealing with syllogisms, induction, definitions, and division," and we have already, after our arguments on the criterion, signs, and proof, discussed syllogisms, induction, and definitions, we think it not amiss briefly to consider division, too. They say, then, that there are four kinds of division: either a term is divided with respect to its meanings, or a whole is divided into its parts, or a genus into species, or a species into particulars. But it is easy, I think, to show that there is no science of division with respect to any of these.

18. Division of a Term into Its Meanings

To come right to the point: They say that the sciences always deal with what is the case by nature, not by convention – and they say this with good reason, for scientific knowledge aims to be firm and unchanging, while the conventional is easily changeable, being altered when there is a shift in the conventions, which is in our power. Since, therefore, terms have meaning by convention and not by nature (for otherwise everybody, Greeks and barbarians alike, would understand everything meant by our utterances; besides which it is also in our power to point out the things meant and mean them by any other terms we may choose), how can there be a science of the division of terms into their meanings? Or how could logic really be, as some think, a "science of things meaning and meant"?

19. Whole and Part

We shall discuss whole and part in our section on physics, but at present the following points need to be made concerning what is called the division of the whole into its parts. When somebody says that a group of ten things is divided into one, two, three, and four, that group is not really divided into these. For as soon as its first part, namely, the one, is taken away (granting for the sake of argument that this can be done), there no longer exists the group of ten but rather a group of nine, that is, something quite other than the group of ten. Thus the
subtraction and division of the remaining parts is not from the group of ten but from some other things, a different one each time.

So it is impossible, I think, to divide the whole into what are called its parts. For if the whole is divided into parts, the parts ought to be comprised in the whole before the division, but they seem not to be so comprised. Thus for example – resting our argument once more on the group of ten – they say that the nine things are certainly a part of the ten, for the latter is divided into one and the nine. But similarly the eight are a part of the ten, for it is divided into the eight and two. And likewise with the seven, the six, the five, four, three, two, and one. If, however, all these are comprised in the group of ten, then, since together with it they constitute a group of fifty-five, it follows that fifty-five are included in the ten, which is absurd. Therefore, the things said to be its parts are not comprised in the group of ten, nor can that group be divided as a whole into parts, as they are not to be seen in it at all.

The same objections will also be made in the case of magnitudes – for example, if somebody should wish to divide up a ten-cubit length. So it is impossible, I think, to divide a whole into parts.

20. Genera and Species

Now there remains the argument about genera and species; we shall treat it at greater length elsewhere, but for now, in brief, we shall have the following things to say. If, on the one hand, the Dogmatists claim that genera and species are concepts, our critical remarks on the ruling part and on phantasia refute them; whereas if they allow them an independent existence, what will they say to the following? If there are genera, either they are equal in number to their species, or there is one genus common to all the species said to belong to it. Now if the genera are equal in number to their species, there will no longer be a common genus to be divided into them. But if the genus is said to be one and the same in all the species of it, either each species will partake of the whole of it, or of a part of it. But certainly it will not partake of the whole; for it is impossible for some one existent thing to be included in two separate things in such a way as to be observed as a whole in each of the things in which it is said to be included. But if the species partakes of a part, then, in the first plane, membership in the genus
will not in general follow from membership in the species, as they assume, and Human Being will not be Animal, but, like *164* Substance, a part of Animal and not animate or sensitive. Next, all the species would be said to participate either in the same part of their genus or in different parts. But, for the reasons stated above, it is impossible that they all participate in the same part. And if they partake of different parts, the species will not be similar to one another with respect to genus (which they will not accept), and each genus will be infinite because cut up into infinitely many pieces – not into the species only but also into the particulars, in which, no less than in its species, it is found. For Dion is said to be not only a human being but also an animal. But if these consequences are absurd, then the species do not even participate in a part or parts of their genus, it being one single thing.

But if each species partakes neither of the whole genus nor of a part of it, how could it be said that the genus is one and the same in all its species, and in such a way as to be divided into them? No one, I think, could say this unless he were inventing some imaginary entities that will be abolished, in accord with the attacks of the Skeptics, by the unresolved controversies of the Dogmatists themselves.

In addition, there is this to be said: the species are of this kind or of that kind; and their genera are either of both this kind and that kind, or of this kind but not of that kind, or neither of this kind nor of that kind. For example, when of the "somethings" some are corporeal and some are incorporeal, and some are true and some are false, and some perhaps are white and some are black, and some very large and some very small, and so on with the rest, the genus Something (for the sake of argument), which some say is the most general of all, will either be all of these or some of them or none. But if Something, that is, the genus, is absolutely none of them, the inquiry is terminated. And if it is said to be all of them, then, in addition to the impossibility of that statement, each of the species and of the particulars in which it exists will need to be all of them. For just as when the genus Animal is defined by them as animate sensitive substance, each of its species is said to be a substance and animate and sensitive, so if the genus is both corporeal and incorporeal, false and true, perhaps black and white, very small and very large, and all the rest, each of the species and of the particulars will be all of these – which is contrary to what we find. Therefore, this too is false.
But if the genus is some of them only, the genus of these will not be the genus of the rest; for example, if Something is corporeal, it will not be the genus of the incorporeal things, and if Animal is rational, it will not be the genus of irrational things, so that there will not be an incorporeal something nor an irrational animal, and similarly in the other cases. But that is absurd. Therefore, the genus cannot be of both this kind and that kind, nor of this kind but not of that kind, nor of neither this kind nor of that kind; and if such is the case, then the genus does not exist at all.

And if someone should say that the genus is potentially all things, we shall reply that what is potentially something must also be actually something; for example, one cannot be potentially a grammarian without being actually something. So, too, if the genus is potentially everything, we ask them what it is in actuality, and thus the same aporiai remain. For it is impossible to be actually all the opposites. Nor can it be some of them actually and others only potentially, for example, actually corporeal and potentially incorporeal. For it is potentially that which it is capable of being actually, and it is impossible for what is actually a body to become, by actualization, something incorporeal. Thus if (for the sake of argument) the genus Something is actually corporeal, it is not potentially incorporeal, and conversely. Hence it is not possible for the genus to be some things actually and some only potentially. And if it is nothing at all actually, it does not even exist. Therefore, the genus, which they claim to divide into the species, is nothing.

Moreover, here is another point worth looking at. Just as, since Alexander and Paris are identical, it is not possible for "Alexander is walking" to be true while "Paris is walking" is false, so if being human is the same for Theon and Dion, then the term "a human being," when used in the composition of a proposition, will make that proposition true or false of both of them. But that is not what we find. For when Dion is sitting down and Theon is walking around, the proposition "A human being is walking" is true when said of one of them and false when said of the other. Therefore, the appellative "a human being" is not common to them both and the same for both, but applies, if at all, differently to each.

21. Common Accidents
Similar things are said also about common accidents. For if the ability to see is one and the same accident in Dion and Theon, then on the hypothesis that Dion perishes but Theon survives and is able to see, either the Dogmatists will say that Dion's ability to see has not perished although he himself has, which makes no sense, or they will say that the same ability to see has both perished and not perished, which is absurd. Therefore, Theon's ability to see is not the same as Dion's, but each ability, if it exists at all, is peculiar to each. And if breathing is the same accident for both Dion and Theon, it is not possible for the breathing of Dion to exist and that of Theon not to exist but this is possible when the one has perished and the other survives. Therefore, breathing is not the same accident for both. In any case, concerning these matters this concise statement will suffice for the present.

22. Sophisms

Perhaps it will not be out of place briefly to consider the topic of sophisms, since those who glorify logic say that it is requisite for explaining them away. Thus, they say, if logic has the ability to distinguish true from false arguments, and if sophisms are false arguments, logic will be capable of discerning these as they abuse the truth with their apparent plausibilities. Hence, the logicians, pretending to be giving assistance to tottering common sense, try earnestly to give us instruction about the concept, the types, and the solutions of sophisms. *166* they say that a sophism is an argument that plausibly but treacherously induces one to accept its conclusion, which is false, or looks false, or is nonevident or in some other way unacceptable. For example, the conclusion is false in the case of this sophism:

Nobody offers you a predicate to drink.
"Drinks absinthe" is a predicate.
Therefore, nobody offers you absinthe to drink

and it looks false in this case:
What neither was nor is possible, is not nonsensical.
It neither was nor is possible for the doctor, qua doctor, to commit murder.
Therefore, that the doctor, qua doctor, should commit murder is not
nonsensical.

Again, it is non-evident in a case such at this:

Not both: I have already asserted something, and the stars are not even in
number.
I have already asserted something.
Therefore, the stars are even in number.

And again, it is unacceptable for other reasons in the so-called "solecistic"
arguments, as, for example,

What you look like, exists.
You look like a delirious person.
Therefore, a delirious person exists.

or

What you see exists.
You see an inflamed spot.
Therefore, an inflamed spot exists.

Furthermore, they also try to provide solutions of the sophisms, saying in
the case of the first one that one thing has been agreed upon by means of the
premises and another has been concluded. For it has been agreed upon that a
predicate is not drunk and that "drinks absinthe" is a predicate, but not that
"absinthe" by itself is such. Hence, whereas one ought to conclude "Therefore,
nobody drinks 'drinks absinthe'," which indeed is true, it has been concluded that
"Therefore, nobody drinks absinthe" which is false and does not follow from
the premises agreed upon. In the case of the second sophism they say that while it
seems to be leading to a false conclusion, so as to make the unwary hang back
from giving their assent to it, the conclusion is in fact true, namely, "Therefore, that the doctor, qua doctor, should commit murder is not non-sense." For no proposition is nonsense, and "The doctor, qua doctor, commits *167* murder" is a proposition; therefore, this is not nonsense. And the sophism inferring the nonevident, they say, is a member of the class of fallacies involving a shift of meaning. For when, by hypothesis, nothing has been asserted beforehand, the negated conjunction is true since the conjunction itself contains the false conjunct "I have already asserted something." But after the negated conjunction has been asserted, when the second premise, "I have already asserted something," has become true owing to the fact that the negated conjunction has been asserted before the second premise, the premise that is a negated conjunction becomes false since the false conjunct in the conjunction becomes true; so that it is never possible to draw the conclusion because the negated conjunction and the second premise do not hold simultaneously. And some say that the last group, that is, the solemistic arguments, are absurdly introduced contrary to linguistic usage.

Such things are what some of the logicians have to say about sophisms (others say other things); perhaps their comments can tickle the ears of less thoughtful people, but they are superfluous and worked out in vain. I suppose that this can be seen from what we have observed already; for we have shown that, on the basis of what the logicians say, the true and the false cannot be apprehended; and we have shown it by a variety of arguments but in particular by refuting their evidence for syllogistic force, namely proof and the undemonstrated arguments. It is possible to say much more relating specifically to the topic before us, but now, in our outline, the following point should be made.

In the case of those sophisms that logic seems particularly capable of refuting, the explanation is useless; while as regards those for which explanation is useful, it is not the logician who would explain them away but rather those in each art [teknê] who have got an understanding of the facts. For example, to mention one or two cases, if such a sophism as this were propounded to a doctor:

In the abatement stage of disease, a varied diet and wine are to be approved.
In every type of disease, abatement occurs before the first three days are up.
Therefore, it is necessary for the most part to take a varied diet and wine before the first three days are up,
the logician would have nothing to say toward explaining the argument away, useful though such an explanation would be; but the doctor will do so, knowing that "abatement" is ambiguous and refers either to that of the entire disease, or to the tendency to betterment, after crisis, of each particular attack; and knowing also that the abatement of the particular attack occurs for the most part before the first three days are up but that it is not in this abatement but in the abatement of the whole disease that we recommend the varied diet. Whence he will say that the premises of the argument are incoherent, with one kind of abatement – of the whole disease – taken in the first premise, and another kind – of the particular attack – taken in the second. *168*

Again, when someone suffers from a fever related to an attack of cramping and such an argument as the following is propounded,

Opposites are remedies for opposites.
Cold is apposite to this feverish condition.
Therefore, cold is the corresponding remedy for this feverish condition;

the logician will have nothing to say, but the doctor, knowing what are the principally relevant pathé and what are the symptoms of these, will say that the argument does not apply to the symptoms (indeed, the result of applying cold is that the fever increases) but rather to the relevant pathè, and that what is relevant is the constipation, which calls for a relaxing mode of treatment, rather than a cramping one; whereas the consequent fever is not principally relevant, nor, therefore, is what seems to be the remedy corresponding to it.

And thus, in the case of the sophisms that can be usefully explained away, the logician will have nothing to say, but instead he will propound to us such arguments as these:

If you don't have beautiful horns and have horns, you have horns.
You don't have beautiful horns and have horns.
Therefore, you have horns.
If something moves, either it moves in the location where it is, or in the location where it isn't. But it neither moves in the location where it is (for it is at rest) nor in the location where it isn't (for how could a thing do anything in a location where it has no presence?). Therefore, nothing moves.

Either what comes into existence is at that time existent, or it is non-existent. But the existent does not come into existence, for it already exists. Nor does the non-existent, for when a thing is coming into existence something is happening to it, but nothing happens to the non-existent. Therefore, nothing comes into existence.

Snow is frozen water. But water is dark in color. Therefore, snow is dark in color.

And, when he has gathered together a collection of such nonsense, he knits his brow and takes logic to hand, trying very solemnly to establish for us by means of syllogistic proofs that something does come into existence and something does move and snow is white and we do not have horns—even though it is sufficient, perhaps, to set obviousness over against these and to demolish their conclusion, firmly maintained though it may be, by means of the equipollent contradictory evidence derived from the appearances. Thus, in fact, when the argument about motion was propounded to a certain philosopher, he just silently walked around, and in daily life people make trips by land and by sea, and build ships and houses and beget children, paying no attention to the arguments about motion and genesis.

An amusing tale is told of the physician Herophilus; he was a contemporary of Diodorus who, exhibiting with logic his foolishness, was wont to rehearse sophistical arguments about many things and especially about motion. So when Diodorus had dislocated his shoulder and went to Herophilus for treatment, the latter said jokingly to him:
While the shoulder was going out, it was either in the place where it was or in a place where it wasn't.
But it was neither in the place where it was, nor in a place where it wasn't.
Therefore, it has not gone out.

The sophist begged him to skip such arguments and just give him the medical treatment suited to his case.

At any rate I think it sufficient to live, empirically and undogmatically, in accord with the common observances and notions, suspending judgment about the things that are said as a result of Dogmatic subtlety and are very far from the usage of daily life.

If, then, logic fails to explain away such sophisms as might usefully be solved, while in the case of those that somebody might suppose that it does explain, the explanation is useless, then logic is simply of no use in the solution of sophisms.

And even on the basis of what is said by the logicians one could show concisely that their technical treatment of the sophisms is useless. the logicians assert that they are motivated toward the art or craft of logic not only in order to ascertain what is implied by what, but mainly in order to know how to distinguish the true and the false by means of demonstrative arguments; thus they say that logic is the science of things true, false, and neither. Since, then, they tell us that a true argument is one that validly infers a true conclusion by means of true premises, when an argument with a false conclusion is pre- pounded we shall know immediately that it is false and we shall not assent to it. For the argument itself must either be unsound or not have true premises. And this is evident from the following: Either the argument's false conclusion follows from the conjunction of the premises, or it does not. Now if, on the one hand, it does not so follow, then the argument will not be sound; for they say that an argument is sound when its conclusion follows from the conjunction of its premises. But if, on the other hand, it does follow, then, according to their own principles of logic, the conjunction of the premises must also be false; for they say that the false follows from the false, but never from the true. And from what has been said above it is evident that, according to them, an argument that is not sound or not true is not demonstrative either.
If, therefore, when an argument is propounded in which the conclusion is false we know at once that because of having the false conclusion it is not true and sound, we shall not give our assent to it even though we may not know where the fallacy lies. For just as we do not give our assent to the truth of what the sleight-of-hand artists do, and we know that they are deceiving us even though we cannot tell how they are doing it, so likewise we do not give credence to the false but seemingly plausible arguments even though we cannot tell in what way they are going wrong.

Further, since the Dogmatists say that sophisms lead not only to falsehood but also to other paradoxical results, we need to discuss them more generally. Any propounded argument either leads us to an unacceptable conclusion or to one which is such that we ought to accept it. In the latter case there will be nothing paradoxical in our assenting to it; but if the argument leads us to something unacceptable, it is not we who should give precipitate assent to the paradoxical result because of the plausibility of the argument, but it is the Dogmatists who should desist from an argument that forces them to assent to paradoxes, if indeed they have chosen, as they profess, to seek the truth and not indulge in silly talk like little children.

For just as, if there is a road leading to a precipice, we do not push ourselves over the edge just because there is a road leading up to it, but we avoid the road on account of the precipice, so also if an argument is leading us to something generally considered paradoxical we shall not assent to the paradox because of the argument, but we shall avoid the argument because of the paradox. So whenever this sort of argument is propounded to us, we shall not assent to the paradox because of the argument, but we shall avoid the argument because of the paradox. So whenever this sort of argument is propounded to us, we shall suspend judgment on each premise, and then, when the whole argument is propounded, we shall conclude whatever seems to be the case.

And if the Chrysippean Dogmatists say that when the heap argument is being propounded one ought to stop and suspend judgment while it is going on, in order not to fall into paradox, all the more would it be appropriate for us as Skeptics, when we suspect paradox, not to give precipitate approval when the premises are propounded, but to suspend judgment about each of them until the whole argument has been presented. And whereas we, taking our start undogmatically from the conventions of daily life, thus avoid the fallacious arguments, the Dogmatists will find it impossible to distinguish a sophism from an argument that
seems to be correctly propounded, for they have to determine dogmatically whether or not the schema of the argument is sound and the premises are true. But we have shown above that they are neither able to apprehend the sound arguments nor to determine that something is true, having no agreed-upon criterion or proof, as we have shown on the basis of what they themselves say.

In view of these points, then, the logical treatment of sophisms that is so much boasted about by the logicians is useless. *171*

We say similar things about the distinguishing of amphibolies. For if an amphiboly is a linguistic expression having two or more meanings, and if linguistic expressions have meaning by convention, then those amphibolies that are worth resolving – such as occur in some practical situation – will be resolved, not by the logician but by the people practised in each particular art, who themselves have the experience of how they have created the conventional usage of the terms to denote the things signified, as, for example, in the case of the amphiboly "In periods of abatement one should prescribe a varied diet and wine." Further, in daily life we see that even children distinguish amphibolies when such distinction seems to them to be of use. Thus certainly, if someone who has different servants with the same name were to direct a boy called, say, Manes (supposing that this is the name the servants have in common), to be summoned to him, the child will ask, "Which one?" And if someone having a number of different wines should say to his boy, "Pour me the wine to drink," the boy will ask, similarly, "Which?" Thus, the experience of what is useful in each particular case produces the distinction.

Concerning all the amphibolies, however, that are not involved in some practical matter of daily life but reside instead in dogmatic principles and are probably useless for living undogmatically, the logician, with his own particular point of view about these, will be similarly forced by the Skeptic attacks to suspend judgment concerning them, insofar as they are probably connected with objects or states of affairs that are nonevident, non-apprehensible, and even non-existent. We shall discuss these matters again another time. But if some Dogmatist tries to refute any of these points he will strengthen the Skeptic argument, himself lending support, because of the argumentation from both sides and the unresolved controversy, to suspension of judgment about the matters in question.
Having said thus much about amphibolies, we here conclude the second book of the Outlines.

*Book 3 of three* *173*

As regards the logic part of what is called "philosophy", the foregoing account may be sufficient by way of outline.

1. Physics

Coming now to the physics part of it, we shall follow the same mode of exposition and shall not refute each of the things the Dogmatists say, topic by topic, but instead we shall undertake to deal with the more general aspects, which encompass the rest.

2. Productive Sources [*Archai*] of Things

And since it is agreed by most people that some sources of things are material and others are productive, we shall begin our account with the productive ones, for these, they say, are more important than the material.

3. God

In view of the fact that the majority assert that god is a maximally productive cause, let us first give consideration to god, noting in advance that, on the one hand, we follow without doctrinal belief the common course of life and we say that there are gods, and we reverence gods and ascribe to them foreknowledge, but, on the other hand, that we have the following points to make against the precipitancy of the Dogmatists.

When we conceive of objects or states of affairs, we are bound to conceive of their substances as well, for example, whether they are corporeal or incorporeal. And also of their forms; for nobody could conceive of a horse without first comprehending the form of the horse. Also, the object conceived of must be conceived of as being somewhere. Since, then, some of the Dogmatists say that
god is corporeal and some that he is incorporeal, and some say that he is anthropomorphic and some that be is not, and some that he is located somewhere and others that be is not, while of those saying that be is located somewhere, some say that he is inside the cosmos and others that be is outside – how shall we be able to form a concept of god when we have no agreed-upon substance nor form of him, nor location where he is? Let the Dogmatists first agree and concur with one another that god is such and such, and only then, when they have sketched this out for us, let them expect us to form a concept of god. But as long as they do not settle their disagreements we cannot tell what agreed-upon conception we are supposed to get from them.

But, they say, when you have conceived of something immortal and blessed, consider that to be god. This, however, is silly, for just as whoever does not know Dion cannot conceive of accidents as belonging to Dion, so, since we do not know what god is, we are not able to learn about or even conceive of his accidents. And aside from these points, let the Dogmatists tell us what a "blessed" thing is, whether it is something that acts upon its subordinates in accord with virtue and forethought, or it is something inactive, neither having any business of its own nor providing any for someone else; for, disagreeing without resolution about this, too, they have made the blessed, and consequently also god, inconceivable for us.

Furthermore, if we go by what the Dogmatists say, even if we form a conception of god it is necessary to suspend judgment concerning whether he exists or does not exist. For it is not pre-evident that god exists. If he affected us just of and by himself, the Dogmatists would agree about who, of what sort, and where he is; but their unresolved disagreement has made him seem non-evident to us and in need of proof. Now, anyone who proves that a god exists either does this by means of something pre-evident or by means of something non-evident. But certainly not by means of something pre-evident, for if what proves a god to exist were pre-evident, then in view of the fact that the thing proved is thought of relatively to what proves it and therefore is apprehended along with it, as we have established, the existence of a god will also be pre-evident, being apprehended along with the pre-evident fact that proves it. But it is not pre-evident, as we have shown. Therefore, it is not proved by means of something pre-evident. Nor is it proved by something non-evident. For if the non-evident proposition that is to
prove that a god exists, and which itself needs proof, is said to be proved by means of something pre-evident, it will no longer be nonevident but rather pre-evident. But neither is it proved by means of something non-evident, for anyone who says that will fall into an infinite regress, since we shall always be asking for a proof of the non-evident proposition that is offered as proving the last one propounded. ⁹ Therefore, that a god exists cannot be proved from any other proposition. And so, if it is not of itself pre-evident nor provable from something else, whether a god exists will not be apprehensible.

Further, this too should be said. Anyone who asserts that god exists either says that god takes care of the things in the cosmos or that be does not, and, if be does take care, that it is either of all things or of some. Now if he takes care of everything, there would be no particular evil thing and no evil in general in the cosmos; but the Dogmatists say that everything is full of evil; therefore god shall not be said to take care of everything. On the other hand, if he takes care of only some things, why does he take care of these and not of ¹⁰ those? For either he wishes but is not able, or be is able but does not wish, or he neither wishes nor is able. If he both wished and was able, he would have taken care of everything; but, for the reasons stated above, he does not take care of everything; therefore, it is not the case that he both wishes and is able to take care of everything. But if he wishes and is not able, he is weaker than the cause on account of which he is not able to take care of the things of which ¹¹ he does not take care; but it is contrary to the concept of god that he should be weaker than anything. Again, if he is able to take care of everything but does not wish to do so, he will be considered malevolent, and if be neither wishes nor is able, he is both malevolent and weak; but to say that about god is impious. Therefore, god does not take care of the things in the cosmos.

Further, if god does not take care of anything and there is no work or product of his, nobody will be able to say from whence be apprehends that god *¹⁷⁵* exists, if indeed god neither appears of himself nor is apprehended through his products. And thus, whether god exists is not apprehensible. From these ¹² considerations we conclude that most likely those who firmly maintain that god exists will be forced into impiety; for if they say that he takes care of everything, they will be saying that god is the cause of evils, while if they say that he takes
care of some things only or even of nothing, they will be forced to say that be is either malevolent or weak, and manifestly these are impious conclusions.

4. Cause

In order to keep the Dogmatists from attempting to defame us, too, seeing that they are at a loss as to how to refute us with facts, we shall consider the active cause more generally, after first trying to understand the concept of cause. Now, if we go by what the Dogmatists say, nobody could have a conception of cause, since in addition to offering conflicting and strange notions of cause, by their disagreement about it they have also made the existence of it undiscoverable. For some say that causes are corporeal, and others say that they are incorporeal. It would seem that according to them a cause, in the wider sense, would be that by the action of which the effect comes about; for example, the sun or the sun's heat is the cause of the wax being melted or of the melting of the wax. But they have even disagreed about this, with some using appellatives – for example, "the melting" – for what the cause is the cause of, and others using predicates – for example, "is melted." Anyhow, in the wider sense, as I was saying, the cause would be that by the action of which the effect comes about.

Most of the Dogmatists hold that of these causes some are conclusive, some are associates, and others are synergistic. Causes are conclusive when the effect is present when they are present, absent when they are absent, and diminished when they are diminished; it is thus, they say, that fastening the halter is the cause of the choking. And a cause is associate if it contributes a force equal to that of its fellow cause toward the existence of the effect; thus, they say, each of the oxen that pull the plow is a cause of the pulling of the plow. And a cause is synergistic if it contributes a small force toward the easy occurrence of the effect, as when two people are lifting something heavy and a third helps to lift it.

Some people, however, have asserted also that present things are causes of things future, as, for example, the proximate causes. For instance, extended exposure to the sun is the cause of fever. But others reject this view, on the ground that, since the cause is relative – that is, relative to the effect – it cannot precede the effect as its cause. In our state of aporia about these matters, we have the following to say.
5. Is Anything a Cause of Anything?

That there are causes, is plausible; for how else could growth occur, and diminution, generation, destruction, change in general, and each of the physical and psychological effects, the disposition of the whole cosmos, and all the rest, if not because of some cause? And if there were no causes, everything would come from everything, and by chance. For example, perhaps horses would come from mice, and elephants from ants; and in Egyptian Thebes there would have been rainstorms and snow and the south would have had no rain, if there had not been a cause on account of which the south is stormy in winter and the east is dry. Further, anyone who says there are no causes is refuted; for if he claims to make this statement simply and without any cause he will not be worthy of belief, while if he says that it makes it because of some cause, he is positing a cause while wishing to deny it, in granting a cause why causes do not exist.

For these reasons it is plausible that there are causes. But that it is also plausible, on the other hand, to say that nothing is the cause of anything will be plain when we have set forth a few of the many arguments to show this. Thus, for instance, it is impossible to conceive of a cause before apprehending its effect as its effect. For only then do we recognize that it is a cause of the effect, when we apprehend the latter as an effect. But we are not able to apprehend the effect of the cause as its effect if we do not apprehend the cause of the effect as its cause. For only then do we suppose ourselves to recognize that the effect is an effect of it, when we apprehend the cause as the cause of that effect. If, then, in order to conceive the cause it is necessary to have prior recognition of the effect, and in order to recognize the effect, as I said, it is necessary to have prior acquaintance with the cause, the circularity type of aporia shows that both are inconceivable, it being impossible to conceive the cause as a cause or the effect as an effect; for, since each of them needs credibility from the other, we do not know with which of them to begin the conceiving. Hence we shall not be able to assert that anything is the cause of anything.

Further, even if someone should grant that it is possible to form a concept of cause, because of the disagreement it would be considered not to be apprehensible. For some say that there are examples of causation, some say that
there are not, and some suspend judgment. Now anyone who says that something
is the cause of something will either admit that he just says this, without being
motivated by any rational cause, or else he will say that he has arrived at his
assent due to some causes. If, on the one hand, he admits that he just says it, he
will be no more worthy of belief than the person who just says that nothing is the
cause of anything; while if, on the other hand, he speaks of causes because of
which he thinks that something is the cause of something, he will be trying to
establish what is in question by means of what is in question; for while we are
calling into question whether anything is the cause of anything, he asserts that,
since there exists a cause of there being a cause, there is a cause. And besides,
as we are questioning the very existence of causes, it will of course be necessary
for him to supply a cause of the cause of there being a cause, and a cause of that,
and so on ad infinitum. But it is impossible to supply an infinite number of causes;
therefore, it is impossible to assert with firm assurance that anything is the cause
of anything. *177*

Furthermore, a cause produces an effect either at a time when it already exists and exists as a cause, or when it is not a cause. Now it certainly does not do
so when it is not a cause; but if it does so when it is a cause, it must have existed
and have become a cause beforehand, and then, this done, it must bring about the
effect, which is said to be produced by it at a time when it is already a cause. But
since the cause is relative, that is, relative to the effect, clearly it cannot, as a
cause, exist before the effect; therefore it is not possible for the cause, at the time
when it is the cause, to produce that of which it is the cause. And if it cannot
produce anything either when it is a cause or when it is not, then it cannot
produce anything. Wherefore, it will not be a cause, for apart from producing
something a cause cannot be conceived as a cause.

Whence some people say also the following: the cause must either exist at the
same time as the effect, or before it, or come into being after it. But to say that the
cause is brought into existence after the genesis of its effect would be ridiculous.
But neither can it exist before it, for it is said to be conceived relatively to it,
and the Dogmatists hold that relatives, qua relative, coexist and are conceived
together with one another. Nor can it exist at the same time as the effect; for if it is
productive of the effect, and if what comes into being must come into being
through the agency of what exists, it is necessary that the cause first become a
cause, and then, this done, produce the effect. Consequently, if the cause exists neither before nor at the same time as the effect, and the effect does not come into being before it, it does not, I suppose, have any existence at all. It is also clear, I think, that by these considerations, too, the concept of cause is once again destroyed. For if the cause, as a relative thing, cannot be conceived as existing before the existence of its effect, but yet, in order to be conceived as the cause of its effect, it must indeed be conceived as existing before its effect, then since it is impossible to conceive of anything as existing before something before the existence of which it cannot be conceived as existing, it is in consequence impossible for the cause to be conceived.

From these points we conclude further that if the arguments by which we show the existence of causes are plausible, and if those, too, are plausible which prove that it is incorrect to assert the existence of a cause, and if there is no way to give preference to any of these over others—since we have no agreed-upon sign, criterion, or proof, as has been pointed out earlier—then, if we go by the statements of the Dogmatists, it is necessary to suspend judgment about the existence of causes, too, saying that they are "no more" existent than non-existent.

6. Material Sources

Concerning the productive sources, then, it will suffice for the present to have said this much; and now we should briefly discuss the so-called "material" sources. That these are not apprehensible may be seen easily and at once from the disagreement about them that has grown up among the Dogmatists. For Pherecydes of Syros said that the earth was the source of everything, and Thales of Miletus, that the source was water; Anaximander, his student, the infinite; Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia, air; Hippasus of Metapontum, fire; Xenopbanes of Colophon, earth and water; Oenopides of Chios, fire and air; Hippo of Rhegium, fire and water; Onomacritus in his Orphics, fire, water, and earth; the followers of Empedocles, as well as the Stoics, fire, air, water, earth—and is there any need even to mention the mystical "matter devoid of quality" that some of them talk about, when even they themselves do not firmly maintain that they apprehend it? The followers of Aristotle the Peripatetic take as their sources fire, air, water, earth, and the "revolving body"; Democritus and Epicurus,
atoms; Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, homogeneous things; Diodorus, surnamed Cronus, minimal bodies having no parts; Heracleides Ponticus and Asclepiades Bithynus, continuous masses; the followers of Pythagoras, the numbers; the mathematicians, the boundaries of bodies; Strato the Physicist, the qualities.

33 With so much (and even more) disagreement existing among the Dogmatists concerning material sources, we shall, if we give our assent, either assent to all the positions stated and the others as well, or to some of them. But it is not possible to assent to all; for we shall not be able, I presume, to assent both to the followers of Asclepiades, who say that the elements are frangible and have qualities, and also to the followers of Democritus, who claim that the elements are indivisible and devoid of quality, not to mention the followers of Anaxagoras, who ascribe every sensible quality to the homogeneous 34 things. And if we give preference to one position over the others, either we simply do so, that is, without proof, or we do so with proof. But we shall not give assent without proof, and if with proof, the proof must be true. However, it would not be conceded to be true unless it had been determined by a true criterion to be such, and a criterion is shown to be true by a proof 35 that has been determined to be correct. If, then, in order to show that the proof giving preference to some position is true, it is necessary for its criterion to have been proved, and in order that the criterion have been proved, it is necessary for its proof first to have been determined to be correct, we have circularity, which does not let the argument go forward, since the proof is always in need of a proven criterion and the criterion is in need of a proof that has been 36 determined correct. And if anyone should wish to determine the criterion by a criterion and to prove the proof by a proof, he will be headed for infinity. If, then, we are neither able to assent to all the positions about the elements nor to some of them, it is appropriate to suspend judgment about them.

37 It is possible, I think, to show by means of these arguments alone that the elements, that is, the material sources, are not apprehensible. But in order that we may be able to refute the Dogmatists more fully, we shall linger upon the topic for such time as is required. However, since the doctrines about the elements are, as we have shown, numerous and indeed almost infinite, we shall, in view of the character of our treatise, beg off from arguing against each one specifically, but shall instead oppose all of them by implication. For since any position one might take concerning the elements will involve regarding them either as corporeal or
incorporeal, we think that it will be sufficient if we show that both corporeal and incorporeal things are not apprehensible; for thus it will be clear that the elements, too, are not apprehensible.

7. Are Bodies Apprehensible?

Now some people say that a body is that which is capable of acting or being acted upon. But if we go by this conception, bodies are not apprehensible. For, as we have shown, causes are not apprehensible; and when we cannot say whether there is such a thing as a cause, we are also not able to say whether there is any such thing as something acted upon, for what is acted upon is always acted upon by a cause. And if both the cause and what is acted upon are not apprehensible, it follows that bodies are not apprehensible, either. But some say that a body is what is extended in three directions and is solid. They say that a point is that which has no parts, a line is length without breadth, a surface is length with breadth; when depth and solidity are added to this, there is a body, that is, the object of our present discussion, composed of length, breadth, depth and solidity. But arguing against these people is easy. For they will say either that the body is nothing over and above these things or that it is something other than the combination of them. Now, apart from the length, breadth, depth, and solidity, there would be no body; and if the body is these, then anyone who showed that they do not exist would also abolish bodies, for wholes are abolished when all their parts are abolished.

It is of course possible to disprove the existence of these in various ways, but for the present it will suffice to say that if boundaries exist, they are lines or surfaces or bodies. Now, if someone should say that a surface or line exists, it will also be said that each of the four features mentioned above either can exist by itself or is found only in connection with the so-called "bodies." But it is silly, I think, to fancy a line or surface existing by itself. And if it should be said that each of these is found only in connection with the bodies and does not exist by itself, then, first of all, it will thereby be granted that bodies have not been generated from them (for it would have been necessary, presumably, for them to have acquired existence by themselves beforehand, and then to have combined to
produce the bodies); and second, they do not exist even in the so-called "bodies."

And it is possible to show this by means of a number of arguments, but for the present it will suffice to mention the *aporiai* having to do with touch. For if juxtaposed bodies touch one another, they contact one another with their boundaries—for instance, with their surfaces. But the surfaces will not be unified as a whole with one another because of the touching, for otherwise the touching would be a fusion and separating the things touching would be a tearing apart, which we do not find to be the case. But if the surface touches the surface of the juxtaposed body with some of its parts only, and with others of the parts is united with the body of which it is a boundary, then it will not be without depth, its parts being understood to be different in respect to depth, with one part touching the juxtaposed body, and the other being that by which it is joined to the body of which it is a boundary>. Therefore, not even in connection with a body can one find length and breadth without depth, nor, consequently, a surface.

And likewise when, by hypothesis, two surfaces are juxtaposed to one another along the boundaries where they terminate—that is, edgewise, that is to say, along lines—then these lines, by means of which the surfaces are said to touch each other, will not be unified with one another for they would fuse; but if any one of these lines touches the juxtaposed line with some of its parts and with others is united to the surface of which it is a boundary, it will not be without breadth and hence will not be a line. And if no line or surface is in a body, neither will length, breadth, or depth be in it.

If someone should say that boundaries are bodies, the answer to him will be brief. For if length is a body, it will have to be partitioned into its three dimensions, each of which, being a body, will again be partitioned into another three, which will be bodies, and these, likewise, into others, and so on ad infinitum; so that the body becomes infinite in size, having infinitely many parts; which is absurd. Therefore, the aforementioned dimensions are not bodies. And if they are neither bodies nor lines nor surfaces, they will not be considered to exist.

Solidity, too, is not apprehensible. For if it were apprehended, it would be apprehended by touching. If, therefore, we show that touch is not apprehensible, it will be clear that solidity, too, cannot be apprehended. But by means of the following considerations we conclude that touch is not apprehensible. Things that
touch one another either touch parts to parts or whole to whole. But certainly not whole to whole, for that way they will be unified and not touching one another. But not parts to parts, either. For their parts are parts relative to the whole, but relative to their own parts they are wholes. Now these wholes, which are parts of other things, will not, in view of what has been said above, touch each other whole to whole, but also not parts to parts; for the parts of these, too, as being wholes relative to their own parts, will not touch one another whole to whole nor parts to parts. But if we apprehend touch neither as occurring with respect to wholeness nor with respect to parts, it will not be apprehensible. And for this reason solidity, too, will not be apprehensible. Whence the same holds of bodies, for if these are nothing other than the three dimensions together with solidity, and we have shown that each of those is not apprehensible, bodies too will not be apprehensible.

Thus, insofar as this depends on the concept of body, it will not be apprehensible whether there is any such thing as a body. And the following also needs to be said about the topic at hand. The Dogmatists assert that, of things that exist, some are objects of sense perception and others are objects of thought, and that the latter are apprehended with the intellect and the former with the senses, and further that the senses are simply passive, while the intellect proceeds from the apprehension of the objects of sense perception to that of the objects of thought. So if there is such a thing as a body, it is either an object of sense perception, for it seems to be apprehended as an assemblage of length and depth and breadth and solidity and color and some other things together with which it is experienced, whereas the senses are said by them to be single receptive. Yet if bodies are said to be objects of thought, then in the nature of things there must certainly exist some objects of sense perception from which the thought of the bodies thought about will be derived. But nothing exists besides bodies and the incorporeal, and of these the incorporeal is unquestionably an object of thought, while bodies are not objects of sense perception, as we have shown. Since, then, there is in the nature of things no object of sense perception from which the thought of a body will be derived, bodies will not be objects of thought. And if they are neither objects of sense perception nor objects of thought, and besides these there is not anything else, it must be said that if we go by the Dogmatists' account there are not any bodies, either. For these reasons, by
opposing the arguments about bodies to the apparent existence of bodies, we are brought to suspension of judgment about them.

The non-apprehensibility of bodies brings with it the non-apprehensibility of the incorporeal. For privations are thought of as privations of positive states; for example, blindness is a privation of sight, deafness of hearing, and similarly in the other cases. Wherefore, in order that we may apprehend a privation it is necessary that we have apprehended beforehand the state of which it is said to be the privation; for someone who had no concept of sight would not be able to say that this person does not have it, that is, is blind. If, therefore, the incorporeal is the privation of the corporeal, and if when states are not apprehended it is not possible for the privations of them to be apprehended, and if further it has been shown that bodies are not apprehensible, then the incorporeal too will not be apprehensible.

Furthermore, either the incorporeal is an object of sense perception or an object of thought. And if it is an object of sense perception it will not be apprehensible, by reason of the difference of animals and of human beings and of the senses and of the circumstances and owing to the admixtures and the rest of what we have said before in our remarks on the ten modes; and if it is an object of thought, then since we do not have direct apprehension of the sensible objects, starting from which we are supposed to move to the objects of thought, we will not have direct apprehension of the objects of thought, nor, consequently, apprehension of the incorporeal.

Also, anyone claiming to apprehend the incorporeal will assert that he apprehends it either by sense or by means of argument. But certainly not by sense, since the senses seem to perceive their objects by a kind of impacting or "stinging." Take sight, for instance, whether it occurs by the presence of a cone or with emissions and admissions of images or with effusions of rays and colors, and take also bearing, whether it is impelled air or the parts of the sound that come around the ears and strike the acoustic gas so as to produce the perception of the sound. Also, smells impinge on the nose and tastes on the tongue, and the objects affecting the sense of touch impinge on the sense of touch. But incorporeal things cannot admit of such impacting, so that they would not be apprehensible by sense.

But not by means of an argument, either. For if an argument is a lektón and incorporeal, as the Stoics say, anyone who asserts that incorporeal things are
apprehensible by means of an argument is begging the question. For while *182* we are questioning whether it is possible to apprehend something incorporeal, be, taking up an incorporeal object, proposes to produce, just by means of this, 53 the apprehension of incorporeal things. Yet the argument itself, since it is incorporeal, is one of the things in question. How, then, will anyone prove that this incorporeal thing – I mean, the argument – is previously apprehended? If by means of another incorporeal thing, we shall question the proof of the apprehension of that, and so on ad infinitum; but if by means of a body, the apprehension of bodies is also in question. By what means, then, shall we show that the body is apprehended that is taken up in order to prove the incorporeal argument? If by means of a body, we are thrown into an infinite regress, and if by means of something incorporeal, we fall into circularity. So, with the argument thus remaining inapprehensible, if indeed it is incorporeal, nobody would be in a position to say that the incorporeal is apprehensible by means of it.

54 But if the argument is a body, then, as there is disagreement about bodies too as to whether or not they are apprehended (because of what is called their "continual flux," so that they are thought neither to admit of the demonstrative "this" nor to exist, wherefore Plato calls them "things that are coming into being" and never "things that are"), I am at a loss as to how this disagreement about bodies will be settled, since because of the difficulties stated just above it cannot be settled either by means of a body or by means of something incorporeal. Therefore, it is not possible to apprehend incorporeal things by 55 means of an argument. And if they neither fall within the scope of the senses nor are apprehended by means of an argument, they will not be apprehended at all.

If, then, it is impossible to take a firm stand about the existence of bodies or about incorporeal things, one must also suspend judgment about the elements and perhaps even about what are derivative from the elements, seeing that of these, some are bodies and some are incorporeal, and there are aporiai about both. In any case, with judgment suspended for these reasons on both the productive and material sources, the whole story about sources is aporetic.

8. Blending
Next, leaving also these matters aside, how do the Dogmatists say that the compounds arise from the primary elements, when neither contact nor touch nor blending nor mixture has any existence at all? For there is no such thing as touch, as I showed a bit earlier when I was discussing the existence of bodies; and I shall now briefly show that, if we go by what the Dogmatists say, the way of blending, too, is impossible. For much is said about blending, and the Dogmatists' positions on the problem at hand are almost endless; hence from the unresolved disagreement one might conclude at once that the matter is not apprehensible. And for the moment, in view of the plan of the treatise, we shall beg off from opposing each of their points individually and shall consider it sufficient at present to say the following. *183*

They state that blended things are composed of substances and qualities. 57 So, one will say either that the substances are mixed but the qualities are not, or that the qualities are mixed but not their substances any longer, or that neither is mixed with the other, or that the two are unified with one another. But if neither the qualities nor the substances are mixed with one another, a blending cannot be conceived; for how will a single sensation arise from the things that are blended if the things blended are not mixed in accord with any of the aforementioned ways? And if the qualities are said to be simply juxtaposed but the substances are mixed, then in this way, too, the account would be absurd, for we do not perceive the qualities in the blended materials as separate, but as completely unified, derived from the mixing. And if somebody should say that the qualities are mixed but the substances are not, be will be asserting the impossible. For the qualities subsist in the substances, wherefore it would be ridiculous to say that the qualities, separated from the substances, are somehow privately mixed with one another, and the substances, devoid of qualities, are left apart.

It remains to say that both the qualities and the substances of the things 59 blended permeate one another and by mixing produce the blend. But this is more absurd than the preceding possibilities; for such a blend is impossible. For example, if a cup of hemlock juice is mixed with ten cups of water, it would be said that the hemlock is blended together with all the water, for certainly if someone took even the smallest portion of the mixture he would find it full of the power of the hemlock. But if the hemlock is mixed into every part of the water and is distributed as a whole through the whole of it by the mutual penetration of
the substances as well as their qualities, thus giving rise to the blend, and if, further, the things distributed over one another occupy in every part equal space, so that they are equal to each other, then the cup of hemlock will be equal to the ten cups of water, so that the mixture ought to be either twenty cups or only two, if we are to go by the present hypothesis about how blending occurs. And if, again, a cup of water is poured into the twenty cups, the quantity ought to be forty cups, if we go by the hypothesized theory, since it is both possible to consider the one cup to be the twenty over which it is distributed, and also possible to consider the twenty cups to be the one, to which they are made equal. And thus it is possible, pouring in one cup at a time and reasoning in like manner, to conclude that the original twenty cups of the mixture must be twenty thousand and more, as well as only two, going by the hypothesis of how the blending occurs – a conclusion that reaches the ultimate of absurdity.

But if it is not possible for blending to occur when either the substances alone are mixed together, or the qualities alone, or both, or neither, and if no other possibilities can be conceived, the way in which blending, as well as mixing in general, takes place is inconceivable. Wherefore, on this account of blending, too, if the so-called "elements" are not capable of forming compounds either by being placed in contact with one another by way of juxtaposition or by being blended or mixed, the natural philosophy of the Dogmatists is unintelligible. *184*

9. Motion

63 In addition to the things said above, we could have based our case on the argument about types of motion, since on this basis, too, the natural philosophy of the Dogmatists could be held impossible. For certainly the compounds must come about as a result of some motion in the elements and the productive source. If, then, we show that no type of motion is agreed upon, it will be clear that even granting hypothetically all the assumptions mentioned above, the so-called "physical theory" has been elaborated by the Dogmatists in vain.

10. Transitional Motion
Those who are supposed to have given the most complete accounts say that there are six kinds of motion: local transition, natural change, increase, diminution, generation, and destruction. We shall consider each of these forms of motion separately, beginning with local transition. This, according to the Dogmatists, is that by which the thing in motion goes from one location to another, either as a whole or in part – as a whole in the case of people walking around, in part in the case of a sphere moved around its center, for while as a whole it stays in the same location, the parts exchange their locations.

The principal views about motion are three, I think. The common people and some of the philosophers assume that motion exists, but Parmenides and Melissus and some others think that it does not. The Skeptics said that motion "no more" exists than not, for if we go by the appearances motion seems to exist, but if we go by the philosophic account it seems not to exist. So when we have set out the opposition between those who assume that motion exists and those who assert that it does not, and when we find the disagreement equally balanced, we shall be forced to conclude that, if we go by what people say, motion "no more" exists than not. we shall begin with those who say that it exists. These rely most of all on "obviousness." If motion does not exist, they say, how does the sun go from east to west, and how does it make the seasons of the year, seeing that these come about by its approaches to us and its recessions from us? Or how do ships set sail from harbors and put in at other harbors very far away? And how does the person who denies motion manage to go forth from his house and return to it again? They say that these facts are completely irrefutable. Thus, when one of the Cynics heard an argument against motion he did not reply but simply stood up and walked around, showing by deed and "obviousness" that motion exists.

These people, then, undertake in this way to discomfit those who hold a position opposite to theirs, whereas those who deny the existence of motion venture such arguments as the following. If something is moved, it is moved either by itself or by something else. But if it is moved by something else, then (since what moves is active and what is active moves) that too will need another moving thing, and the second thing a third, and so on ad infinitum, so that the motion has no beginning; which is absurd. Therefore, it is not the case that what is moved is always moved by something else. But neither is it moved by itself. For that which is said to be moved by itself will be moved either without
a cause or on account of some cause. But they say that nothing comes to pass without a cause; and if it is moved on account of some cause, the cause on account of which it is moved will be what moves it, whence, in accord with the consideration stated a moment ago, the process goes on to infinity. And furthermore, since everything that moves moves either by pushing or pulling or lifting or pressing down, that which moves itself will have to move itself in one of these ways. But if it moves itself by pushing, it will have to be in back of itself; if by pulling, in front of itself; if by lifting, underneath itself; and if by pressing down, above itself. But it is impossible for anything to be above or in front of or underneath or in back of itself. And if nothing is moved either by itself or by something else, then nothing is moved.

If somebody takes refuge in the notions of motive and choice, it is necessary to remind him of the controversy about "what is in our power" and that the controversy remains unresolved since up to now we have not found a criterion of truth.

Moreover, there is also this to be said. If something is moved, either it is moved in a location where it is or in a location where it is not. But it cannot be moved in the location where it is, for if it is there, that is where it rests; nor can it be moved in the location where it is not, for where something is not, there it cannot act or be acted upon. This argument is that of Diodorus Cronus, and it has had many refutations, of which, on account of the character of our treatise, we shall set out only the more striking ones, together with a judgment about them, as it appears to us.

Some, then, say that it is possible for something to be moved in the location where it is, for example, that spheres revolving around their centers are moved while remaining in the same location. Against these people one must transfer the argument to each of the parts of the sphere, and, noting that if we go by their account it is not even moved part by part, conclude that nothing is moved in the location where it is. we shall make the same point also against those who say that what is moved has two locations, that in which it is and that to which it is going. For we shall ask them when the thing moved is going from the location in which it is to the other one—whether while it is in the first location or in the second. But when it is in the first location it does not go over to the second, for it is still in the first; and when it is not in this location, it is not departing from it.
And besides, the question is being begged; since where a thing is not, there it cannot act; for certainly nobody is going to agree that what he does not grant to move at all nevertheless goes to some location.

Some, however, say that "location" is used ambiguously: in a broad sense to denote, for example, my house, and in an exact sense to denote, say, the air enveloping the surface of my body. Then what is moved is said to be moved in a location, not in the exact sense but in the broad sense. Against these people it is possible to say, dividing up the broad-sense location, that in one part of it the body said to be moved is properly located (i.e., in the exact-sense location), but that it is not in the other part (i.e., in the remaining parts of the broad-sense location); and then, arguing that nothing can be moved in the *186* location where it is or in a location where it is not, to conclude that it is not even possible for a thing to be moved in what is called, in the broad but not strictly correct sense, a "location," for the latter is composed of the exact location where the thing is and the exact locations where it is not, and it is been shown that a thing cannot move in any of these.

The following argument needs to be brought up, too. If something moves, either it moves step by step or over a divisible distance all at once; but it is not possible for something to move step by step, nor over a divisible distance all at once, as we shall show; therefore, nothing moves.

That it is not possible for something to move step by step is immediately apparent. For if the bodies and the locations and times in which they are said to move are divided to infinity, motion will not occur, as it is impossible to find among an infinite number any first thing, from where the thing said to be moved will initially be moved. And if the division of the aforesaid things (bodies, locations and times) ends in indivisible parts, and each of the things moved traverses in like manner the first indivisible portion of the location in the corresponding first indivisible portion of the time, then all things in motion will go at equal velocity – for example, the fastest horse and the tortoise; which is even more absurd than the former case. Therefore, motion does not take place step by step.

But neither does it occur over a divisible distance all at once. For if, as they say, non-evident things ought to be evidenced by the appearances, then, since in order for someone to travel over the distance of a stade he must first travel over
the first part of the stade, and secondly over the second part, and the other parts likewise, so also everything that moves ought to move step by step; for certainly if that which moves were said to go through at once all the parts of the location in which it is said to move, it will be in all parts of that location at once, and if one part of the location through which it moves is cold and one part is hot, or one part, say, is black and one part is white in such a way as to color the things that happen to be there, the object in motion will be simultaneously cold and hot or black and white; which is absurd. Next, let them say how much of a given location the moving thing goes through all at once. For if they are going to say that it is an indefinite amount, they will be admitting the possibility of something moving through the whole earth at once; but if they avoid this, let them define for us the amount of the location. But trying to define accurately the location beyond which it will not be possible for the object in motion to proceed even the slightest distance all at once is, I think, not only arbitrary and rash or even ridiculous, but it throws us again into the original *aporia*; for all things will have equal velocity if indeed each of them makes its transitional movements in like manner through accurately defined so locations. And if they are going to say that the thing in motion moves all at once through a small but not accurately defined location, it will be possible for us, in accord with the Sorites *aporia*, always to add a tiny amount to the given amount of location. If, then, they will take a stand anywhere when we are making such an argument, they will fall again into that humbug about accurately defined location; and if they accept the process of addition, we shall force them to agree that it is possible for something to move all at once over *187* the whole earth. So that the things said to move do not move through a divisible location all at once. And if something moves through a divisible location neither all at once nor step by step, it does not move at all.

Those who deny transitional motion make these points and still more. But we, being unable to dismiss either these arguments or the appearance on the basis of which people assert the existence of motion, suspend judgment (in view of the antithesis of the appearances and the arguments) concerning whether motion exists or does not exist.

11. Increase and Diminution
Using the same reasoning we also suspend judgment about both increase and diminution, for "obviousness" seems to support their existence, while arguments seem to refute it. For consider: The growth in size of that which increases must occur while it is existing as a substance, presumably, so that it will be false for anyone to say that a thing increases when something else is added to it. Since, then, substances are never stable but are always in flux, with parts supplanting parts, the thing that is said to have increased does not possess both its previous substance and, together with this, the added substance, but a wholly different one. Just as if, for example, when there is a three-cubit pole somebody should bring a ten-cubit pole and say that the three-cubit pole bad increased, what he said would be false because the one is wholly different from the other, so also in every case of so-called "increase," where the former material is flowing away and the other is supplanting it, if the so-called "addition" is really added, one would not say that such a condition is increase but rather that it is complete alteration.

The same argument applies also to diminution; for how would something be said to diminish if it did not as a whole maintain its substance? Besides, if diminution takes place by the subtraction of something, and increase by addition, and there is no such thing as addition or subtraction, there will not be any such thing as diminution or increase.

12. Subtraction and Addition

That there is no such thing as subtraction, they argue as follows. When something is subtracted from something, either the equal is subtracted from the equal, or the greater from the lesser, or the lesser from the greater. But subtraction does not take place in any of these ways, as we shall show; therefore, subtraction is impossible.

That subtraction does not take place in any of the aforementioned ways is evident from the following. What is subtracted from something must, before the subtraction, be included in that from which it is subtracted. But the equal is not included in the equal, for example, six in six; for that which includes must be greater than what is included, and that from which something is subtracted must be greater than what is subtracted, in order that something be left over after the subtraction; for just in this respect does subtraction seem to differ from
complete abolition. Nor is the greater included in the lesser, for example, six in five, for that is absurd. And for the following reason the lesser is not included in the greater, either. For if five were included in six, as less in more, then also four is going to be included in five, three in four, two in three, and one in two. So six will contain five, four, three, two, and one, and these when taken together come to 15, which, on the supposition that the lesser is included in the greater, has to be included in six. And similarly, 35 is included in 15, which is included in six – and so on, step by step, to infinity. But it is absurd to say that infinitely many numbers are included in the number six. Therefore, it is also absurd to say that the lesser is included in the greater. So if what is subtracted from something must be included in that from which it is going to be subtracted, and the equal is not included in the equal, nor the greater in the lesser nor the lesser in the greater, then nothing is subtracted from anything. Moreover, if something is subtracted from something, either a whole is subtracted from a whole, or a part from a part, or a whole from a part or a part from a whole. But it is plainly absurd from the start to say that a whole is subtracted either from a whole or from a part; and so the remaining possibilities are to say either that a part is subtracted from a whole or from a part; which again is absurd. For example (basing the argument on the case of numbers, for clarity), consider ten and let a unit be said to be subtracted from it. Now this unit cannot be subtracted from the whole ten nor from the part of ten left over, that is, ning, as I shall show; therefore, it is not subtracted at all.

For if the unit is taken from the whole ten, then, since the ten is neither something other than the ten units nor one of the units, but the aggregate of the units, the given unit ought to be subtracted from each of the units in order to be subtracted from the whole ten. But certainly nothing can be subtracted from a unit. For the units are indivisible; and hence the given unit will not be subtracted in this way from the ten. And even if somebody should grant that the unit was subtracted from each of the units, the unit will have ten parts and having ten parts will be ten. But also, since ten other parts have been left over, after the subtraction of the ten parts of the unit just mentioned the ten will be twenty. But it is absurd to say that one is ten and ten is twenty, and that the indivisible is divisible, as they claim. Therefore, it is absurd to say that the unit is subtracted from the whole ten.
92 Nor is the unit subtracted from the remaining ning; for that from which something is subtracted does not remain complete and entire, while the ning does remain complete and entire after the subtraction of that unit. And besides, since the ning is nothing other than the ning units, if it should be said that the unit is subtracted from all ning, there will be a subtraction of ning; and if from a part of the ning – say, eight – the same absurdities will follow, and if from the ultimate unit, they will be saying that the unit is divisible, which is absurd. 93 So, then, the unit is not subtracted from the ning, either. But if it is subtracted neither from the whole ten nor from a part of it, it is not possible for a part to be subtracted from a whole or a part. If, then, nothing is subtracted as a whole or a part from a whole or *189* a whole from a part or a part from a part, nothing is subtracted from anything.

Furthermore, they consider addition, too, to be impossible. For what is added, they say, is either added to itself or to what existed beforehand, or to the combination of both; but none of these alternatives holds; therefore, nothing is added to anything. For example, suppose that there are four cups of something, and let a cup be added. To what, I ask, is it added? For it cannot be added to itself, since what is added is other than that to which it is added, and nothing is other than itself. Nor is it added to the combination of itself and what subsisted beforehand, that is, of the four cups and the cup. For how could something be added to what does not yet exist? Besides, if ‘the added cup is mixed with the four cups and the one cup, a six-cup quantity will result from the four cups and the one cup and the added cup. But if the cup is added to the four cups alone, then, since that which is spread out over something is equal in extent to that over which it is spread out, the cup spread out over the four-cup quantity will double it, so that the whole quantity will be eight cups – which is contrary to what is observed. If, then, what is said to be added is added neither to itself nor to what existed beforehand nor to the combination of both, and there is no alternative besides these, then nothing is ever added to anything.

13. Exchange
Exchange, too, is covered along with the existence of addition, subtraction, and local motion, for it is the subtracting of something and the addition of something, in a shift.

14. Whole and Part

And both whole and part are covered. For the whole seems to come into being by the aggregation and addition of the parts, and to cease from being the whole by the subtraction of one or more of them. Furthermore, if there is such a thing as a whole, either it is other than its parts or else the parts themselves are the whole. But the whole appears to be nothing other than the parts, for surely when the parts are taken away nothing is left that would permit us to reckon the whole as something other than these parts. But if the parts themselves are the whole, "the whole" will be a mere name, that is, an empty appellative, and the whole will have no individual existence, just as there is no such thing as separation apart from the things separate or a roof apart from the components that have been made into the roof. Therefore, there is no such thing as a whole.

Nor are there any such things as parts, either. For if there are parts, either they are parts of the whole or of one another or each of itself. But they are not parts of the whole, since it is nothing else than the parts (and besides, on this basis the parts will be parts of themselves, since each of the parts allegedly serves to complete the whole), nor of one another, since a part seems to be included in that of which it is a part, and it is absurd to say that the hand, for example, is included in the foot. But neither will each be a part of itself; for because of the inclusion something will be both greater and less than itself. If, then, the things said to be parts are parts neither of the whole nor of themselves nor of one another, they are not parts of anything. And if they are not parts of anything, they are not parts; for relative things stand or fall together.

Let this much be said, just by way of digression, since we have considered whole and part once before.

15. Natural Change
And some, using arguments such as the following, say that so-called "natural change" too does not exist. If something changes, what changes is either a body or incorporeal; but each of these alternatives leads to aporia; therefore, the account of change is aporetic. If something changes, it changes by some action of a cause and by being a thing that is acted upon. But it does not change by being a thing that is acted upon, for the existence of causes has been refuted, whereby the existence of what is acted upon is also refuted, as there is nothing by which it is acted upon. Therefore, nothing changes at all. Again, if something changes, either what is changes or what is not. But what is not does not exist and thus cannot be acted upon or act, and so it does not allow of change. But if what is changes, either it changes insofar as it is in being, or insofar as it is not in being. But insofar as it is not in being, it does not change, for, not being, it is not. But if it changes insofar as it is in being, it will be other than being in being, that is, it will not be in being. And it is absurd to say that what is is not in being; therefore, what is does not change, either. And if neither what is nor what is not changes, and there is nothing else, it only remains to say that nothing changes.

Some people say also the following things. Whatever changes has to change in some time, but nothing changes in the past nor in the future nor yet in the present, as we shall show; therefore, nothing changes. Now nothing changes in the past or future, for neither of these is present, and it is impossible to do anything or to be acted upon at a time that does not exist, that is, is not present. But it does not change in the present, either. For the present time, I think, is also nonexistent, and, even if we set this aside for now, it is indivisible; and it is impossible to suppose that a piece of iron, for instance, changes in an indivisible time from hard to soft, or that any of the other changes takes place, for they appear to require some continuation of time. If, therefore, nothing changes either in the past time or in the future or in the present, it must be said that nothing changes.

In addition to these points, if there is change it is either sensible or intelligible. But it is not sensible, for the senses are simply passive, while change seems to involve simultaneous awareness of both that from which it changes and that into which it is said to change. And if it is intelligible, then, since there is an unresolved controversy among the ancients concerning the existence of intelligibles, as we have already pointed out many times, we shall be unable to make any assertion about the existence of change. *191*
16. Generation and Destruction

Both generation (coming into being) and destruction are eliminated together with addition and subtraction and natural change. For apart from these nothing would be generated or destroyed. For example, it is by the destruction of the ten that a nine is generated, as they say, when a unit is taken away, and conversele by the addition of the unit the ten is generated from the destruction of the nine; and by natural change the rust is generated as the bronze is destroyed. So that when the aforementioned changes are eliminated it is necessary I think, that generation and destruction are eliminated, too.

But nevertheless some people say also the following. If Socrates came into being, either he came into being at a time when he did not exist or at a time when he already existed. But if he were said to have come into being when he already existed, he would have come into being twice; while if he came into being when he did not exist, then simultaneously he existed and did not exist - by his having come into being he existed, but by hypothesis he did not. And if Socrates died, he either died when he was living or when he was dead. But when he was living he did not die, since he would have been both living and dead, nor did he die when he was dead, since he would have died twice. Therefore, Socrates did not die. By applying this argument to each case of something said to come into being or to be destroyed, it is possible to eliminate generation and destruction.

Moreover, some reason thus: If something comes into being, either what is comes into being, or what is not. But what is not does not come into being. For nothing, including coming into being, happens to what is not. Nor does what is come into being. For if what is comes into being, either it comes into being insofar as it is in being or insofar as it is not in being. But insofar as it is not in being, it does not come into being. And if it comes into being insofar as it is in being, then, since they say that what comes into being becomes one thing from being another, what comes into being will be other than what is in being, that is, will not be in being. Therefore, what comes into being will not be in being, which is nonsense. If, then, neither what is nor what is not comes into being, nothing at all comes into being.
For the same reasons, nothing is destroyed. For if something is destroyed, either what is or what is not is destroyed. But what is not is not destroyed, for it is necessary that what is destroyed be acted upon. What is is not destroyed, either. For either it is destroyed while it remains in a state of being, or while it does not so remain. And if it is destroyed while it remains in a state of being, the same thing will simultaneously be in a state of being and in a state of nonbeing. For since it is not destroyed insofar as it is in a state of nonbeing but rather insofar as it is in a state of being, it follows that, on the one hand, insofar as it is said to have been destroyed it will be other than what is and therefore in a state of nonbeing, while on the other hand, insofar as it is said to be destroyed while remaining in a state of being, it will be in a state of being. But it is absurd to say that the same thing is both in a state of being and in a state of nonbeing; therefore, what is is not destroyed while it remains in a state of being. And if what is is destroyed while it does not remain in a state of being, *192* but at first passes into nonbeing and then in this way is destroyed, it will no longer be what is that is destroyed, but rather what is not – which we have shown to be impossible. If, then, neither what is is destroyed nor what is not, and besides these there is nothing else, nothing is destroyed.

It will suffice in an outline to have made these points about the changes – points from which it follows that the physical theory of the Dogmatists is not factual and is even unintelligible.

17. Rest

115 On the same basis some have been perplexed about permanence in nature, saying that what is in motion is not at rest. But every body is continuati in motion, according to the assumptions of the Dogmatists, who say that everything is in flux and is always undergoing divisions and additions – thus, Plato does not even call bodies "beings," but only "things that are coming into being," and Heraclitus likens the mobility of our everyday matter to the swift 116 flow of a river. Therefore, no body is at rest. What is said to be at rest is thought to be constrained by the things around it, and what is constrained is acted upon; but nothing is acted upon, since causes do not exist, as we have shown. Therefore, nothing is at rest.
And some people also propound the following argument. What is at rest is being acted upon, and what is acted upon is moved; therefore, what is said to be at rest is in motion; but if it is in motion it is not at rest. From these considerations it is plain that not even the incorporeal is at rest. For if what is at rest is being acted upon, and being acted upon is a property of bodies, if anything, and not of incorporeal things, nothing incorporeal can be acted upon or be at rest. Therefore, nothing is at rest.

So much for the subject of rest. And since each of the aforementioned items cannot be conceived without location and time, we must pass to a consideration of these. For if we show that these are nonexistent, then through them each of the others, too, will be nonexistent. Let us begin with location.

18. Location

The word "location" is used in two ways, striati and loosely-loosely in a broad sense (e.g., my location is the city), and strictly for what exactly contains us and by which we are enclosed. We are now inquiring about the exact type of location. Some people have affirmed and others have denied the existence of this, and some have suspended judgment about it. Of all these, those who say that it exists take refuge in "the obvious." For, they say, who will assert that there is no such thing as a location when he sees its parts, such as right and left, up and down, before and behind, and when he is here at one time and there at another, and sees that where my teacher was conversing, there I am conversing now, and when he apprehends that things naturally light have a different location from those that are naturally heavy, and, further, when he hears the ancients [Hesiod] saying "For verily, first of all chaos came into being"? For they say that the totality of locations is called chaos from its capacity to contains the things that come to be in it. And if there is such a thing as a body, they say, there will also be a location. For without this there would be no body. And if there is the "by which" and the "from which," there is also the "in which," which is a location. But the antecedents of both of the aforementioned conditionals hold; therefore, the consequents of both of them hold, too.

Those who abolish locations do not grant that the parts of locations exist; for a location, they say, is nothing other than its parts, and whoever trics to infer
that locations exist by assuming that their parts exist is seeking to establish the point at issue by means of itself. Similarly foolish, they claim, are those who say that something is or has been in some location, when location in general has not been granted. Such people, they say, assume also the existence of bodies, which has not been granted without question besides which, the "from which" and the "by which," like locations, have been shown not to exist. They claim also that Hesiod is not a trustworthy judge of philosophical matters. And while thus disposing of the considerations tending to support the existence of locations, they also establish in a more complex way that these do not exist, by using in addition what seem to be the most weighty views of the Dogmatists about locations, namely those of the Stoics and Peripatetics, in the following way.

The Stoics say that a void is that which is capable of being occupied by an existent thing, but is not so occupied, or that it is an interval empty of body, or an interval not occupied by a body, and that a location is an interval occupied by an existent thing and equal in extent to what occupies it (here meaning by "existent thing" the body), and that a space is an extension partly occupied by a body and partly unoccupied, though a few say that a space is the location of a large body, so that the difference between location and space is in size. Then it is argued as follows. When the Stoics tell us that a location is an interval occupied by a body, in what sense do they say that it is an interval? Is it the length of the body or the width or the depth only, or the three dimensions together? For if it is only one dimension the location will not be equal in extent to that of which it is the location; besides, that which includes will be part of what is included, which is wholly nonsensical. And if the three dimensions together, then, since in the so-called "location" there exists neither a void nor some other body having dimension but only the body said to be in the location, which body is composed of the dimensions (for it is length and breadth and depth and hardness, the last of which is said to be an accident of the first three), the body itself will be its own location, and the same thing will be containing and contained, which is absurd. Therefore, there exists no dimension of an existing location. For this reason, there is no such thing as a location.

And the following argument, too, is put forward. Seeing that the dimensions are not found to be twofold in each of the things said to be in a location, but there is one length and one width and one depth, are these dimensions of the body only
or of the location only or of both? If they are of the location only, the body will not have any particular length, breadth or depth, so that the body will not be a body, which is absurd. And if of both, then, since the void has no subsistence aside from the dimensions, if the dimensions of the void exist in the body and serve to compose the body itself, what composes the void will also be what composes the body. For concerning the existence of solidity nothing can be firmly maintained, as we have shown above; and since as regards the so-called "body" only those dimensions appear which are of the void and are identical with the void, the body will be a void; which is absurd. And if the dimensions are of the body only, there will be no dimension of the location, whence there will be no location. If, then, no dimension of location is found in any of the aforementioned ways, there is no such thing as a location.

In addition to these points it is said that when the body enters the void and a location comes into being, either the void remains or withdraws or is destroyed. But if it remains, the same thing will be both full and empty, and if it withdraws by a transitional movement or is destroyed by change, the void will be a body, for these pathē are characteristic of a body. And it is absurd to say that the same thing is both empty and full, or that the void is a body. Therefore, it is absurd to say that the void can be occupied by a body and become a location. For these reasons, the void too is found to be nonexistent, if indeed it is impossible for it to be occupied by a body and to become a location; for it was said that a void is what is capable of being occupied by a body. And space is eliminated together with these; for if it is a large location it is dealt with along with location, and if it is a dimension that is partly occupied by a body and partly empty, it is eliminated together with both of those.

These arguments, then, and still more, are directed against the views held by the Stoics as regards location. Now the Peripatetics define location as the boundary of what encloses, insofar as it encloses, so that my location is the surface of the air that forms a mold of my body. But if this is what location is, the same thing will both be and not be. For when the body is about to come to be in some location, it is necessary that the location exist beforehand so that the body can come to be in it, since nothing can come to be in that which does not exist; thus, the location will exist before the body comes to be in it. But insofar as the location is brought about when the surface of the enclosing material forms a mold
of what is enclosed, it is not possible for the location to subsist before the body's coming to be in it, and for this reason it will not exist at that time. But it is absurd to say that the same thing both does and does not exist; therefore, a location is not "the boundary of what encloses, insofar as it encloses."

Furthermore, if there is such a thing as a location, either it is created or it is non-created. But it is certainly not non-created, for, they say, it is brought about by being molded around the body in it. But neither is it created, for if it is created, then either the location in which the body-in-location is already said to be comes into existence when the body is in the location, or when the body \[133\] is not in the location. But it cannot be when the body is in the location (for the location of the body in it already exists), nor when the body is not in the location, since, as they say, what encloses is molded around what is enclosed, *195* and in that way the location comes into existence, and nothing can be molded around what is not in it. And if a location does not come into existence either when the body is in the location or when it is not, and besides these no other alternative is conceivable, the location is not created. And if it is neither created nor non-created, it does not exist.

It is also possible to state these points in a more familiar way. If there is \[134\] such a thing as a location, either it is a body or it is incorporeal. But each of these alternatives is aporetic. So too, therefore, is the concept of location. Again, a location is conceived in relation to the body of which it is the location; but the account of the existence of bodies is aporetic; and therefore so is the account about locations. The location of each thing is not eternal, but since there is no such thing as generation, if the location is said to come into being, it turns out to be nonexistent.

It is possible to give still more arguments, but in order not to lengthen our account, let it just be added that while the arguments give pause to the Skeptics, "obviousness," too, makes them uncomfortable. Consequently, insofar as it is a matter of what is said by the Dogmatists, we join neither side but instead suspend judgment about location.

19. Time
We feel the same way about the question of time, too, for insofar as we go by the appearances there seems to be such a thing as time, while if we go by the things said about it, it appears not to exist. Some people define time as the dimension of the motion of the whole (and by "the whole" I mean the cosmos), and others as that motion itself; Aristotle, or as some say, Plato, defines it as the amount of before and after in motion; Strato, or as some say, Aristotle, defines it as the measure of motion and rest; and Epicurus, according to Demetrius the Laconian, as an event made up of events, accompanying days and nights, seasons, pathé and the opposite, motions and rests. As regards substance, some— for example, the followers of Aenesidemus— have said that time is a body (claiming that it does not differ from Being and Primary Body), and some have said that it is incorporeal. Either all these positions are true, or all are false, or some are true and some are false; but they cannot all be true (for they are mostly inconsistent), nor will the Dogmatists admit that they are all false. And besides, if it were granted false that time is a body, and also false that it is incorporeal, it will automatically be granted that time does not exist; for besides these alternatives there is no other possibility. Nor, in view of the equipollent disagreement and the aporia concerning Criterion and Proof, is it possible to apprehend which positions are true and which are false. For these reasons, therefore, we shall be unable to maintain anything firmly about time.

Moreover, since time seems not to exist without motion and rest, time is abolished when motion and rest are eliminated. But nevertheless some people make also the following points concerning time. If time exists, either it is finite or infinite. But if it is finite, it began at some time and will come to an end at some time, and for that reason there was once a time when time did not exist, namely, before it began, and there will be a time when time will not exist, namely, after it comes to an end; which is absurd. Therefore, time is not finite. But if it is infinite, then, seeing that part of it is said to be past, part present, and part future, either the past and future exist or they do not. But if they do not exist, and only the present, which is momentary, remains, time will be finite and the original aporiai will follow. On the other hand, if the past and future do exist, each of them will be present. But it is absurd to call past and future time "present." Therefore, time is not infinite, either. And so, if it is neither infinite nor finite, it does not exist at all.
In addition, if time exists, it is either divisible or indivisible. But it is not indivisible. For, according to the Dogmatists, it is divided into the present and the past and the future. Nor is it divisible, for anything divisible is measured by some part of itself, the measuring part being put alongside what is being measured, part by part, as when we measure a cubit with a finger. But time cannot be measured by any of its parts. For if, say, the present measures the past, it will be put alongside the past and for this reason will be past; and, similarly, in the case of the future it will be future. And if the future should measure the others, it will be present and past; and so, likewise, the past will be future and present which is nonsense. Therefore, time is not divisible, either. But if it is neither indivisible nor divisible, it does not exist.

Also, time is said to be tripartite, that is, partly past, partly present, and partly future. Of these, the past and the future do not exist. For if past and future time exist now, each will be present. Nor does the present time exist, either. For if it does exist, either it is indivisible or divisible. But it is not indivisible, since things that change are said to change in the present time and nothing changes—like iron becoming soft, etc.—in an indivisible time. Thus the present time is not indivisible. But neither is it divisible. For it would not be divided into presents, as the present is said to change into the past imperceptibly because of the swift flux of things in the cosmos. Nor would it be divided into past and future; for that way it will be nonexistent, with one part of it no longer existent and the other part not yet existent. Whence, too, the present cannot even be the termination of the past and the beginning of the future, since then it will both exist and not exist. For it will exist since it is present, but it will not exist since its parts do not exist. Therefore, it is not divisible, either. But if the present is neither indivisible nor divisible, it does not even exist. And if neither the present nor the past nor the future exists, there is no such thing as time, since a composite of nonexistent is nonexistent.

The following argument, too, is given against time. If time exists, either it is liable to generation and destruction or it is immune to these. But it is not immune to generation and destruction, since part of it is said to be past and no longer to exist, while part of it is said to be future and not yet to exist. Nor, on the other hand, is it liable to generation and destruction. For, according to the hypotheses of the Dogmatists themselves, things that come into being must come into being
from something that exists, and things that are destroyed must be destroyed into something that exists. So, if time is destroyed into the past, it is destroyed into a nonexistent, and if it comes into being from the future, *197* it also comes into being from a nonexistent, for neither of these exists. But it is absurd to say that something comes to be out of a nonexistent or is destroyed into what does not exist. Therefore, time is not liable to generation and destruction. And if it is neither immune nor liable to generation and destruction, it does not exist at all.

On top of this, since everything that comes into being seems to come into being in time, if time comes into being, it comes into being in time. Now either it comes into being in itself or in another time. But if in itself, the same thing will both exist and not exist. For since that in which something comes into being must exist before that which comes into being in it, the time that is coming into being in itself, insofar as it is coming into being, does not yet exist, but insofar as it is coming into being in itself, does already exist. Therefore, it does not come into being in itself. But neither does it come into being in iso another time. For if the present time comes into being in the future time, the present time will be future, and if in the past time, it will be past. And the same must also be said concerning the other times. So that one time does not come into being in another time. But if it neither comes into being in itself nor in another time, time is not liable to generation. And it has been shown that it is not immune to generation, either. Therefore, being neither liable nor immune to generation, it does not exist at all; for everything that exists is bound to be either liable or immune to generation.

20. Number

Since time seems not to be found apart from number, it will not be out of place to give a brief discussion of number, too. Now as a matter of custom we speak (in a manner free of doctrine) of numbering something, and we bear that there is such a thing as number; but the sophistry of the Dogmatists has provoked arguments against this, too. For example, the Pythagoreans even claim that numbers are elements in the cosmos. They say, in fact, that the appearances are composite but that the elements must be simple; therefore, the elements are non-evident. But of things non-evident, some, such as atoms and aggregates, are bodies, while others, such as figures and forms and numbers, are incorporeal. Of
these, the bodies are composite, being combinations of length, breadth, depth and resistance, or perhaps weight. Thus the elements are not only non-evident but also incorporeal. But of the incorporeal things, each has a number that is intuited along with it; for it is either one or two or more. On this basis it is concluded that the elements of what exists are non-evident and incorporeal numbers that are intuited along with everything whatever. And not only these, but also the Monad and the Indefinite Dyad that comes into being by the addition of the Monad, and by participation in which the particular dyads become dyads. For they say that it is from these that the other numbers, which are intuited along with the things enumerated, arise, and that the cosmos is established. And they say that the point involves the notion of the Monad, and the line that of the Dyad (for it is considered as lying between two points), and the surface that of the Triad (for they say that it is the sideways flowing of the line to another point lying outside of it), and the body that of the Tetrad, for a body arises through the ascension of the surface up to a point lying above it. And thus they model bodies and the whole cosmos, which they say is ordered in accord with harmonie ratios, namely that of "by fours," which is the interval of a fourth, as eight is to six, and that of "by fives," which is the interval of a fifth, as nine is to six; and that of "by ails," which is the octave, as twelve is to six.

These are their dreams. And they also claim that a number is something other than the things enumerated, arguing that if by definition an animal were, say, one, then a plant, since it is not an animal, will not be one; but a plant is one; therefore, the animal is net one just by being an animal but only in virtue of something that is intuited with it, external to it, and in which each animal participates with the result that it becomes one. Also, if the number is the things enumerated, then since the things enumerated are, say, human beings, cattle and horses, the number will also be human beings, cattle, and horses, and it will be white and black and bearded if the things counted should happen to be such. But all this is absurd; therefore, the number is not the things enumerated, but it has a special existence apart from these, whereby it is intuited along with the things enumerated and is an element.

But when the Pythagoreans had thus concluded that a number is not the things enumerated, the aporia about number came in as a corollary. For it is argued that if there is such a thing as a number, either it is the enumerated things themselves
or it is something else external to these; but the number is not the enumerated things themselves, as the Pythagoreans have proved, nor is it something other than these, as we shall show. Therefore, there is no such thing as a number.

158 That a number is not anything external to the things enumerated, we shall establish, for the sake of clarity, by giving the argument for the case of the Monad [i.e., the abstract number One]. If, then, there is any such thing as the Monad-in-itself, by participation in which each of the participants becomes one, either this Monad will be one or it will be as numerous as its participants. But if it is one, does each of the things said to participate in it participate in all of it, or only in a part of it? For if one human being, say, has all of the Monad, there will no longer be a monad for the one horse to participate in, or the one dog or any of the other things we call "one," just as, supposing that there are a number of naked people and that there is only one cloak, which has been donned by one of the people, the others will remain naked and without a cloak. But if each thing participates in a part of it, then, in the first place, the Monad will have a part – indeed, it will have infinitely many parts, into which it will be divided, which is absurd. And in the second place, just as a part of the Decad, for example, the Dyad, is not a group of ten, so neither will a part of the Monad be a unit, and for this reason nothing at all will participate in the Monad. So the Monad in which the particulars are said to participate will not be one.

160 But if the monads, by participation in which each of the particulars is said to be one, are equal in number to the enumerated things that are called "one," the monads participated in will be infinitely many. And either these participate *199* in a "basic" monad or in monads equal in number to themselves, and are monads for that reason, or else they do not participate but are monads without any participation. For if they can be monads without participation, then every perceptible thing can be unitary without participation in a monad, and so the monad said to be perceived "in itself" is straightway eliminated. But if those monads, too, are monads by participation, either they all participate in one thing or each participates in its own particular thing. And if all in one, each will be said to participate either in a part or in the whole, and the original aporiai will remain; but if each in its own, then a monad will have to be intuited along with each of those monads, and others along with the intuited ones, and so on ad infinitum. If, then, in order to apprehend that there are such things as "monads in themselves,"
by participation in which each existent thing is one, it is necessary to have apprehended an infinite infinity of intelligible monads, and if it is impossible to apprehend an infinite infinity of intelligible monads, then it is impossible to show that there are any such things as intelligible monads and that each existent thing is one, becoming one by participation in its own monad.

Therefore, it is absurd to say that there are just as many monads as there are things participating in them. But if the so-called Monad-in-itself is neither one nor as many as the things participating in it, then it does not exist at all. Likewise, none of the other numbers will exist "in itself," for in the case of every number it is possible to use the argument here presented paradigmatically for the case of the monad. But if the number does not exist in itself, as we have shown, nor is it the things enumerated, as the Pythagoreans have proved, and besides these there is no other alternative, it must be said that there is no such thing as a number.

Further, how do those who think that a number is something other than the things enumerated say that the Dyad arises from the Monad? For when we compine a monad with another monad, either something is added to these monads from outside, or something is subtracted from them, or nothing is either added or subtracted. But if nothing is either added or subtracted, there will not be a dyad. For neither when they were apart from one another did the monads have the Dyad intuited along with them, in accord with their own definition, nor has anything been added to them from outside, just as, by hypothesis, nothing as been subtracted. So that the combination of the monad with the monad will not be a dyad, since no subtraction or addition has taken place. But if a subtraction does take place, not only will there not be a dyad, but the monads will even be diminished. And if the dyad is added to them from outside, in order that a dyad may come to be from the monads, the things seeming to be two will be four; for to start with there exists a monad and another monad, and when a dyad from outside is added, the number four will result. the same argument applies also in the case of the other numbers said to result from combination.

If, then, the numbers said to be combinations of the hasie ones arise neither by subtraction nor by addition nor without subtraction or addition, the genesis of the number said to be in itself and apart from the things enumerated is impossible. But the Dogmatists themselves make it evident that the numbers *200* formed by combination are not really ungenerated, when they say that they are compounded
and generated from the hasie numbers, for example, from the Monad and the Infinite Dyad. Thus, numbers do not exist of themselves. And if the numbers are neither found to exist of themselves nor have their existence in the things enumerated, then, if we go by the subtleties introduced by the Dogmatists, there will be no such thing as a number.

Let it suffice to have said thus much in outline about the so-called Physics part of philosophy.

21. The Ethics Part of Philosophy

There remains the, Ethies part, which is supposed to concern itself with things good, bad, and indifferent. So in order that we may treat this subject, too, in a summary way, we shall inquire into the existence of things good, bad, and indifferenti first setting forth the concept of each.

22. Things Good, Bad, and Indifferent

Accordingly, the Stoics say that the good is "beneficial activity or what is not alien to beneficial activity," meaning by "beneficial activity" virtue and worthwhile action, and by "what is not alien to beneficial activity" the worthwhile person and the friend. For virtue, which is "the ruling part of the soul in a certain state," together with worthwhile action, which is "an activity in accord with virtue," are precisely beneficial activity, and the worthwhile person and the friend are not alien to beneficial activity. And beneficial activity, being the ruling part of the soul, is a part of the worthwhile person. But they say that wholes are not the same as their parts, for a human being is not a hand, nor are they other than the parts, for without the parts they do not exist. Thus they say that wholes are "not alien" to the parts. Hence, since the worthwhile person is a whole in relation to his ruling part, with which they have identifies beneficial activity, they say that he is "not alien" to beneficial activity.

They also declare that "good" has three senses. In one sense, they say, good is that by which it is possible to be benefited, this being the primary good, that is, virtue; in another sense it is that of which being benefited is an accident, I result, for example, virtue and virtuous actions; and in a third sense it is that which is
capable of benefiting, and such are virtue and also virtuous actions and the worthwhile person and the friend, and gods and worthwhile subordinate deities – so that the second signification of "good" includes the first, and the third includes the second and the first. But some define "good" as "that which is choiceworthy for its own sake," and others as "that which assists happiness or supplements it"; where the happy life is, as the Stoics say, "the serene life."

Such things as these are what they say concerning the concept of good. But he who asserts that the good is "what benefits" or "what is choiceworthy for its own sake" or "what contributes to happiness" is not setting before the mind what the good is, but only mentioning one of its accidents, which is to no effect. For either the aforesaid accidents pertain only to the good, or also to other things as well. But if also to other things as well, then these accidents are not, thus extended, definitive of the good; and if only to the good, we cannot get from them a concept of the good. For just as the person who has no concept of horse will not know what neighing is, and cannot acquire the concept of horse by means of this (provided that he has not previously encountered a neighing horse), so also anyone who, because he lacks knowledge of the good, is asking what it is, will not be able to recognize the attribute that belongs properly to it and only to it, so as to be able to form therefrom a concept of the good itself. For one must first learn the nature of the good itself, and then find that it benefits and that it is choiceworthy for its own sake and that it is productive of happiness. And that the aforementioned accidents do not suffice to reveal the concept and nature of the good the Dogmatists make evident by what they do. That the good is beneficial and choiceworthy (wherefore the good is said to be, as it were, revered) and that it is productive of happiness, all, I suppose, will agree; but when they are asked to what these accidents pertain, they plunge into implacable combat, with some saying virtue, some saying pleasure, others absence of pain, and still others something else. But if from the aforementioned definitions it had been brought to light what the good itself is, they would not have been in conflict as though its nature were unknown.

So, those of the Dogmatists who appear to be most esteemed differ in this way about the concept of the good; and they have also differed similarly about the bad, with some saying that the bad is "hurtful activity or what is not alien to hurtful activity," and others that it is "what is to be, avoided for its own sake," and
others that it is "what is produttive of unhappiness." But in setting forth by means of these phrases, not the substance of the bad but only some of its supposed accidents, they fall into the previously mentioned aporia.

They also say that the word "indifferent" is used in three senses – in one, it is applied to that which is the object of neither inclination nor disinclination, such as its being the case that the stars, or the hairs on the head, are even in number. And in another sense, to that which is indeed an object of inclination or disinclination but of inclination or disinclination directed no more to one thing than to another, such as in the case of two indistinguishable four-drachma pieces, when it is necessary to choose one of them, for there is an inclination to choose one of them, but no more this one than that one. In a third sense they say that the indifferent is that which contributes neither to happiness nor to unhappiness, for example, health and wealth; for they say that what can be used sometimes well and sometimes ill is indifferent. They claim to discuss this most of all in their ethies. However, what one ought to think about this concept too is evident from what we have said about things good and bad.

So it is clear that they have not brought us to a conception of any of the aforementioned items; but there is nothing surprising about their faiting in this way when they are dealing with matters that, perhaps, do not exist. Indeed, there are some people who argue on this basis that nothing is by nature good, bad, or indifferent.

23. Is Anything by Nature Good, Bad, or Indifferent?

Fire, which beats by nature, appears to everyone to be produttive of beat, and snow, which cools by nature, appears to everyone to be produttive of cooliness, and all things that are affective by nature affect in the same way those who are, as the Dogmatists put it, "in a natural condition." But, as we shall show, none of the so-called "goods" affects everyone as being good; therefore, there does not exist anything that is good by nature. That none of the so-called "goods" affects everyone in the same way is, the Dogmatists agree, evident. For, not to mention the common people – some of whom consider physical fitness to be good, others sexual intercourse, others glutony, others drunkenness, others gambling, others greed, and still others certain things even worse than those –
some of the philosophers themselves, for example, the Peripatetics, say that there are three kinds of good, and of these some concern the soul, e.g., the virtues, and some concern the body, e.g., health and similar things, and others are external, e.g., friends, wealth, and the like. The Stoics themselves, too,\(^{181}\) say that there are three types of goods; and of these some, e.g., the virtues, concern the soul, and some, e.g., the worthwhile person and the friend, are external, and some, e.g., the person who is worthwhile in relation to himself, neither concern the soul nor are external; but the Stoics claim that those which concern the body and which are said by the Peripatetics to be goods are not goods. And some have welcomed pleasure as a good, whereas some say that it is downright bad, so that one philosopher actually proclaimed: "I had rather be demented than delighted."\(^{182}\)

Hence, if things that move us by nature move everybody in the same way, and we are not all moved in the same way by the things called "good"; nothing is good by nature. Furthermore, in view of their inconsistency it is impossible to give credence to all the positions that have been propounded, or even to any one of them. For anyone who says that we ought to give credence to this position and not to that becomes a party to the controversy, since opposed to him he has the arguments of those who believe oppositely; and so for this reason he himself, along with the rest, will have need of an adjudicator instead of making determinations for the others. And since there is no agreed-upon criterion or proof, he will arrive at epoche because of the unresolved dispute about these things, and thus be will not be able to maintain any firm position as to what the good by nature is.

Again, some say this: the good is either the act of choosing or that which we choose. Now the act of choosing, in its ordinary meaning, is not good; for otherwise we would be in no hurry to get that which we are choosing, in order not to lose the power of continuing to choose it; for example, if seeking after something to drink were good, we would not hasten to obtain it; for when we have enjoyed it we are freed of the seeking. And likewise in the case of hunger and love and the rest. The act of choosing, therefore, is not choiceworthy in itself, if indeed it is not actually disagreeable; for the hungry person hastens to obtain food, so as to get rid of the discomfort of the hunger; and similarly with the lover and the person who is thirsty. But neither is the good the choiceworthy. For this is either external to us\(^{184}\) or in us. But if it is external to us, either it produces in us a
comfortable feeling and a welcome condition and a delightful pathos, or it does not affect us at all. And if, on the one hand, it is not delightful to us, neither will it be good nor will it attract us to choosing it nor will it be choiceworthy at all. But if, on the other hand, there arises in us, from the external object, a gentle condition and an agreeable pathos, the external object will not be choiceworthy for its own sake but for the sake of the condition that arises in us from it; so that what is choiceworthy for the sake of itself cannot be external. But neither is it in us. For it is said to be either in the body only or in the soul only or in both. But if it is in the body only, it will elude our gnósis [i.e., our ability to recognize things as being what they are]. For this ability is said to belong to the soul, and the Dogmatists claim that the body by itself is alogos [languageless, incapable of language]. But if the good is said to extend to the soul, too, it would seem to be choiceworthy via the soul's perception and its pathos of delight, for, according to them, what is determined to be choiceworthy is determined to be such by the intellect and not by the languageless body. There remains the alternative that the good is in the soul only. And, from what the Dogmatists say, this too is impossible. On the one hand, the soul perhaps does not even exist. On the other, even if it does exist, and we go by what they say, it is not apprehended, as I have shown in the section on the Criterion. How, then, would anyone make hold to claim that something takes place in something that he does not apprehend? But, leaving these points to one side, in what way, then, do they say that the good comes into existence in the soul? For surely, if Epicurus posits that the goal is pleasure and says that the soul, like everything else, consists of atoms, there is no way of explaining how in a heap of atoms there can arise pleasure or assent, or a determination that this is choiceworthy and good while that is to be avoided and bad.

24. What Is the So-called "Art of Living"?

Again, the Stoics say that the goods in the soul are certain arts, namely, the virtues. And they say that an art [technē] is "a system of jointly exercised apprehensions," and that apprehensions come into existence in the ruling part of the soul. But how a store of apprehensions, that is, an aggregation of enough of them to produce an art, can come into existence in the ruling part (which, according to them, is breath) is impossible to understand, since breath is fluid and
is supposed to be moved as a whole by each impression. And it is humbug to say that the soul as imaged by Plato is capable of receiving the good – and here I am referring to the blend of indivisible and divisible being and that of the nature of the other and the same, or the numbers. Hence, the good cannot be in the soul, either. But if the good is not the act of choosing, and what is choiceworthy for its own sake does not exist externally and is neither in the body nor in the soul, as I have shown, then nothing at all is good by nature.

Nor, for the reasons stated above, is there anything that is bad by nature. For things that seem to some people to be bad are pursued as goods by others, for example, intemperance, injustice, money grubbing, incontinence, and the like. Hence, if the things that are what they are by nature naturally affect everybody in the same way, whereas the things said to be bad do not affect everybody in the same way, nothing is bad by nature.

Likewise, in view of the controversy about indifferent things, nothing is indifferent by nature. For instance, the Stoics say that of indifferent things some are preferred, some rejected, and some neither preferred nor rejected; preferred are the things having sufficient value, like health and wealth; rejected are the things having insufficient value, like poverty and disease; and neither preferred nor rejected are, for example, extending or bending the finger. But some say that none of the things indifferent by nature are simply preferred or rejected; for every indifferent thing appears, in differing circumstances, sometimes preferred and sometimes rejected. For surely, they say, if the wealthy are being plotted against by a tyrant while the poor are being left in peace, everyone would choose to be poor rather than wealthy, so that wealth becomes a thing rejected. Consequently, since every so-called "indifferent" thing is called "good" by some people and "bad" by others, whereas all alike would consider it indifferent if it were indifferent by nature, nothing is indifferent by nature.

So also, if someone should say that courage is by nature choiceworthy, because lions seem to be naturally bold and courageous, and also bulls, perhaps, and roosters and some human beings, then we reply that on this basis cowardice, too, is one of the things choiceworthy by nature, since deer and hares and many other animals are naturally inclined to it. Furthermore, most human beings are found to be cowardly; for rarely does anyone give himself up to death for the sake of his country... but the great mass of mankind are averse to all actions of that kind.
Along the same lines the Epicureans, too, think they have shown that pleasure is by nature choiceworthy; for the animals, they say, right from birth and when still untrained, are inclined to pleasure and averse to pains. But against these people one can argue that what is productive of the bad is not by nature good. And pleasure is indeed productive of bad things; for pain, which according to them is bad by nature, is bound up with every pleasure. Thus, for example, the drunkard feels pleasure when filling himself up with wine; and the glutton, with food; and the lecher when having immoderate sexual intercourse; but these are productive of poverty and disease, which, as the Epicureans admit, are painful and bad. Therefore, pleasure is not by nature good. And, similarly, that which produces good things is not by nature bad, and pains produce pleasures; for we gain knowledge by hard work, and in this way, too, a person acquires wealth and a loved one, and pains produce health as a by-product. Therefore, hard work is not by nature bad. And if pleasure were by nature good and hard work bad, everybody would be similarly disposed to these, as we have said; but we see in any philosophers choosing hard work and temperance while disdaining pleasure.

Similarly, those who say that the virtuous life is good by nature could be refuted by the fact that some wise people choose a life with pleasure, so that the claim that a thing is by nature of this or that sort is parried by the disagreement among the Dogmatists themselves.

And, in addition to these points, perhaps it may not be out of place briefly to give more specific attention to the assumptions concerning things shameful and not shameful, prohibited and not prohibited, laws and customs, reverence toward the gods, piety as concerns the departed, and the like. For in this way, too, we shall find great anomaly concerning what ought or ought not to be done.

For example, among us sodomy is regarded as shameful, and moreover even illegal, whereas by the Germani, they say, it is not considered shameful but just a customary thing. And it is said that also among the Thebans, in the past, this was not believed to be shameful, and they say that Meriones the Cretan got his name by reference to the Cretans' custom, and some people refer to this the burning affection of Achilles for Patroclus. But is there anything surprising about this, when not only the followers of the Cynic philosophy but also those of Zeno of Citium, namely Cleanthes and Chrysippus, say that this practice is indifferent? Further, to have intercourse with a woman in public seems to us to be shameful,
but it is not considered so by some of the people in India; indeed, they are completely indifferent about having intercourse in public, as we have also heard about the philosopher Crates. Moreover, to make prostitutes of women is for us shameful and most reprehensible, but it is emphatically approved by many of the Egyptians; in fact, they say that those women who have the most lovers wear an ornamental anklet as a sign of something they are proud of. And among some of them the young women, before marriage, gather together a dowry by means of prostitution. We also find the Stoics saying that there is nothing wrong with cohabiting with a prostitute or living off her work.

Again, tattooing seems to us to be shameful and degrading, but many of the Egyptians and Sarmatians tattoo their children. Moreover, for us it is shameful for men to have earrings but for some of the barbarians, for example, the Syrians, it is a sign of high birth. And some, to add further signs of high birth, pierce the nostrils of their children and hang silver or gold rings from them, which nobody among us would do, just as no man here would put on a flowery, floor-length dress, which we consider shameful though the Persians deem it very becoming. And when, at the court of the Sicilian tyrant Dionysius, a dress of that kind was offered to the philosophers Plato and Aristippus, Plato refused it, saying "Since I am male by nature, I could never put on a woman's dress," but Aristippus accepted it, saying, "Even in the Bacchanalia a prudent woman will not be defiled." Thus, even in the case of these wise men, this seemed shameful to one of them and not to the other. And with us it is prohibited to marry one's mother or one's own sister. But the Persians, and especially those of them who are supposed to be wise, namely, the Magi, marry their mothers; and the Egyptians take their sisters in marriage; and, as the poet says,

Zeus spoke to Hera, his sister and wife.
Iliad 18.356

Further, Zeno of Citium says that there is nothing wrong with a man's rubbing his mother's private parts with his own, just as nobody would say that it is wicked for him to rub any other part of her body with his hand. And Chrysippus, also, in his *Politics*, decrees that a father may produce, children by his daughter, and a mother by her son, and a brother by his sister. Plato, more generally, said that
women should be held in common. And Zeno does not disapprove masturbation, though to us it is abominable; and we are informed that others, too, practice this evil as though it were a good.

Furthermore, for us it is prohibited to eat human flesh, but for entire barbarian tribes it is indifferent. Indeed, why should we speak of the barbarians, when even Tydeus is said to have eaten the brain of his enemy, and the Stoics say that there is nothing wrong with eating the flesh of other people or of oneself? And with us it is prohibited to the general public to defile an altar of a god with human blood, but the Laconians whip themselves fiercely on the altar of Orthosian Artemis in order that there be a great flow of blood on the altar of that goddess. Also, some people sacrifice a human being to Cronus, just as the Scythians sacrifice strangers to Artemis; but we think that holy places are polluted when a human being is killed. And among us the law punishes paramours, but for some people having intercourse with the wives of others is an indifferent matter; even some philosophers, too, say that intercourse with another's wife is indifferent.

With us, the law decrees that parents should receive care from their children; but the Scythians kill them when they become more than 60 years old. And what is remarkable about that? – seeing that Cronus cut off his father's genitals with a sickle, and Zeus huried Cronus down to Tartarus, and Athena, together with Hera and Poseidon, tried to put their father in chains. Moreover, Cronus decided to do away with his own children, and Solon gave the Athenians the law concerning extralegal matters, by which he turned over to each individual the decision whether to kill his own children. But with us the laws prohibit the killing of children. The Roman lawgivers also decree that children are servants and slaves of their parents, and that the parents, not the children, have control over the property of the children until the children have bought their freedom; but among other people this has been rejected as tyrannical. Also, it is the law that killers be punished, but often when gladiators kill they are honored. Furthermore, the laws forbid striking free men, but when athletes strike free men, often even killing them, they are thought to deserve honors and crowns. And with us the law decrees that each man shall have one wife, but among the Thracians and Gaetulians (this is a Libyan tribe) each man has many wives. Again, for us piracy is illegal and unjust, but for many of the barbarians there is nothing wrong
with it. In fact, people say that the Cilicians considered it a fine thing, so much so that they deemed those who died in *207* piracy to be worthy of honor. And Nestor, according to the poet, after greeting Telemachus and his comrades, said to them,

Can it be that you are wandering aimlessly, like pirates?
Odissey 3.73

and yet if there were something wrong with piracy, he would not have greeted them in that friendly way, since he suspected that they were that kind of people.

Further, stealing is unjust and illegal for us; yet those who say that Hermes is the most thievish god cause it not to be considered unjust, for how could a god be bad? And some say that the Laconians punished thieves, not for having stolen but for having gotten caught. Also, among many peoples the coward and the man who throws away his shield are punished by law; which is why the Laconian mother, giving the shield to her child as he was going out to war, said, "Either come back with this shield, my son, or on it." But Archilochus, as though praising himself to us for throwing away his shield and fleeing, says,

Some Saïan is gloating over the shield, which I unwillingly
Left in the bush, but I, on the other hand,
Did escape the finality of death.
Frag. 6 Diehl

And the Amazons used to maim their male offspring so as to make them incapable of any manly action, while they themselves kept charge of war; whereas with us the opposite has been regarded as right. Besides, the mother of the gods is favorably disposed toward effeminate people, and the goddess would not have made this judgment if not being manly were by nature bad. 218 Thus, there is a great deal of anomaly as regards both matters of justice and injustice and the excellence of manliness.

There is also a full supply of controversy regarding religion and the gods. For the majority say that gods do exist, but some, like the followers of Diogoras of Melos and Theodorus and Critias the Athenian, say that they do not. And of those
asserting that gods exist, some believe in the traditional gods, and others in those
invented by the Dogmatie systems – for example, Aristotle said that God is
incorporeal and "the boundary of the beavens"; the Stoics, that he is a breath that
pervades even ugly things; Epicurus, that he is anthropomorphie; and
Xenophanes, that he is a sphere having no pathè. And 219 some say that he cares
about our affairs, and others that he does not; for Epicurus; says that what is
blessed and incapable of being destroyed has no concerns of its own nor provides
any to others. Whence some of the common people, too, say that there is one god,
others that there are many and of various shapes; and they descend even to the
suppositions of the Egyptians, who believe in gods that are dog-faced or hawk-
shaped, as well as cows, crocodiles, or what have you.

Whence, too, there is a great deal of anomaly as concerns the sacrificial 220
practices and worship of the gods in general; for things that are holy in some rites
are considered unholy in others. But this would not have been the case if the holy
and the unholy were such by nature. Thus, for instance, nobody would *208*
sacrifice a pig to Sarapis, but people do sacrifice pigs to Herales and Aselepius.
The sacrificing of sheep to Isis is prohibited, but they are offered up with 221
favorable omens to the so-called Mother of the Gods and to other gods. And some
people sacrifice human beings to Cronus, but most think that this is wicked. In
Alexandria they sacrifice a cat to Horus and a beetle to Thetis, which none of us
would do. To Poseidon they sacrifice the horse, with good omens, but to Apollo,
especially the Apollo of Didymus, that animal is odious. 222 It is an act of piety to
sacrifice goats to Artemis, but not to Aselepius. I could mention a whole lot of
other instances similar to these, but I am omitting them since my aim is brevity.
But certainly, if a sacrifice were holy or unholy by nature, it would have been
considered so by all alike.

It is also possible to find instances similar to these in the religious 223
observances having to do with the human diet. A Jew or an Egyptian priest would
rather die than eat pork; for the Libyan it is completely prohibited to taste the
flesh of the sheep; for some of the Syrians, that of the dove; for others, that of
sacrificial victims. And in some rites eating fish is sanctioned; in others, it is
sacrilegious. And, of the Egyptians considered to be wise, some think it impious
to eat an animal's head, others the shoulder, others the foot, and 224 others some
other part. And nobody would bring forward an onion as something to be
dedicated to Zeus Casius at Pelusium, just as no priest of the Libyan Aphrodite would take a taste of garlic. In some rites they avoid mint, in some catnip, and in others parsley. And there are people who say that they would sooner eat their fathers' heads than eat beans. But for still others these things are indifferent. Further, eating dog meat seems to us impious, but some of the Thracians are reported to do this. And perhaps there was such a custom even among the Greeks; thus Diocies, too, prompted by the practices of the Asclepiads, prescribed that puppy meat be given to some of his patients. And some people, as I was saying, eat with indifference even the flesh of human beings, a thing that has been considered by us to be sinful. Yet if religious usages and prohibitions were valid by nature, they would be recognized by everybody alike.

It is possible to make similar observations about reverence toward those who have passed away. Some people, after wrapping the dead up completely, bury them in the ground, considering it sacrilegious to expose them to the light of day; but the Egyptians, removing the entrails, embalm them and keep them above ground with themselves. And the fish-eaters among the Ethiopians throw the dead into the lakes, to be consumed by the fish; but the Hyrcanians put them out as food for the dogs, and some of the Indians do likewise for the vultures. And they say that the Trogiodytes take the dead person to some hilly place and then, tying him bead to foot, laughingly throw stones at him; and when they have covered him with these, they go away. And some of the barbarians sacrifice and eat those who are over sixty years of age, but bury in the ground those who die in their youth. Some peoples burn the dead; of these, some retrieve and bury the bones, while others carelessly leave them strewn about. And it is said that the Persians impale the dead and embalm them with sodium nitrate, and then they bind them up with strips of cloth. And so we see how much trouble other people undergo as concerns the dead. *209*

Also, some people regard death itself as something to be feared and avoided, but others do not. Indeed, Euripides says,

Who knows whether to be alive is really to be dead,  
While to be dead is considered, down below, to be alive?  
Frag. 638 Nauck
And Epicurus says,

Death is nothing to us; for what is dissolved is insensible, and what is insensible is nothing to us. (Ed. Usener, pp. 61.6, 71.6)

They say, too, that if indeed we are composed of soul and body, and death is a dissolution of soul and body, then when we exist death does not (for we are not dissolved), but when death exists we do not (for when the composite of soul and body no longer exists, we do not exist either). And Heraclitus says that both living and dying exist in both our state of life and our state of death; for when we are alive our souls are dead, that is, entombed within us, and when we die the souls revive and live. Further, some people suppose that dying is better for us than living. Thus Euripides says,

For the newborn child, headed for so many evils,
We ought to get together and sing a dirge;
But the dead man, who is done with evil,
We should haul off with rejoicing and shouts of triumph.
Frag. 449 Nauck

The following lines, too, were said from the same point of view. 231

For mortals the best thing is not to have been born at all,
Nor to have looked upon the rays of the fiery sun,
But, if born, to reach the gates of Hades as quickly as possible
And lie buried deep in the earth.
Theognis 425ff.

We know, too, the facts about Cleobis and Biton, which Herodotus relates in the story about the Argive priestess. Also, some of the Thracians are reported to sit around the newborn child and sing a dirge. So, then, death should not be considered something terrible by nature, any more than life should be considered something good by nature. Nor are any of the aforementioned things of this character or that by nature, but all are conventional and relative.
The same type of treatment can be carried over to each of the other customs, which, because of the brevity of our account, we have not here described. And if we are not able immediately to point out the anomaly concerning them, it should be noted that there may well be disagreement concerning them among various peoples that are unknown to us. For just as, even if we did not happen to know of the Egyptians' custom of marrying their sisters, we would not be right in maintaining it to be universally agreed that people should not marry their sisters, so also it is not right to maintain that there is no disagreement about those customs concerning which the anomaly has not been noticed by us, since it is possible, as I was saying, that there is disagreement about them among peoples that are unknown to us. *210*

Thus the Skeptic, seeing so much anomaly in the matters at hand, suspends judgment as to whether by nature something is good or bad or, generally, ought or ought not be done, and be thereby avoids the Dogmatists' precipitancy, and he follows, without any belief, the ordinary course of life; for this reason be has no pathos one way or the other as regards matters of belief, while his pathé in regard to things forced upon him are moderate. As a human being be has sensory pathé, but since be does not add to these the belief that what be experiences is by nature bad, his pathé are moderate. For having in addition a belief like this is worse than the actual experience itself, just as sometimes people undergoing surgery or some other such experience bear up under it while bystanders faint because of their belief that what is going on is bad. Indeed, he who supposes that something is by nature good or bad or, in general, ought or ought not be done, is upset in all sorts of ways. When things he considers bad by nature happen to him be thinks himself pursued by the torments of the Furies, and when be gets possession of things that appear to him to be good, then, because of vanity and the fear of losing them, not to mention concern lest he should land back among the things he considers to be bad by nature, be sinks into a state of extraordinary disquietude. And as for those who say that goods cannot be lost, we shall hold them in check by the aporia having to do with the controversy about that. From all this we reason that if what is productive of the bad is bad and to be avoided, and if confidence that certain things are by nature good and others bad produces disquietude, then assuming confidently that something is naturally good or evil is bad and to be avoided.
It will suffice for the present to have made these points about the good, the bad, and the indifferent.

25. Whether There Is an Art [*Technē*] of Living

238 From what has been said it is evident that there can be no such thing as an art of living. For if there is such an art, it involves the experience of things good, bad, and indifferent; consequently, since these do not exist, there is no art of living, either. Furthermore, since the Dogmatists do not all with one voice specify a particular art of living, but some postulate one art and others another, they land in controversy and in the argument about controversy that 239 I gave in our discussion concerning the good. Yet even if all of them should postulate one art of living—such as the celebrated "prudence" [*phronēsis*] dreamed of by the Stoics and seemingly more convincing that the rest—even so, no less absurdity will follow. For since prudence is a virtue, and only the wise possess virtue, the Stoics, who are not wise, will not possess the art of 240 living. And in general, since according to them it is impossible that there exist an art or skill at all, there will not exist any art of living if we go by what they have to say.

Thus, for example, they say that an art is a system of apprehensions, and that an apprehension is an assent to an apprehensive *phantasia*. But the apprehensive *phantasia* cannot be made out. For not every *phantasia* is *211* apprehensive, nor is it possible to determine which *phantasia* are apprehensive, since we cannot decide simply by means of just any *phantasia* which *phantasia* is apprehensive and which is not, and if we need an apprehensive *phantasia* in order to determine which *phantasia* is apprehensive we fall into an infinite regress, always requiring another apprehensive *phantasia* in order to determine whether the *phantasia* taken to be apprehensive is indeed apprehensive. And 241 also in the following respects the Stoics do not reason correctly in their exposition of the concept of apprehensive *phantasia*, for when they say that an apprehensive *phantasia* is one that arises from what exists, and that the existent is what is such as to produce an apprehensive *phantasia*, they fall into the circularity type of *aporia*. So if, in order for there to be an art of living, there must first be an art, and in order for there to be an art there must be an apprehension beforehand, and in order that there be apprehension it is necessary that assent to an apprehensive *phantasia* be
apprehended, but the apprehensive phantasia cannot be made out, then the art of living cannot be made out, either.

Additionally, the following is argued. Every art seems to be apprehended by means of its own special activity, but there is no activity special to the art of living; for whatever activity somebody might ascribe to it is found to be common to ordinary people as well - for example, honoring parents, returning deposits, and all the rest. Therefore, there exists no art of living. We shall not determine, just on the basis of something said or done by a prudent person, apparently from a prudent condition, that the art of living is "the activity of prudence," as some assert. For the prudent condition itself is not apprehensible, being apparent neither from itself directly nor from its activities; for these latter are common to ordinary people as well. And the claim that by means of the consistency of his actions we apprehend the one who possesses the art of living is the claim of those who overestimate human nature and are wishful thinkers rather than truth-tellers.

For the mood of mortal man
Is like the day, which the father of gods and men brings on.
Odyssey 18, 136-7

There remains the claim that the art of living is apprehended from those activities that the Stoics describe in their books; as these are numerous and similar to one another, I shall set forth just a few as typical examples. Thus, for instance, Zeno, the leader of the sect, in his essays says various things about the treatment of children, and in particular the following: "Have carnal knowledge no more and no less of a favorite child than of a non-favorite, of a female than of a male; for the same things befit and are befìtting to favorite and non-favorite, female and male." And as concerns piety to parents the same man says, referring to the story of Jocasta and Oedipus, that there was nothing sbocking about his rubbing his mother. "And if, when some part of her body was ailing, he had been heipful by rubbing it with his hands, that would not have been shameful; was it shameful, then, if by rubbing other parts he cheered her up and stopped her grief, and produced noble children by his mother?" With these comments Chrysippus, too, agrees. For instance, in his *Politics* he says, "I approve of living in accord with what is, quite rightly, customary amongg many peoples these days, that is,
that the mother has children by her son, the father by his daughter, and brothers by sisters of the same mother." And in the same treatises he introduces cannibatism to us; he actually says "If from the living some part is cut off that is good for food, we should not bury it or get rid of it in some other way, but should eat it in order that from our parts another part may be produced." And in his writings on propriety he says expressly, concerning the burial of parents, "When one's parents pass away, one should use the simplest burials, treating the body, like nails or teeth or hair, as being nothing to us, and we need bestow no care or attention on such a thing as that. Hence, also, if the flesh is good, people should use it for food, just as when one of their own parts, such as a foot, is cut off, it would be appropriate to use it and similar things; but if the flesh is not good, they should either bury it deep and leave it, or burn it up and abandon the ashes, or throw 't away and have no concern fer it, just as with nails and hair."

Most of the Philosophers' statements are of such a sort, but they would not dare to put them into practice unless they lived under a government by the Cyclopes or Laestrygonians. And if they are in every way incapable of carrying out these ideas, and what they do is common to ordinary people, there is no activity that is special to those who are supposed to possess the art of living. If, then, the arts do require to be apprehended through their special activities, and no activity is seen that is special to the so-called "art of living," this art is not apprehended. Consequently, nobody can firmly maintain that it exists.

26. Whether People Acquire the Art of Living

And if the art of living comes to be in people, either it comes to be in them by nature or by means of learning and teaching. But if by nature, then either the art of living arises in them insofar as they are human, or insofar as they are not human. But certainly not insofar as they are not human. And if insofar as they are human, phronésis would belong to all human beings, so that all would be prudent and virtuous and wise. But the Stoics say that most people are bad. Hence, the art of living would not belong to them insofar as they are human. Therefore, it does not belong to them by nature.
Furthermore, since the Stoics claim that an art is a system of apprehensions that are exercised together, they imply that both the other arts and the one under discussion are to be acquired by some kind of experience and learning.

27. Whether the Art of Living Can Be Taught?

But it is not acquired by teaching or learning. For in order that these should exist, three things must first be agreed to exist, namely, the subject taught, the teacher and the learner, and the method of learning. But there is no such thing as any of these. Neither, therefore, is there any such thing as teaching. *213*

28. Whether Anything Is Ever Taught

Now what is taught is either true or false; and if false, it could not be taught; for they say that the false is the nonexistent, and the nonexistent could not be an object of teaching. But neither would it be taught if it were claimed to be true; for in our discussion of the criterion we pointed out that the true does not exist. If, then, neither the false nor the true is taught, and aside from these there is nothing that can be taught (for nobody will claim that while these cannot be taught, he teaches things that are objects of *aporai*), then nothing can be taught. And the matter taught is either an appearance or is nonevident. But if it is an appearance, it will not need to be taught. For appearances appear to everybody alike. But if it is nonevident, then since nonevident things are also not apprehensible because of the unresolved controversy about them, as we have shown many times, it will not be capable of being taught. For how could a person teach or learn something be does not apprehend? But if neither appearances nor nonevident things are taught, nothing is taught.

Again, what is taught is either corporeal or incorporeal. But, according to our argument of a moment ago, neither of these, whether it is an appearance or a nonevident thing, can be taught. Therefore, nothing is taught.

Moreover, either an existent state of affairs is taught, or a nonexistent state of affairs. But a nonexistent state of affairs is not taught, for if it was taught, then, since teaching is considered to be of truths, a nonexistent state of affairs will be true. And, being true, it will exist, for they say that the true is what exists and is
opposed to something. But it is absurd to say that a nonexistent state of affairs exists; therefore, a nonexistent state of affairs is not taught. But \(^{257}\) neither is an existent state of affairs. For if an existent state of affairs is taught, either it is taught insofar as it is existent or insofar as it is something else. But if it is to be taught insofar as it is existent, it will be one of the things that exist, and because of this will not be a thing to be taught; for teaching should proceed from certain things that are agreed upon and are not to be taught. Therefore, an existent state of affairs, insofar as it is existent, is not a thing to be taught. But neither is it a thing to be taught insofar as it is something else. For what \(^{258}\) exists does not have any accident that does not exist, so that if what exists is not taught insofar as it exists, it will not be taught insofar as it is something else, for whatever is an accident of it exists. And besides, whether the existent state of affairs that they will say is taught is an appearance or something nonevident, since it is subject to the aforementioned *aporiai* it will not be a thing to be taught. And if neither what exists nor what does not exist is taught, then there is nothing that is taught.

29. Whether There Is Any Such Thing as a Teacher or Learner?

The foregoing takes care also of the teacher and the learner, although they are \(^{259}\) no less objects of *aporiai* in their own right. For either the skilled [*technitēs*, artist] teaches the skilled, or the unskilled the unskilled, or the unskilled the skilled, or the skilled the unskilled. But the skilled does not teach the skilled, \(^{214}\) for neither of them, insofar as be is skilled, needs learning. But neither does the unskilled teach the unskilled, just as the blind cannot lead the blind. Nor does the unskilled teach the skilled, for that would be ridiculous. It remains to consider the possibility that the skilled teaches the unskilled. But this, too, cannot happen. For it is declared to be wholly impossible that there should even exist such a thing as a skilled person, since nobody is observed to be skilled by nature and right from birth, nor to become skilled from previously being unskilled. For either a single principle, that is, one apprehension, can make the unskilled person skilled, or there is no way. But if one apprehension makes the unskilled person skilled, we can say, in the first place, that an art or skill is not a system of apprehensions; for the person who knows nothing at all would be termed skilled if only he had been taught a single principle of the art in question. And in the second
place, even if somebody should say, of a person who has already mastered certain principles but is unskilled for lack of one more, that if he got that one be would change from unskilled to skilled by a single apprehension, he will be making a capricious assertion. For it is not possible to point out any individual person who is still unskilled but will become skilled by the addition of one principle; nobody knows how to enumerate the principles of a skill so as to be able to say, by counting off the principles already known, how many are left to make up the total number of its principles. Accordingly, knowledge of one principle will not make the unskilled person skilled. And if this is true, then, in view of the fact that nobody acquires all the principles of an art at once but only one by one, if at all (but let us grant that as an assumption), the person said to acquire the principles of the art one by one would not become skilled; for we recall that the knowledge of just one principle cannot make the unskilled skilled. Hence, nobody can become skilled from being unskilled. So that for these reasons there appears to be no such thing as a skilled person or artist. And because of that, no such thing as a teacher, either.

Nor is it possible for the alleged learner to learn and apprehend the principles of an art he does not possess. For just as he who is blind from birth would not, insofar as he is blind, have any perception of color, nor, likewise, he who is deaf from birth a perception of sound, so the unskilled person would not apprehend the principles of the art he does not possess. For if he did, he would be skilled and unskilled in the same things-unskilled, since that is what he is by hypothesis, and skilled, since he apprehends the principles of the art he does not possess. So that the skilled does not teach the unskilled. And if the skilled does not teach the unskilled, nor the unskilled the unskilled, nor the unskilled the skilled, nor the skilled the unskilled, and besides these there are no other possibilities, then there is no such thing as a teacher or a person who is taught.

30. Whether There Is Any Such Thing as a Method of Learning

And if there is no such thing as a teacher or learner, the "method of teaching" disappears, too. It is equally subject to aporiai for the following reasons as well. A method of teaching will proceed either by appeal to obviousness or by discourse. But it will not proceed either by appeal to obviousness or by
discourse, as we shall show; therefore, the "method of learning" is not free of aporiai, either.

For teaching cannot occur by appeal to obviousness, since the obviousness is of things displayed. And what is displayed is apparent to everybody; and what is apparent in that it is apparent is grasped by everybody; and what is grasped by everybody in common is not a thing to be taught; therefore, nothing is taught by appeal to obviousness.

Nor is anything taught by discourse. For this discourse either signifies something or it does not. But if it does not signify anything, it cannot serve to teach anything, either. And if it does signify something, either it signifies by nature or by convention. But it does not signify by nature, because not everybody understands everything he hears; for example, Greeks bearing barbarians and barbarians bearing Greeks. And if it signifies by convention, clearly those who have apprehended in advance the objects with which the several words are associated will be aware of these objects, not by being taught by the words things of which they were ignorant, but by remembering and calling to mind things they already know; but those who need to learn things they do not know and who do not know with which objects the words are associated, will not grasp anything. Consequently there cannot be any such thing as a method of learning. For the teacher needs to produce in the learner the apprehension of the principles of the art that is being taught, in order that thus the learner, apprehending the system of these, may become skilled. But there is no such thing as apprehension, as we have shown previously; therefore, there cannot be any such thing as a method of teaching. And if there is no such thing as a matter taught, nor a teacher nor a learner, nor a method of learning, there is no such thing as learning or teaching.

These, then, are the points typically raised concerning learning and teaching. And one can be similarly aporetic about the so-called "art of living." Thus, for example, we have shown previously that there is no such thing as the matter taught, for example, in this case, prudence; and there is no such thing as a teacher or learner. For either the prudent person will teach the prudent person, or the imprudent will teach the imprudent, or the imprudent the prudent or the prudent the imprudent; but none of these teaches the other; therefore, the so-called "art of living" is not taught. It is superfluous, I suppose, to speak about the other cases; but if the prudent person teaches prudence to the imprudent, and
prudence is the knowledge of things good, bad, and neither, then the imprudent person is ignorant of things good, bad, and neither, and, as be is ignorant of these, he will merely hear what is said when the prudent person is teaching him about these but be will not recognize them for what they are. For if he should grasp them while he is in the state of imprudence, then imprudence, too, will be capable of observing what things are good, bad, or neither. But, according to the Dogmatists, imprudence is certainly not a state conducive to observing these things, since, if it were, the imprudent person would be prudent. Therefore, according to the definition of prudence, the person without it does not grasp the things said or done by the person with it. And not grasping, he would not be taught by him, especially since, as we have shown above, he cannot be taught either by appeal to obviousness or by discourse. But if one cannot come to possess the so-called "art of living" either by learning and teaching or by nature, that art so much vaunted by the philosophers cannot be discovered.

But even if, giving good measure, someone were to go ahead and grant that this dreamed up art of living is present in somebody, it will appear to be hurtful and the cause of disquietude, rather than beneficial, to those possessing it.

31. Whether the Art of Living Benefits Its Possessor

Thus, to take by way of example a few arguments out of many, it might seem that the art of living would benefit the possessor by providing him self-control in his impulses toward the good and away from the bad. the person who they say is a wise man with self control is said to have self control either insofar as he has no impulse toward the bad and away from the good, or insofar as he does have evil impulses toward and from, but masters them with reason. But as regards making bad decisions he would not have self control, for be will not control what be does not possess. And just as one would not say that a eunuch has self-control with respect to sexual pleasures, nor that a person with a bad stomach has self-control with respect to the enjoyment of food (since for such things they have no craving that they can combat by means of self-control), in the same way one ought not say that the wise man has self-control if he has no natural pathos to restrain by his self-control. And if they are going to say that he has self-control insofar as he makes bad decisions but overcomes them with reason, then first of
all they will be granting that prudence was of no benefit to him just when he was perturbed and in need of help, and secondly be turns out to be even more unfortunate than those who are called "wicked." For if he has an impulse toward something, be is certainly perturbed, and if be controls it with reason, he still has the bad in himself, and because of this be is more perturbed than the "wicked" person who no longer has this feeling; for if the latter has an impulse, he is perturbed, but when be gets what be desires, the perturbation ceases.

Thus, insofar as it is up to his prudence, the wise man does not acquire self-control, or if he does, he is the most unfortunate of all, so that the art of living has brought him no benefit but the greatest perturbation. And we have shown previously that the person who supposes that he possesses the art of living and that through it he can recognize which things are good by nature and which evil, is very much perturbed both when he has good things and when evil. It must be said, then, that if the existence of things good, bad, and indifferent is not agreed upon, and perhaps the art of life, too, is nonexistent, and that even if it should provisionally be granted to exist, it will provide no benefit to those possessing it, but on the contrary will cause them very great perturbations, the Dogmatists would seem to be idly pretentious in what is termed the "ethics" part of their so-called "philosophy."

On the subject of ethics, too, we have now gone over as many points as is appropriate in an outline, and here we terminate both the third book and the whole work, The Outlines of Pyrrhonism, adding only the following.

32. Why the Skeptic Sometimes Purposely Puts Forward Arguments Weak in Persuasiveness

Because of his love of humanity the Skeptic wishes to cure by argument, so far as he can, the conceit and precipitancy of the Dogmatists. Accordingly, just as the doctors who treat physical symptoms have remedies that differ in strength, and prescribe the severe ones for people with severe symptoms and milder ones for those mildly affected, so too the Skeptic sets forth arguments differing in strength. And in the case of those who are severely afflicted with precipitancy be employs arguments that are weighty and capable of vigorously disposing of the Dogmatists' symptom of conceit, but in the case of those who have this symptom
in a superficial and easily curable way, and are capable of being restored to health by milder persuasion, he uses the milder arguments. Hence the person motivated by Skepticism does not hesitate to advance at one time arguments that are weighty in persuasiveness and at another time such as even appear weak – he does this purposely, on the assumption that many times the latter suffice for accomplishing his task.

Glossary

| αγωγὴ | way |
| αδηλος | non-evident |
| αδικ'κριτος | indistinguishable |
| αδικ'φορος | indifferent |
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